Filozofia Nauki <p>„Filozofia Nauki” (ang. "The Philosophy of Science") jest kwartalnikiem naukowym wydawanym w Instytucie Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Zamieszcza recenzowane artykuły, polemiki i recenzje obejmujące cały zakres filozofii analitycznej, w tym epistemologię, ontologię, filozofię nauki, filozofię języka, filozofię umysłu, logikę filozoficzną, semiotykę logiczną, prakseologię i kognitywistykę.</p> Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland pl-PL Filozofia Nauki 1230-6894 How to Find Productive Causes in Big Data: An Information Transmission Account <p>It has been argued that the use of big data in scientific research obviates the need for causal&nbsp;knowledge in making sound predictions and interventions. Whilst few accept that this claim is&nbsp;true, there is an ongoing discussion about what effect, if any, big data has on scientific methodology and, in particular, the search for causes. One response has been to show that the automated&nbsp;analysis of big data by a computer program can be used to find causes in addition to mere correlations. However, up until now it has only been demonstrated how this can be achieved with&nbsp;respect to difference-making causes. Yet it is widely acknowledged that scientists need evidence&nbsp;of both “difference-making” and “production” in order to infer a genuine causal link. This paper&nbsp;fills in the gap by outlining how computer-assisted discovery in big data can find productive&nbsp;causes. This is achieved by developing an inference rule based on a little-known causal process&nbsp;theory called the information transmission account.</p> Billy Wheeler ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 5 28 Is There a Uniform Explanation for Strawsonian Contrast Cases? <p>Strawson once observed that sentences containing non-referring definite descriptions tend to&nbsp;elicit different types of intuitive responses from language users. While some of these sentences&nbsp;elicit a sense of squeamishness, others elicit a robust sense of falsity. Strawson explained this type&nbsp;of response difference in terms of presupposition and topicality. In the last decades, Strawson’s&nbsp;approach has been often criticized on the ground that it cannot provide a uniform explanation for<br>all possible occurrences of non-referring definites. In this paper, I examine two recent Strawson-inspired projects and argue that they also fall short of providing a uniform explanation of the&nbsp;data. In the final section, I briefly delineate an alternative approach, which seems to have greater&nbsp;explanatory power than its rivals.</p> Zoltán Vecsey ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 29 47 Baker’s Theory of Material Constitution and Thinking Things into Existence <p>The paper provides a critical evaluation of Lynne Rudder Baker’s nonmereological theory of&nbsp;material constitution in light of the “thinking into existence” objection, formulated by Theodore&nbsp;Sider and Dean W. Zimmerman. Although Baker responds to it, she focuses on its specific versions presented by Sider and Zimmerman and does not address the source of the problem. Baker&nbsp;maintains that beliefs, social practices, and conventions can bring a new intention-dependent<br>object into existence. However, as I argue, the thinking into existence objection shows that constituted objects, if there are any, are ontologically independent of beliefs, social practices, and&nbsp;conventions. In fact, Baker’s theory doesn’t give us any reason for believing that intention-dependent objects are any more real than fictional objects.</p> Tufan Kıymaz ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 49 56 Representing Numbers <p>The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of how we can represent numbers (especially&nbsp;natural numbers) and how our choice of a representation affects our ability to compute various&nbsp;functions. In particular, we show the importance of computability of the characteristic function of&nbsp;identity in a representation of numbers. It turns out that it is a very strong assumption that significantly increases the scope of our knowledge about a given representation, including our ability<br>to tell which functions are computable in this representation.</p> Michał Wrocławski ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 57 73 Ontologia matematyki wczesnego Hilberta <p>Hilbert’s views on the ontology of mathematics changed significantly between 1891 and 1904.&nbsp;Although his contributions to the foundations of mathematics in the years 1899-1904 paved the&nbsp;way for his later program of formalism, in the ontology of mathematics he was then still far from&nbsp;methodological nominalism associated with his mature formalism. Paradoxically, Hilbert’s original position in the ontology of mathematics (from 1891) was that of conceptualism combined<br>with constructivism. These two views were the philosophical basis for Brouwer’s intuitionist&nbsp;attacks on Hilbert’s account of the foundations of mathematics in the 1920s.</p> Jerzy Dadaczyński ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 75 88 Metodologiczny postulat reizmu. Zarys analizy <p>It is widely assumed that reism, a philosophical position introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbiński, had&nbsp;two aspects: ontological and semantic. Sometimes it is also claimed that reism ultimately became&nbsp;a kind of methodological program. The aim of this article is to analyze the methodological aspect&nbsp;of reism (or methodological reism). Since Kotarbiński did not explicitly formulate this layer of his&nbsp;theory, the first part of the article attempts to reconstruct methodological reism. In the second&nbsp;part, I discuss some of its problems. Finally, in the third part, I try to show its merits.</p> Alicja Chybińska ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 89 110 Nazwy i przedmioty w Traktacie logiczno-filozoficznym <p>In this paper, I try to answer the following questions: what are objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus&nbsp;Logico-Philosophicus? What function does a name perform in a sentence according to Wittgenstein?&nbsp;What is the Bedeutung of a name? I argue that answers to these questions come from the&nbsp;Wittgensteinian vision of logic. The first part of the article concerns Frege and Russell’s universalist conception of logic, which is the main object of Wittgenstein’s attack. The second part of the<br>article is about Wittgenstein’s conception of logic and some consequences of this conception for&nbsp;the interpretation of Tractatarian objects and names. My main result is that the meaning of&nbsp;a name should be understood as a truth-value potential of an expression. The last part concerns&nbsp;the connections between the so-called ontological parts of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s views&nbsp;on an ideal formal language.</p> Krystian Bogucki ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 111 129 Are We Rational When It Comes to Rationality? [Review of Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics, M. Hetmański (ed.), Leiden: Brill–Rodopi 2018] <p>The paper is a review of the book Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to&nbsp;Heuristics edited by Marek Hetmański. The volume consists of eighteen chapters on different&nbsp;topics revolving around the common theme of rationality. The review discusses each paper, focusing more closely on some, in order to evaluate the arguments and claims that I find interesting, controversial, or surprising. Most chapters fall into the category of standard analytic philosophy with just a few lightly flirting with other philosophical traditions and one discussing José&nbsp;Ortega y Gasset.</p> Jakub Rudnicki ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-12-31 2018-12-31 26 4 131 145