Non-maximalism Reconsidered: Truthmaking and the Dependence of Truths on Being

Błażej Mzyk

doi:10.14394/filnau.2023.0009

Autor

Błażej Mzyk Jagiellonian University, Doctoral School in the Humanities, Institute of Philosophy https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5601-102X

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2023.0009

Słowa kluczowe:

truthmaking, non-maximalism, deflationary truthmaking, dependence of truths on being

Abstrakt

Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. Given the combinations of these positions, I propose a new classification indicating the positions available to a non-maximalist. I argue that one of these positions is particularly worth adopting because of its advantages over the other options.

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Non-maximalism Reconsidered: Truthmaking and the Dependence of Truths on Being

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