Corazza's Critique of the Concept of Object-Dependent Thought

Authors

  • Aleksander Latkowski Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw

Keywords:

object-dependent thought, perceptual knowledge, psychological generalization, structured proposition, direct reference

Abstract

The aim of the article is to prove that the concept of an object-dependent thought withstands the critique put forward by Eros Corazza. In the first section of the article I present and elaborate on the concept of object-dependent thought, formulated for the first time by Gareth Evans. In the second section I present Corazza’s criticism of this concept and point to the fact — not emphasized enough by Corazza — that it may be understood in two different ways: methodological and ontological. In the final part of the article I defend the concept of object-dependent thoughts. I show that ontological intuitions are not a sufficient ground for the refutation of the concept, since this would mean that they need to be strengthened with methodological assumptions. Those assumptions however — in the light of my argumentation — do not seem justified.

Published

2016-09-01

How to Cite

Latkowski, A. (2016). Corazza’s Critique of the Concept of Object-Dependent Thought. The Philosophy of Science, 24(3), 43–72. Retrieved from https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/825