Frege, Husserl, Leoniewski and Heidegger. Being in Analytic Perspective

Abstract

The main aim of the paper is paraphrasing Heidegger's category of being in the theoretic framework of Fregean phenomenological semantics. The choice of Fregean phenomenological semantics as the tool of the paraphrase is justified by the fact that philosophy articulated in Sein und Zeit may be interpreted as the modification of Husserl's project of phenomenology which is treated, in turn, as generalisation of Frege's theory of sense and nominatum. So in the paper it is defended that Heidegger's category of being stems from Frege's considerations devoted to basic semantic questions. In the first chapter there are specified in existentialistic language ten principles clarifying the notion of being. In the second part the principles are paraphrased in the phenomenological theory of noema (this category is understood in spirit of the so called Californian interpretation). This move allows us to show how the conception of being is the modification of Frege's and Husserl's semantics. In the last chapters there is reconstructed Heidegger's model of acts of reference. The formal tool of the reconstruction is Leśniewski's formal language (enriched by Ajdukiewicz) with indexes designating ways of existence and referential backgrounds.