Causal Relevancy and Nominalism. A Few Notes on Davidson's Ontology

Authors

  • Mariusz Grygianiec Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw

Keywords:

epiphenomenalism, Davidson, events, properties, causal relation, objection, ontology

Abstract

The paper presents a rejoinder to Katarzyna Paprzycka's critique of my defence of Davidson's ontology. According to Paprzycka the epiphenomenalists objection to the doctrine of anomalous monism, considered as an internal objection, is unquestionably flawed, but when it comes to some external interpretations of the objection in question — it is justified. The text provides a couple of arguments and comments which are intended to show that in most cases the external objection to anomalous monism is in fact either uncharitable or inaccurate, thus unsound one.

Published

2012-03-01

How to Cite

Grygianiec, M. (2012). Causal Relevancy and Nominalism. A Few Notes on Davidson’s Ontology. The Philosophy of Science, 20(1), 109–115. Retrieved from https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/671