Troubles with the Concept of Correspondence

Abstract

The article is an analysis of various versions of the correspondence theory of truth and shows that this theory - in all of its versions - rests on two irreconcilable assumptions. First, according to the theory, the relation between the truth bearer and the truth maker - i.e. the portion of reality which makes the bearer true - is a grounded relation, which means that it holds whenever the elements grounding the relation exist, and that each of the elements may exist independently of the other. Secondly, the correspondence theory of truth explicitly or implicitly presupposes that the truth maker always - i.e. necessarily - makes the truth bearer true. The first assumption implies that truth as a feature of convictions, assertions, judgments, etc. is either impossible or by nature unrecognizable. The second assumption is fulfilled only when the alleged "grounded" relation is replaced by an internal relation of identity between the truth bearer and its truth maker. The thesis that the so-called relation of correspondence between thought and reality is essentially their identity follows - contrary to what is commonly believed - from every version of the correspondence theory of truth that does not lead to either nihilism or scepticism. The author illustrates this fact by means of an analysis of the theories of G. E. Moore, B. Russell, H. Field, B. Smith and A. Newman. All of this paves the way for the identity theory of truth, which nevertheless faces its own difficulties in providing a satisfactory explanation of the existence of falsity.