Mechanical Representations and a Non-mechanistic Folk Psychology? An Answer to the Critics of „Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych. Perspektywa mechanistyczna”

Abstract

In this paper, I address critical assessments of my book Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych. Perspektywa mechanistyczna (Explaining with Mental Representations. A Mechanistic Perspective). Against Marcin Miłkowski’s critique, I defend the legitimacy of the online/off-line distinction and argue that S-representations constitute the only type of a purely subpersonal representation that unambiguously meets Ramsey’s job description challenge. To answer Paweł Grabarczyk’s remarks, I clarify the distinction between interpreting and consuming representations, as well as explain the role played by this distinction in the argument present in the book. In addressing Witold Hensel’s comments, I argue that my position on folk psychological states (like beliefs and desires) does not boil down to simple instrumentalism, as well as clarify my position about the role that folk psychology plays in cognitive science. To answer the issues raised by Robert Poczobut, I discuss the distinction between factors that are constitutive of folk psychological states and the ones that are causally relevant to them; I use this distinction to clarify my claim that folk psychology lacks significant commitments regarding the mechanistic architecture of the mind.