Arguments All the Way Down: Infinitism and Philosophical Method

Max Deutsch

doi:10.14394/filnau.2023.0017

Autor

Max Deutsch The University of Hong Kong, Department of Philosophy https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5979-4189

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2023.0017

Słowa kluczowe:

arguments, intuitions,, intuition denial, infinitism, conceptual engineering, methodology

Abstrakt

The paper presents a methodological regress problem for “intuition deniers,” those philosophers who claim that philosophy does not rely on intuitions as evidence. It then proposes to solve this problem by adopting “methodological infinitism,” a close cousin of infinitism about inferential justification. A proposal to the effect that conceptual engineering might allow methodologists to accept that intuitions are treated as evidence and thus sidestep the methodological regress problem is considered and rejected.

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