O pojęciu zdarzenia będącego złamaniem prawa przyrody
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0017Słowa kluczowe:
compatibilism, law-breaking event, Consequence Argument, Peter van Inwagen, David LewisAbstrakt
In this paper, I analyze the concept of an event that breaks a law of nature. My investigations are carried out in the context of David Lewis’s critique of Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. It is argued that Lewis’s definition of a “law-breaking event” is too narrow. I offer an amended definition and explore its consequences for the prospects of van Inwagen’s argument.
Bibliografia
Beebee H. (2003), Local Miracle Compatibilism, „Noûs” 37(2), 258-277. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00438
Earman J. (1986), A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: Reidel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9072-8
Hill C. S. (1992), Van Inwagen and the Consequence Argument, „Analysis” 52(2), 49-55. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/52.2.49
Horgan T. (1985), Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument, „Philosophical Studies” 47(3), 339-356. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355208
Lewis D. (1973), Counterfactuals, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Lewis D. (1979), Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, „Noûs” 13(4), 455-476. https://doi.org/10.2307/2215339
Lewis D. (1981), Are We Free to Break the Laws?, „Theoria” 47(3), 113-121. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x
Lewis D. (1986), Events [w:] Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 241-269. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195036468.003.0008
McKay T. J., Johnson D. (1996), A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism, „Philosophical Topics” 24(2), 113-122. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199624219
Oakley S. (2006), Defending Lewis’s Local Miracle Compatibilism, „Philosophical Studies” 130(2), 337-349. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-4677-4
Schnieder B. S. (2004), Compatibilism and the Notion of Rendering Something False, „Philosophical Studies” 117(3), 409-428. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000016484.52149.52
van Inwagen P. (1975), The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism, „Philosophical Studies” 27(3), 185-199. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01624156
van Inwagen P. (1983), An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
van Inwagen P. (2000), Free Will Remains a Mystery, „Philosophical Perspectives” 14, 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.1
van Inwagen P. (2004), Freedom to Break the Laws, „Midwest Studies in Philosophy” 28(1), 334-350. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00099.x
van Inwagen P. (2017), Author’s Preface to the French Translation of “An Essay on Free Will” [w:] Thinking about Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177-191. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316711101.014
van Strien M. (2014), The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 45(1), 167-185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9241-0
Earman J. (1986), A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: Reidel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9072-8
Hill C. S. (1992), Van Inwagen and the Consequence Argument, „Analysis” 52(2), 49-55. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/52.2.49
Horgan T. (1985), Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument, „Philosophical Studies” 47(3), 339-356. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355208
Lewis D. (1973), Counterfactuals, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Lewis D. (1979), Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, „Noûs” 13(4), 455-476. https://doi.org/10.2307/2215339
Lewis D. (1981), Are We Free to Break the Laws?, „Theoria” 47(3), 113-121. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x
Lewis D. (1986), Events [w:] Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 241-269. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195036468.003.0008
McKay T. J., Johnson D. (1996), A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism, „Philosophical Topics” 24(2), 113-122. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199624219
Oakley S. (2006), Defending Lewis’s Local Miracle Compatibilism, „Philosophical Studies” 130(2), 337-349. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-4677-4
Schnieder B. S. (2004), Compatibilism and the Notion of Rendering Something False, „Philosophical Studies” 117(3), 409-428. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000016484.52149.52
van Inwagen P. (1975), The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism, „Philosophical Studies” 27(3), 185-199. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01624156
van Inwagen P. (1983), An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
van Inwagen P. (2000), Free Will Remains a Mystery, „Philosophical Perspectives” 14, 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.1
van Inwagen P. (2004), Freedom to Break the Laws, „Midwest Studies in Philosophy” 28(1), 334-350. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00099.x
van Inwagen P. (2017), Author’s Preface to the French Translation of “An Essay on Free Will” [w:] Thinking about Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177-191. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316711101.014
van Strien M. (2014), The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism, „Journal for General Philosophy of Science” 45(1), 167-185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9241-0
Pobrania
Opublikowane
2021-10-31
Jak cytować
Kuźniar, A. (2021). O pojęciu zdarzenia będącego złamaniem prawa przyrody. Filozofia Nauki, 29(3), 107–123. https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0017
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Filozofia Nauki | ISSN 1230-6894 | e-ISSN 2657-5868