Truth at the Limits of Conceptual Engineering

Mariona Eiren Miyata-Sturm

doi:10.14394/filnau.2023.0020

Authors

Mariona Eiren Miyata-Sturm University of Oxford, Faculty of Philosophy https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7260-9232

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2023.0020

Keywords:

conceptual engineering, amelioration, truth, concepts, conceptual change

Abstract

Interest in conceptual engineering – the project of evaluating and ameliorating concepts – has increased dramatically in recent years. One still underexplored question is whether there are any limits to conceptual engineering: are some concepts immune to revision or replacement? Here I discuss two arguments to the effect that the concept of truth cannot be engineered. Both are based on a thought experiment by Eklund (2015), who suggests that TRUTH might spell one of the limits of conceptual engineering. He does not give a full-blown argument in favor of this, so the arguments I consider are based on two ways of interpreting his comments. Neither, I argue, supports the claim that TRUTH cannot be engineered.

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