A Hybrid Account of Structural Rationality

Erhan Demircioglu

doi:10.14394/filnau.2024.0001

Autor

Erhan Demircioglu Koç University, Department of Philosophy https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1579-7505

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2024.0001

Słowa kluczowe:

coherence, structural rationality, akrasia, wide scope, narrow scope, rational requirements

Abstrakt

In this paper, I will present and defend a hybrid account of structural rationality, simultaneously accommodating what two rival accounts, wide-scopism and narrow-scopism, get right. Wide-scopism holds that moving from an incoherent state to a coherent state is always a structurally rational thing to do. Narrow-scopism holds that there are cases in which the particular way in which coherence is achieved matters to structural rationality. The hybrid account I offer here holds that these two claims are compatible and true.

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