The Problem of Basic Statements as a Test in the Internalism-Externalism Issue

Abstract

The relevance of the Popperian heritage to the internalism-externalism issue is explored. First, the nature of the controversy between Popper and his disciples, Watkins and Zahar, about basic statements is discussed. Popper's resistance to Watkins' and Zahar's elaborations is suggested to be motivated by his implicit antiinternalist attitude that is misnamed by him as antipsychologism. Next, instead of a conventionalist, an externalist reading of Popper's mention about the role of a „scientific jury” in accepting basic statements is offered. It is doubtful, however, whether Popper can be considered an externalist, for he rejects the concept of justified belief altogether. Still, it is suggested that future elaboration of his ideas may help to explain away the circularity apparent in Goldman's reliabilism and arrive at a more tenable form of externalism.