Epistemic Interests and Relativism

Abstract

This paper considers Adam Grobler's fallibilism as an attractive alternative for both epistemological fundationalism and nihilism. Fallibilism claims that science is only a collection of temporary opinions, which entails rejecting of the idea of justification in aid of establishing critical preferences. In Grobler's thought that role is played by the conclusion to the best explanation (abductionism). Grobler's ideas dismantle the belief that relativity implies relativism. This paper deals with several Grobler's problems, such as theory-ladeness thesis (interpretation of observation), problems of facts, litigation of absolutism with relativism. I claim that problem of epistemic interests should be viewed as theoretical, e.g. considered as an element of our background knowledge, or wider philosophical framework (for example metaphysics). Some formulations of local internal realism are subject to paradox of self-referentiality.