Conceptual Engineering, Folk Commitments, and Reflective Equilibrium

Yuanfan Huang

doi:10.14394/filnau.2023.0010

Autor

Yuanfan Huang Shanghai Jiao Tong University, School of Humanities, Department of Philosophy https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9144-2063

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2023.0010

Słowa kluczowe:

conceptual engineering, folk commitment, function, reflective equilibrium

Abstrakt

While conceptual engineering aims to revise or improve known concepts, it faces the problem of avoiding changing the subject, known as the discontinuity challenge. Although there are three versions of the discontinuity challenge, this paper focuses on addressing the continuity between folk commitments and philosophers’ concepts. One prevailing solution considered is appealing to the concept’s proper function. This approach uses the concept’s function, a theoretical notion, to solve the discontinuity challenge. However, the functional plan faces the problem of indeterminacy, namely that philosophers can never reach a consensus on a concept’s function. In contrast, this paper proposes a solution based on Lycanian reflective equilibrium. The notion of “folk commitments” in Lycanian reflective equilibrium is too narrow. To address this shortcoming, this paper provides a revised Lycanian reflective equilibrium based on a richer notion of “folk commitments” that includes case intuitions, common sense, and ordinary language usage.

Bibliografia

Anderson S. R. and Lightfoot D. W. (2002), The Language Organ: Linguistics as Cognitive Physiology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613869

Austin J. L. (1956/1957), “A Plea for Excuses,” [in:] Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method, V. C. Chappell (ed.), New York: Dover Publications, 1–30.

Baz A. (2017), The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801887.001.0001

Belleri D. (2021), “Downplaying the Change of Subject Objection to Conceptual Engineering,” Inquiry, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1908161

Brady M. (2013), Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685523.001.0001

Brun G. (2014), “Reflective Equilibrium without Intuitions?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17(2), 237–252. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9432-5

Brun G. (2022), “Re-engineering Contested Concepts: A Reflective-Equilibrium Approach,” Synthese 200(168), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03556-7

Cappelen H. (2018), Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198814719.001.0001

Cappelen H. and McKeever M. (2022), “In Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy 53(2–3), 221–237. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12548

Carlsson U. (2018), “The Folk Metaphysics of Love,” European Journal of Philosophy 26(4), 1398–1409. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12398

Carnap R. (1950), Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carnap R. (1963), “P. F. Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism,” [in:] The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, P. Schilpp (ed.), Lasalle: Open Court, 933–940.

Craig E. (1990), Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

DeRose K. (2005), “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism,” Philosophical Quarterly 55(219), 172–198. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00394.x

Double R. (1996), Metaphilosophy and Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195107623.001.0001

Eklund M. (2015), “Intuitions, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Fixed Points,” [in:] The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, C. Daly (ed.), London: Palgrave Macmillan, 363–385.

Flanagan B. and Hannikainen I. R. (2022), “The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100(1), 165–179. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1833953

Haidt J. (2001), “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108(4), 814–834. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.108.4.814

Hannon M. (2019), What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-first Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190914721.001.0001

Hansen N., Porter J. D., and Francis K. (2019), “A Corpus Study of ‘Know’: On the Verification of Philosophers’ Frequency Claims about Language,” Episteme 18(2), 242–268. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.15

Hardimon M. O. (2017), Rethinking Race: The Case for Deflationary Realism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674978447

Haslanger S. (2020), “How Not to Change the Subject,” [in:] Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variation, T. Marques and A. Wikforss (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803331.003.0013

Hawthorne J., Rothschild D., and Spectre L. (2016), “Belief Is Weak,” Philosophical Studies 173(5), 1393–1404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0553-7

Henson R. G. (1967), “Ordinary Language, Common Sense, and the Time-Lag Argument,” Mind 76(301), 21–33. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXVI.301.21

Jorem S. (2022), “The Good, the Bad, and the Insignificant – Assessing Concept Functions for Conceptual Engineering,” Synthese 200(106), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03548-7

Kitsik E. (2020), “Explication as a Strategy for Revisionary Philosophy,” Synthese 197(3), 1035–1056. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1774-z

Knoll V. (2020), “Verbal Disputes and Topic Continuity,” Inquiry, 1–22. https://doi.org/10. 1080/0020174X.2020.1850340

Koch S. (2023), “Why Conceptual Engineers Should Not Worry About Topics,” Erkenntnis 88(5), 2123–2143. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00446-1

Lycan W. (2019), On Evidence in Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malcolm N. (1964), “Moore and Ordinary Language,” [in:] Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method, V. C. Chappell (ed.), New York: Dover Publications.

Nado J. (2021a), “Conceptual Engineering, Truth, and Efficacy,” Synthese 198 (Suppl. 7), 1507–1527. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02096-x

Nado J. (2021b), “Re-engineering Knowledge: A Case Study in Pluralist Conceptual Engineering,” Inquiry, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1903987

Pinder M. (2021), “Conceptual Engineering, Metasemantic Externalism and Speaker-Meaning,” Mind 130(517), 141–163. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz069

Prinzing M. (2018), “The Revisionist’s Rubric: Conceptual Engineering and the Discontinuity Objection,” Inquiry 61(8), 854–880. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1385522

Queloz M. (2022), “Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem,” Mind 131(524), 1247–1278. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac028

Rawls J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rescher N. (2005), Common-Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition, Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.

Rescher N. (2014), Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective, Lanham: Lexington Books.

Riggs J. (2021), “Deflating the Functional Turn in Conceptual Engineering,” Synthese 199(3), 11555–11586. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03302-5

Rorty R. (1989), Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804397

Rorty R. (2009), Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400833061

Sawyer S. (2018), “The Importance of Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118(2), 127–147. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy008

Schupbach J. N. (2017), “Experimental Explication,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(3), 672–710. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12207

Simion M. and Kelp C. (2020), “Conceptual Innovation, Function First,” Noûs 54(4), 985–1002. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12302

Somerville J. (1986), “Moore’s Conception of Common Sense,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47(2), 233–253. https://doi.org/10.2307/2107438

Strawson P. F. (1963), “Carnap’s Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy,” [in:] The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, P. Schilpp (ed.), Lasalle: Open Court, 503–518.

Sundell T. (2020), “Changing the Subject,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(5), 580–593. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.6

Thomasson A. L. (2020), “A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work,” [in:] Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, A. Burgess, H. Cappelen, and D. Plunkett (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 435–458. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0021

Williamson T. (2007), The Philosophy of Philosophy, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wittgenstein L. (1958), The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Harper and Row.