Filozofia Nauki https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn <p>„Filozofia Nauki” (ang. "The Philosophy of Science") jest kwartalnikiem naukowym wydawanym w Instytucie Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Zamieszcza recenzowane artykuły, polemiki i recenzje obejmujące cały zakres filozofii analitycznej, w tym epistemologię, ontologię, filozofię nauki, filozofię języka, filozofię umysłu, logikę filozoficzną, semiotykę logiczną, prakseologię i kognitywistykę.</p> Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland pl-PL Filozofia Nauki 1230-6894 On the Insufficiency of Taste Expressivism https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1092 <p>It is possible to construct situations (with a suitable kind of setting) in which one speaker utters&nbsp;“This is tasty” and another one responds with “That’s not true.” The aim of this paper is to motivate the idea that typical (broadly) expressivist accounts of taste disagreements are unable to explain such situations (although some of them can successfully explain disagreements in which&nbsp;another kind of dissent phrase — like “Nuh-uh” — is employed). This is because utterances of&nbsp;“That’s not true” are typically used to ascribe falsehood to propositions. Taste expressivism has it,&nbsp;however, that when one utters “This is tasty,” one typically manifests her evaluative attitude&nbsp;(which is non-propositional) toward something rather than describes what attitude she bears toward that thing. Another aim of the paper consists in proposing an alternative account of taste&nbsp;disagreements. It is close to taste expressivism in the case of disagreements in which speakers&nbsp;respond with “Nuh-uh” but departs from it in situations in which they respond with “That’s not&nbsp;true.” The account is developed within a contextualist framework according to which taste utterances express contextually enriched propositions that contain judges who evaluate things as tasty&nbsp;or not.</p> Marián Zouhar ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-10-31 2019-10-31 27 3 5 27 10.14394/filnau.2019.0015 How to Index Visual Contents https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1093 <p>According to the Content View (CV), visual perceptual experiences represent the subject’s surroundings or have representational content. A critical question posed by Charles Travis against&nbsp;CV is how the subject of experiences could index or introspectively ascribe a specific representational content of a given (occurring) visual experience: if her visual experiences incorporate representational contents, how could she ascribe a particular content to any given visual experience&nbsp;of hers? According to Travis, while visual representation is supposed to be “a familiar phenomenon; something we can tell is happening” (Travis 2004: 86), there is no good available evidence&nbsp;that our visual experiences represent our surroundings; and he thinks so because there seems to&nbsp;be no method of visual contents’ indexation or self-ascription. The aim of this paper is to show&nbsp;how CV could meet what I shall call the Indexing Problem for perceptual — more specifically, visual&nbsp;— content. My main positive suggestion turns on the thought that the contents of visual experiences&nbsp;could be indexed by the way things demonstrably look to the subject of experiences.</p> Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-10-31 2019-10-31 27 3 29 54 10.14394/filnau.2019.0016 Modele jaźni w samowiedzy https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1094 <p>This article argues for an externalist self-model in self-knowledge, as an answer to the question of&nbsp;how to defend self-knowledge in the face of evident errors in self-cognition such as self-illusions.&nbsp;The externalist model is contrasted with an internalist model, although both are based on a predictive coding mechanism. The main thesis is that for preserving the status of self-knowledge as&nbsp;knowledge an external element is needed — namely, some feedback from the environment — which&nbsp;corrects not only cognitive prediction errors regarding the world but also errors in self-cognition&nbsp;by forcing the proper action of the subject (agent) and dynamic adaptation of the model of the&nbsp;embodied self. The mechanism of self-corrections is best described by externalist models.</p> Anita Pacholik-Żuromska ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-10-31 2019-10-31 27 3 55 76 10.14394/filnau.2019.0017 Neopopperowski argument przeciw funkcjonalizmowi https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1095 <p>This article presents a new argument against mind–body functionalism, strongly inspired by&nbsp;some remarks made by Karl Popper. First, the author presents the original Popperian argument against materialism (from The Self and Its Brain) and its reconstruction by Mariusz Grygianiec. The argument’s conclusion is that if materialism is true, it must also be devoid of any rational grounding. Employing Ned Block’s and Joseph Levine’s accounts of functionalism, the author reformulates the original objection in order to make it a threat to functionalism, which is a more widespread view than the identity theory (which was the aim of Popper’s criticism). The argument proves to be resilient to some potential dangers: Hilary Putnam’s example of the Twin Earth or a duplicate counter-argument mentioned by Block. The conclusion is analogous to the original one: functionalism, provided that it is true, is irrational.</p> Michał Pawłowski ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-10-31 2019-10-31 27 3 77 86 10.14394/filnau.2019.0018 Uwagi Wittgensteina "O pewności" a teoria kolektywów myślowych i stylów myślowych Flecka https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1096 <p>In his ‘Philosophical Investigations’, Wittgenstein declares that he is neither creating a theory nor explaining anything: he is merely describing the ways of using words and sentences, thus trying to make philosophical problems disappear. In fact, however, he proposes a theory of the nature of language games and their functions, even though — because of the above declaration — he expresses it in a fragmentary and unclear way. After 1946, his views underwent significant transformations: he abandoned the philosophy of mathematics for the philosophy of psychology. And in the last months of his life, in the notes published posthumously as On Certainty, he expressed a number of epistemological claims that explain our cognitive attitudes. He did not manage to finish this work. We have to do it for him, and crucial supplements are provided — as this paper argues — by Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought collectives and thought styles.</p> Wojciech Sady ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-10-31 2019-10-31 27 3 87 102 10.14394/filnau.2019.0019 Co mówi o prawach przyrody geneza tego pojęcia? Polemika z Ronaldem N. Gierem https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1097 <p>The aim of this paper is to analyze Ronald N. Giere’s claim that the four characteristics associated with laws of nature — truth, universality, necessity, and objectivity — have a theological origin. It is argued that in some important cases theological justification of these features was absent, that some theological ideas made it even more difficult to think about laws of nature in this way, and that there were good reasons internal to science to formulate the notion of laws of nature in this particular way.</p> Joanna Luc ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-10-31 2019-10-31 27 3 103 116 10.14394/filnau.2019.0020 Najwcześniejsza postać formalizmu Hilberta https://fn.uw.edu.pl/index.php/fn/article/view/1098 <p>The aim of this paper is to describe and analyze the first (1922) of a long series of Hilbert’s works in which he presented the mature version of formalism. His formalism in 1922 can be called mature because it is characterized by an explicit introduction of metamathematics. Hilbert distinguishes several levels of mathematics (not just two, as one may think — formalized mathematics and metamathematics): the level of meaningless arithmetical signs, labelled I-Z in this paper, the level of arithmetic with content (inhaltliche Arithmetik), II-T, which describes signs from level I-Z, the level of formalized mathematics, II-F (Hilbert postulated a full formalization of mathematics), and the level of metamathematics with content, III-MM, which describes signs from level II-F. Hilbert emphasized that the relation of III-MM to II-F is the same as the relation of II-T to I-Z (description, investigation). In this way, he tried to characterize metamathematics. He expected that in III-MM a consistency proof of II-F could be built, which was the aim of Hilbert’s formalism. This paper discusses Hilbert’s first proof of an auxiliary metamathematical theorem. It is indicated that, on level III-MM, Hilbert assumed a part of arithmetic from level II-T and the classical logic. Although in 1922 he did not distinguish explicitly between the finite and infinite mathematics and between the real and ideal mathematics, such a division was implicit in his study. This allows us to assume that already in 1922 Hilbert had an idea of a finitistic consistency proof of infinitistic mathematics, announced a few years later. It appears, therefore, that already in 1922 he had a very clear idea of formalism, which was presented in detail in the middle of the decade. Hilbert was also aware in 1922 that Brouwer’s objections would eventually force him to explain the issue of logical foundations of classical mathematics.</p> Jerzy Dadaczyński ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2019-10-31 2019-10-31 27 3 117 129 10.14394/filnau.2019.0021