Aposterioryczny intuicjonizm etyczny a percepcja moralna

Ignacy Kłaput

doi:10.14394/filnau.2023.0015

Autor

Ignacy Kłaput Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii https://orcid.org/0009-0009-1844-4244

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2023.0015

Słowa kluczowe:

moral perception, a posteriori ethical intuitionism, foundationalism, cognitive penetration, moral skepticism, evolutionary debunking argument

Abstrakt

A posteriori ethical intuitionism is the view that our ethical beliefs can be justified non-inferentially, with such justification acquired through experience. To support this view, one can appeal to moral perception – an ability that enables us to perceive moral properties and thereby provides perceptual justification for our ethical beliefs. In this paper, I analyze various accounts of moral perception and their potential relevance to the foundationalist project of a posteriori ethical intuitionism. The analysis identifies affective intuitionism as the most promising approach in this context. In the remainder of the article, I examine the challenges posed by the cognitive penetration of moral perception. I argue that, for proponents of a posteriori ethical intuitionism, the best response is to acknowledge the existence of certain innate mechanisms underlying moral perception. I also aim to show that such a solution does not necessarily undermine the validity of ethical theory or the importance of ethical development in our moral lives. Finally, I present possible strategies for defending a posteriori ethical intuitionism against the so-called evolutionary debunking argument, which questions the reliability of moral perception.

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