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ONTOLOGY OF PERFORMANCE IN LIGHT OF KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI'S THEORY OF ACTIONS AND PRODUCTS

Abstract

Using the original reflections of the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the article aims to present the ontological status and qualities of the phenomenon of artistic performance. Through linguistic analysis, Twardowski tried to capture the difference and the mutual relationship between action and its product. In the first part, we present Twardowski's theory of action and product; in the second, we try to identify several properties of performance that are indicated by the main theorists of performance; in the third part, even though Twardowski's findings are problematic at times, we show the possibility of using them to enhance our understanding of the ontological peculiarity of performance. In the concluding section, we present contributions to the structure of the general theory of performance, taking into account not only artistic performance but also organizational and technical performance.

Keywords: performance, performance studies, Kazimierz Twardowski, ontology of action

INTRODUCTION

In the concluding section of his *On Actions and Products* (1911/1999),¹ Kazimierz Twardowski indicates research prospects following from his prior distinction between actions and their products:

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¹The text appeared in a commemorative book celebrating the 250th anniversary of Lvov University in 1911 under the Polish title *O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki* [On actions and products. Some remarks from the borderline of psychology, grammar, and logic], Kraków 1911. For this article, we use the translation available in a collection of Twardowski's writings entitled *On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy* (Twardowski 1999: 103–132).



After analyzing the various sorts of mental and psychophysical products and their interrelations, one would expect numerous clarifications pertaining to the tasks and subject-matter of each of the humanistic sciences. (Twardowski 1999: 132)

Twardowski admits that the research perspectives (attractive to the humanities) that the science of actions and products creates are applicable, first and foremost, to psychology, conceived at that time as the fundamental science, but also to logic. He says that the humanities are “sciences whose objects are either mental products, considered independently of their formative mental activities, or psychophysical products, considered as an expression of mental products” (Twardowski 1965: 269).

Even if we do not fully endorse Twardowski’s view of the nature of the humanities, wouldn’t it be better to refute the research prospects of the theory of actions and products he outlined and consider them as blind alleys in the history of research? It is here that we seek to answer this question. When using and problematizing Twardowski’s distinctions, we make use of studies which could not have been available to him at the time, but which embraced action and its products, or more precisely, a specific type of action and its results – performance studies. Our goal is to say how effective Twardowski’s theory is when applied to performance studies in order to gain a better insight into performance as such. It is well known that performance has been defined in countless ways in the history of performance studies, and the impossibility of finding a common denominator seems to shatter any hope of working out a clear-cut definition of performance. However, we are not after a spectacular definition that would put an end to the half-century-long dispute on the nature of performance, but a different perspective that might fill in the gaps and show performance in the slightly sharper light shed by the ontological-linguistic lamp of Twardowski’s theory. As far as we know, this is the first attempt of this kind with respect to Twardowski’s theory. We are encouraged to carry out a study like this by the Polish philosopher himself, who invokes images of an actor and dancer performing. While we refrain from any premature assessment of such an attempt until it is complete, we shall be interested in whether and to what extent Twardowski’s theory makes it possible to capture the nature of performance more precisely.

To this end, the considerations here are divided into three parts. First, we present the main theses and problems inherent in Twardowski’s study of actions and products; next, based on the relevant literature, we try to come up with a general definition of performance which might be termed “classic”; finally, we

bring together the issues considered in the two previous sections so as to arrive at conclusions that will make it possible to understand performance better than before.

1. KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI'S STUDY OF ACTIONS AND PRODUCTS

Since Twardowski's theory has been abundantly commented on, we will keep the presentation thereof to an absolute minimum (e.g., Bobryk 2001). The problem context of Twardowski's theory is elucidated in some detail in an instructive article by Piotr Brykczyński (2005), who highlights both linguistic and, above all, ontological problems inherent in the distinction between activities and products. These problems are especially important if we try to build an ontology of performance, which is typically interpreted as both speech acts and performative activities/events.

Twardowski starts his explorations with a linguistic observation that essentially involves a recognition of both the functional and more phenomenal (or event- or object-like) character of word pairs such as "to walk/the walk," "to race/the race," "to jump/the jump," as well as "to speak/the speech," "to think/the thought," "to err/the error," where the first element signifies an activity while the second is its product. Although, as he claims, the primary object of his deliberations is "to examine how the meaning of the second word in each such pair is related to the meaning of the first" (Twardowski 1999: 104), a more thorough examination of the second element is possible only if we first establish what action itself is.

If we accept that the verb in the first element of a pair denotes an activity, then, Twardowski contends, we should acknowledge that the noun in the second element of the pair refers to something more "phenomenal" or "event-like." "In speaking of a race or a jump, we might have in mind not so much the action carried out by someone, as some fact, some phenomenon, something that happens or occurs" (Twardowski 1999: 104).

The problem addressed by Twardowski relates, then, to the meaning of the word describing the latter element of the relationship vis-à-vis the former – in other words, the relationship between the event (or a phenomenon, or that which happens, or that which occurs) and the activity. These designations of the event, many of which overlap or interlock with ontological issues related to the nature of performance, and which Twardowski seems to treat as equal, carry a substantial ontological burden (Brykczyński 2005: 29–35). For the latter is as often defined

as activity or event, also as an effect – performativity is, among other things, effectiveness. In his critique of Twardowski, Brykczyński tries to analyze this phenomenality of the product of an activity – which Twardowski barely mentions in his short treatise without defining it – by pointing to the content of the concept and formally juxtaposing it with others among the above-mentioned concepts, such as an event or process. However, Twardowski seems to be pointing indirectly to a sense of “phenomenon” that is different than the one Brykczyński has in mind, interpreting phenomenon as the result of appearing (Twardowski 1999: 107) – a phenomenon appears. Does this appearance imply only that a product emerges from an activity (1), or do we have here a quasi-phenomenological definition of appearing (2)? Well, neither interpretation can be ruled out, particularly because the very act of appearing, as the principal theme of phenomenology, is construed in two ways: as both appearing and emerging (to bring forth, produce – in the sense of Greek *phúô* → *phúsis*);² however, it can be seen that, starting from section 8, the first option (1) is beginning to prevail, leading to identifying the nominal element of the pair as precisely a “product” rather than a “phenomenon.” It should be admitted that the first hypothesis (1) is corroborated by the fact that Twardowski refers to the second element of the said pair as a “product,” a designation stressing the moment of emerging, while the second hypothesis (2) is supported by the fact that he mentions as equal (following a comma) the phenomenal and the event-like sense of the product of an activity. What “occurs” or “happens” is not what emerges out of something else but what considerably alters the existing order of things in a way that attracts our attention or that we deem important, etc. The moment of genesis is of no relevance here. Significantly, this moment of emerging, paradoxically, is not so important in the case of “permanent products,” which are made from pre-existing matter. Twardowski highlights (1999: 119) that the product of action here is, strictly speaking, “the new configuration, the rearrangement or transformation of the material.” Although a permanent product is taken in its entirety as a result of a particular action, it is only, strictly speaking, that configuration, rearrangement, or transformation of the material. By this token, the proper product of an action has more ontological affinity with the activity itself than the material. But what is this part of an activity that we should distinguish from its material? Twardowski does not say.

²Newer phenomenology speaks here of secondary and primary phenomenalization (Patočka 2000: 247).

Observing an affinity between ontological problems that occur in the theory of actions and products, as well as in the theory of performance, reinforces another interpretation in which Twardowski recalls the grammatical device of the "etymological figure," which he says is "a construction in which the noun, formed from the same stem as the verb, plays the role of a complement (. . . object) to the latter, termed in such instances an 'internal complement'" (Twardowski 1999: 106). Here, Twardowski gives examples of "dance a dance" (replaced with "sing a song" by the book's translator) and "assign an assignment." The verb may not be etymologically related to the noun, just like in the case of the generic verb "to do" (a dance or a favor) or "comply with" (a request or a wish), or the less generic verb "issue" (a judgement, opinion), or "deliver" (a sermon, a speech, etc.). "The 'internality' of such a complement" is manifested in two ways: in the identity of the verbal and nominal stems, or in the possibility of leaving out the redundant verb – "to lie" instead of "commit a lie" or "wish" instead of "make a wish," etc.

Let us note (something that Twardowski does not notice) that such redundancy makes sense only if the action is conscious – when it is intentional. One can "perform a race," but this "performance" presupposes a conscious and a goal-oriented activity. One can run in a less intentional manner, for example, when running away from danger in a fit of panic. In this case, it is hard to speak of performing a run in the strict sense. Do you "perform a lie-down" when you pass out and fall? Similar problems emerge when you "perform a scream." A "performed" scream is such that has an intentional character, while a scream caused by terror will bear the stigma of an involuntary action. Boundaries here are blurry but perceptible intuitively. Another problem is related to "committing an error" and "experiencing sensations." In the first case, an error could be committed only by a person who errs deliberately. But erring on purpose is possible only when the person knows at least the direction to follow to "arrive at" the truth yet for some reason does not. "Erring" like this is more likely to deceive the person or others about the route. A similar situation occurs in the case of "experiencing sensations": is experiencing an activity that gives rise to a sensation? Twardowski points this out (1999: 110, note 20), referring to the deliberations of Władysław Witwicki and Stephan Witasek, yet does not resolve the doubts that arise here.

If such a redundancy can be desirable at times in terms of communication, it does not add, however, any meaning to the content communicated. Now the question arises whether in the case of performance this redundancy says something meaningful about the type of action. This redundancy must not be ignored

if the performativity of action is to be retained. Here, only a potential problem is indicated, which will be dealt with in section 3.

The category of etymologically related nouns also includes those called “verbal nouns” (gerunds), such as running, jumping, inquiring, thinking. They represent, in a way, an intermediate moment (with a focus on action) between a verb expressing an activity and a noun expressing the product of the activity (1999: 112–113). Recognizing only this intermediate element between action and product, Twardowski actually leaves it out of his sphere of interest.

Another problem (indicated above) is the question how a product emerges or appears with action in the background. This is a hugely important issue, which Twardowski does not problematize; however, it largely determines the meaning of a product and its relationship with an action. Twardowski points to an understanding of the manner in which a product comes to be or emerges from an activity only indirectly and vaguely, saying that the product is created “thanks to,” “through,” “as a result of” an activity (1999: 107). But what does this mean? Obviously, the sense of creative action is ruled out. Action does not overlap with creation; nor does it oppose reproduction (1999: 108, note 14). Is this a causal relationship, an intentional–teleological relationship, or something else? Surely, there is no point in blowing up the classic problem of dualism and asking why it happens that man (*res cogitans*) can exert an influence on her body (*res extensa*), and by extension (indirectly) on the world. The action–product relationship is not the subject–object relationship. Nor is it a relationship between intent and purpose. Twardowski says (1999: 107): “When we fight, a fight results; when we think, thoughts arise; when we command, a command occurs; when we sing, a song results.” This is, nonetheless, a rather peculiar manner of speaking. Intuition suggests that fighting amounts to, at best, destruction, suffering, and death. Surely, we must distinguish the goal pursued by the subject of an action from what is created. Whether the subject reaches the goal or not is a different matter. The initiation of a fight may sometimes be the purpose of fighting; then, as a result of fighting, a fight ensues as both an event and a phenomenon. Most often, however (and this seems to be attested by the customary use of language), one engages in a fight to obtain some benefits other than fighting itself. A fight is not the purpose of fighting. Twardowski does not claim this, either. He says only that a fight comes about “when,” not “due to.” So, what would this “when” mean if we were to include it among the aforementioned designations of the link between action and product: through? as a result of? thanks to?

Twardowski notes (1999: 107) that the relationship between action and product is gradable; that is, the product can be either fully distinct from or “coalesced” with the action. Extreme cases are relatively easy to identify. Action and product diverge when an independent physical object is produced ([act of] writing/writing). In contrast, they coalesce when the product of an action is nothing permanent and self-existing in relation to it (dancing/dance). Noticing these two extreme types of products leads Twardowski to distinguish enduring and non-enduring products. The latter exist as long as the activity generating them lasts (scream, speech, thought, walking, lying down, etc.); the former continue to exist when the activity ceases (a line, a drawing, writing, a sculpture, a painting, an imprint, etc.³) (1999: 117). In order to persist when the generating activity ceases, enduring products must have their own matter, which Twardowski calls the “material” of the action (1999: 118–119). “The activity itself, owing to which the enduring product originates, consists in transforming or rearranging the material” (Twardowski 1999: 118–119). This material differs from the “matter” of the action itself (psyche and body), from which a non-enduring product arises. In regard to the “matter” of non-enduring products, Twardowski says only that this is how, for example, earlier memories could be defined, out of which a non-enduring product is created – a “representation.” The matter of enduring products, in contrast, is nothing but the matter of things. Enduring products are things (Twardowski 1999: 119).

An activity and its product (as the former’s internal object) should be distinguished from disposition, on the one hand, and the external object of action, on the other.

The notion of disposition for action is indicated by the verbal noun, which occurs in such expressions as “this man has good judgment about things” (Twardowski 1999: 111). This “judgment” does not refer to an action or its product, but the fact that a particular person has a permanent ability to issue good judgements yet is finding it impossible just now. Nouns such as “speech” or “faith” also have a dispositional sense.

As regards the external object, the following obtains. For example, the internal object (complement) of the activity of speaking is speech, while its external object is that which is spoken about (Twardowski 1999: 117). While not produced by a given activity, the external object – as Twardowski argues – is only correlated with the internal object. Twardowski leaves unanswered the question he asks

³These examples are provided by Twardowski (1999: 117).

(1999: 117, note 37): Does every action need to have an external object alongside the internal one? What is the external object of a non-enduring product, such as screaming or walking? Do enduring products (things) also have their external objects? The external object of writing is that which it speaks about. But what is the external object of a footprint in the sand (Twardowski's example)? This issue is, as we shall see in section 3, essential for understanding performance.

The division of actions and products into physical, psychophysical, and mental brings us to the question of their mutual relationship. In this connection, two relevant issues are important: expression and sign. "The psychophysical product becomes the external *expression* of the mental product" (Twardowski 1999: 120). For example, a cry may express pain, a nod may be an expression of disapproval, etc. The mental product, as Twardowski argues broadly, is the cause of the psychophysical product. At the same time, the psychophysical product can be an expression of many mental products. The first problem that emerges here is similar to the one we come across with the word "action." In line with Twardowski's conception, words like "action" and "expression" should be treated as products of the actions of "doing" and "expressing." All the same, Twardowski says that a psychophysical product is not an expression of an action but a mental product. So, can a product be an action for other products? The problem becomes more pronounced when Twardowski further specifies the sense of expression, distinguishing two situations: when a mental product *expresses itself* in a psychophysical product and when a psychophysical product *is an expression* of a mental product (1999: 121). The second situation occurs when the psychophysical product in which a mental product has been expressed "can itself become the partial cause of the subsequent emergence of the same or a similar mental product, and when it plays this role of a partial cause by eliciting the same or similar mental action as that which gave rise to the given psychophysical product" (Twardowski 1999: 121). What this "elicitation" of mental actions (which Twardowski also refers to as the cause of, e.g., thoughts (1999: 124)) is about is unknown.

"Psychophysical products that signify certain mental products are also called the *signs* of the latter, and these mental products themselves are termed the *meanings* of the psychophysical products" (Twardowski 1999: 122). This means, however, that with regard to permanent expressions of mental products, i.e., things, signs are permanent, but their meanings – as mental products – are non-enduring. Although non-enduring, as Twardowski argues (1999: 125), the

mental product “exists potentially in that psychophysical product, in that sign.” When creating in this way a semblance of something enduring, we say that non-enduring mental products are *preserved* in an enduring psychophysical product (i.e., a thing), thanks to which these enduring products can, after non-enduring products cease, become “a partial cause” for the creation of non-enduring products that are similar to the existing ones (in metaphorical terms: those feelings that are “locked or embodied” (Twardowski 1999: 125) in an enduring product). This preservation of mental and psychophysical products that are non-enduring makes them appear enduring; this can be so overwhelming that these products may seem even independent of the actions that give rise to them. This semblance of independence is strengthened by the impression of the *identicalness* of mental products emerging in individual minds (e.g., “the same” thought, “the same” feeling); these products are the meaning and result of enduring products. But it is only an *impression*, because everyone perceives the acting of these enduring products somewhat differently.

Towards the end of his treatise, Twardowski (1999: 129) mentions so-called artificial or surrogate products. These are products that only simulate other products “which originate in virtue of different actions.” He calls the former artefacts and the latter “petrefacts.” Examples of artefacts are acting and logic. As for the former, Twardowski says that, as a psychophysical product, it “does not emerge as the result of a genuine feeling that ordinarily expresses itself in such a demeanor, but as the result of a representation of a feeling, that is to say – as the result of a represented [i.e., imagined] feeling” (1999: 129). In a similar way, most of the time, a logician makes use of not real but merely presented judgements.

In order to lay the groundwork for non-psychologically conceived logic (e.g., of the Husserlian type or symbolic logic, called *logistics* at the time), keeping mental actions separate from their products and preserving them in writing turned out to be crucial. Twardowski hopes that the above-mentioned distinctions can also play a decisive role in the case of other sciences. Still in this vein we could define, for instance, theatrology as a science of acting artefacts, which in contrast to logic are not – or at least usually not – preserved in a permanent psychophysical product (even though a theatrical performance might be recorded by means of a photograph or on cinematic film). Unlike logic, which abstracts from individual differences when mental products are created based on permanent psychophysical products (texts) – trying to capture precisely “the same” thought – such abstraction is not only impossible in theatrology but even unnecessary

because what is individual in the reception of a psychophysical product (acting) is essential for the final content of the meaning of the spectacle.

2. THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF PERFORMANCE

A presentation of Twardowski's theory of actions and products together with their simultaneous problematization will be a convenient platform for asking about the nature of performance. In our attempt to recreate Twardowski's views, we tried to touch on the problems that the author himself – at least in the treatise under discussion – overlooked and failed to address.

Given the limitations of the present article, we shall focus on cultural performance, leaving aside technical and organizational performance. Narrowing down our scope to cultural performance only, which enjoys a privileged position in the general theory of performance, should not largely impact our understanding of what performance is as such. Particularly close to our hearts in regard to cultural performance is artistic performance, which we interpret, in this instance, not so much as any artistic performative action, such as a dance show or a music concert, but rather as what is meant by this designation, i.e., performance art.

First, let us determine, given the existing literature, what is actually at stake when we characterize an action or event as a performance. Right from the start, we run into a host of problems from which, however, we can abstract a solid core of the concept of performance, allowing for some simplifications. Keeping in mind the long and heated debate on this subject, let us – for the sake of our considerations here – call this core, somewhat exaggeratedly, a *classical concept of performance*.⁴

First of all, we are struck by the infinite and indeterminate semantic scope of the word “performance.” In the “world as theatre” and the “society of spectacle,” nearly every sphere of life can be called performance, but there is no single preferred meaning of what is called performance. Most often, the word “performance” is associated with what we call “show,” “spectacle,” or “presentation,” just like in circus shows, which are about *demonstrating* skills, thus about showing virtuosity in the way certain activities or gestures are performed, which for most of us is beyond reach. Also, performance is not only about these rare, extraordinary skills

⁴Even though this term (like all designations containing the adjective “classic”) may raise some objections, it is found in the literature of the subject. For instance, Dariusz Kosiński (2016: 40) uses the plural when mentioning “classic definitions of performance.”

but also everyday activities that are performed by most members of a given community and conform to specific *patterns* of behavior. In this case, what matters is not the manner but precisely the norm conformed to. Finally, the third way to use this word is related to *achievements* or *results* (e.g., in sports competitions) of not only humans but also machinery or companies. This meaning of “performance” highlights the actual impact of performance on reality; it is something completed – and in the highest degree. Even the use of the word “performance” alone points to the instability of its meaning, which vacillates between *presenting*, *performing*, and *norm-setting*. There are, we will say, three basic functions that performative action embodies.⁵ Traditionally, these three functions have been assigned three corresponding values: beauty, truth, and good.

When introducing the concept of performance, Richard Schechner observed (2013: 42) that although every culture has certain behaviors that *are* performances, “about anything can be studied ‘as’ performance.” He says (2013: 42): “from the vantage of the kind of performance theory I am propounding, every action is a performance,” although not every action is a genuine performance. This ambivalence, observed as one starts to understand performance, and symbolically expressed as the “is/as” combination, assumes a great many forms, which turn performance and performance studies into a hardly perceptible transitional domain. As Schechner says (2001: 10), “performance studies is ‘inter’ – in between. . . . Performance studies resists or rejects definition. As a discipline, PS cannot be mapped effectively because it transgresses boundaries, it goes where it is not expected to be. It is inherently ‘in between’ and therefore cannot be pinned down or located exactly.” For this reason, performance studies eludes the imperative of “purity” and borrows from many areas of broadly understood humanities. One thing is certain: performance cannot be considered as an *object* having no context or impact. Performance itself is “in between” (Schechner 2013: 30), so it is definitely more akin to an activity, event, occurrence, or action – some kind of movement and change. Although performance is not a static object, it is not clear whether it is an event or action. In light of Twardowski’s theory of actions and products presented above, this ambivalence can be interpreted in such a way that the definition of performance wavers between, on the one hand, its more action-like and verbal character, and, on the other, a more event-like, phenome-

⁵Kosiński (2016: 40) speaks of a triunity: “drama/presenting/constituting” (*dramat/przedstawienie/ustanowienie*) and “pattern, showing/exposing, fulfilling” (*wzór, okazywanie/wystawienie, spełnienie*).

nal, and noun-like aspect. Performance would be not only something between activity and event, between process and its product, but this ambivalence would involve other parameters of performance, placing it between speech and the body, reproduction and creation, the subject and the object, acting and experiencing, theme and context, creation and destruction.

For all their caution, both Schechner and other researchers keep trying to elaborate on what performance is as such. Let us first see what Schechner says. Performance studies deal with “what people do in the activity of their doing it” (Schechner 2013: 16). Performance is not a single action but the activity of doing, the acting of action. He argues that performance is conscious acts that have the nature of “restored behavior.” They are “‘twice-behaved behaviors,’ performed actions that people train for and rehearse” (Schechner 2013: 28). While referring to the studies done by Erving Goffman on “the theatre of everyday life,” where we play certain preordained social roles, Schechner concludes that performative action consists of earlier activities, realized and taught from generation to generation. Just as imagination – despite creating new and striking things – makes use of the existing pool of recollections while introducing new arrangements into it, performance founded on activities that have already been rehearsed and internalized but, combined anew and presented in novel context, constitute a new thing. Schechner invokes (2013: 50) the image of a film director who puts together strips of cinematic film. The point is not only that a specific behavior has a unique pattern (it doesn’t really matter whether real or unreal, familiar or unfamiliar), which when reproduced in different circumstances and for other purposes appears as something new and becomes a new pattern, but also that acting brings this pattern to light, highlights it, comments on it or questions it – in other words, it is shown somehow. Therefore, when defining performance as performance, Schechner lets himself employ a further iteration (2013: 35): “performances are marked, framed, or heightened behavior separated out from just ‘living life’ – restored restored behavior, if you will.” Surely, this iteration, however, makes things more complicated than otherwise. A “restored restored behavior” is one that has been both saved from oblivion and revealed. Schechner admits (2013: 35), though, that “it is not necessary to pursue this doubling. It is sufficient to define restored behavior as marked, framed, or heightened.” This “intensification” of action is connected with yet another property of performance. “Restored behavior is symbolic and reflexive” (Schechner 2013: 35). So, both behavior and presentation involve showing the meaning or sense of action.

Other researchers of performance speak in the same vein. Richard Bauman (1989: 262–266, Carlson 2018: 15) claims that performance is about some “consciousness of doubleness, according to which the actual execution of an action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an ideal, or a remembered original model of that action.” This is linked, in a way, to the real or fictitious presence of an observer. “Performance is always performance for someone, some audience” (Carlson 2018: 15). In a similar spirit, Jacek Wachowski (2011: 271) says that it is “an action for oneself and for the Other.” A similar definition of performance is given by Dell Hymes (1975: 13), who argues that a performance is a subset within conduct, in which one or more persons assume a responsibility to an audience and a tradition as they understand it. In this way, the aspect of normativity comes into play. The idea of performative duality, mentioned by Bauman, is a reference, in a way, to Derrida’s critique, who in his polemics with Austin asserted that the key to understanding performatives lies in their citationality and iterability (Derrida 1982: 326). The same is acknowledged by Wachowski (2011: 296): “iterability characterizes every performance.” Performative behaviors, even if unique and new as a whole, are compositions made up of scraps of earlier activities, whose original meaning and form remain unknown, forgotten, distorted, or twisted (Schechner 2013: 34), but which can be endlessly compiled and recapitulated one way or another – assigning to those activities a new or the original meaning. Hence, Marvin Carlson (2001: 15) calls performance “ghosting”: each scene is a “haunted stage.” Dariusz Kosiński (2016: 47) highlights that this doubling is present in the very word “dramaturgy,” which in Greek literally means “action” or “the work of what is done.” Although this reproduction of a specific pattern of behavior is important for performance, equally important is the moment of what happens during this reproduction, realization itself, which – as Schechner would say – consists not only in behaving but also in highlighting or making known. Bauman, whom we cited above, accentuates this aspect in his other attempt to define performance: performance is about “highlighting the manner” in which communication between the agent and the audience takes place (Bauman 1986: 3). Performance is a demonstration of acting skill, but Bauman adds something else to this: he says that this demonstration takes place “above and beyond its referential content” (Bauman 1986: 3). This important addition expands the earlier definitions of performative action by the acknowledgment of the intrinsic possibility of performance being divested of the meaning or performative function that it originally had – as if, as a result of the original action being preserved

and presented, the reference of the doer to the original sense could be weakened or even totally extinguished. It happens, then, that performance is treated as an action that suspends its original sense, merely showing it, which makes it “pretend” activity – play. For as Huizinga says (1980: 13): play is a “representation of something.” Colloquially speaking, play is about doing something which is not for real. It is action in quotation marks.

3. THE CLASSICAL CONCEPT OF PERFORMANCE VIS-À-VIS TWARDOWSKI’S THEORY OF ACTION AND PRODUCT

What does this all have to do with Twardowski’s theory of actions and products, presented in section one?

The above-cited classic definition of performance points chiefly to the fact that while performance is indeed action, it is action that makes itself an event through a doubling or even tripling of some kind. We speak of doubling because *any* action, hence not only performance, is an action reactivating earlier actions – ours or those of others. We could assume that Twardowski also points indirectly to the existence of an action preceding a specific action when speaking of *disposition* towards action, but it must be added that the sense of “disposition” is slightly different than that of “prior action.” Not every action undertaken presupposes disposition; rather, the converse holds true: each disposition presupposes a prior repeated action so that it eventually becomes a permanent disposition. At any rate, even if the idea related to disposition is wrong, the very linguistic device that became the starting point for Twardowski’s deliberations on actions and products perfectly renders this doubling (e.g., “dance a dance,” “speak a speech,” etc.) that performance theorists pointed to, especially if one speaks of “performing some action.” The performance of a dance, speech, run, etc. suggests that the activity somehow “consists of” two activities, or rather an activity and its product, which in the case of non-enduring products is often indistinguishable from the very activity (e.g., dance a dance). Consequently, if we were to find an analogy, in Twardowski’s theory the term that comes closest to this “prior” activity, which in a specific activity is “elicited” in some way (as indicated by the classical conception of performance), is precisely what he calls “product.” In this sense, the product would, paradoxically, precede the activity itself. To use the example of dance: “dance a dance” or “perform a dance” means to do an action that has a specific, usually traditional, form, which is invoked just as the action is performed. Typically, this

form of activity (“a dance”) carries meaning and norm-setting content (pattern) and also indicates the proper context for doing that.⁶ This is why we hear “dance this way,” “we don’t dance this way,” “one is dancing here,” or “no dancing here.” As regards enduring products, Twardowski notes that by virtue of them being both an expression and a sign of activity, they create an impression that a given activity is “enchanted” or “embodied” in them and that the one who is in contact with this product recreates in himself the earlier activity or conjures up “the same” mental product.

Performance, however, is distinguished from other actions by one more thing: it is a threefold activity. The idea behind this tripling is to turn this elemental action and its product into a “presentation” or a “phenomenon” – something that shows up, exposes itself, or appears – hence a thing to watch, or more broadly, experience. Zbigniew Raszewski (1991: 24; see also Kosiński 2016: 51) says in this instance that the spectacle activity is open. Let us call this *the phenomenal aspect of performance*. As Heidegger (1962: 51) says, a phenomenon is “that which shows itself, the manifest” (*das, was sich zeigt; das Offenbare*). And it is this presentation of an activity, not some property of the activity itself, that defines it as performance. A performative action would be an action dominated by presentation; put differently, it would be an action in which it presents itself, or a self-presenting action. For this reason, it can be called a game (Gadamer 2004: 115). By paraphrasing the famous proposition of Franz Brentano, who used the word “presentation” (*Vorstellung*) in an entirely different context, we could say that each performative action “is either a presentation or is based upon an underlying presentation” (Husserl 2001: 129). But what is this presentation? Is it some extra activity that is appended to the primary activity, or does it result therefrom?

The classical concept of performance contains the idea that it is during a performance that a given behavior is exposed, revealed, and shown. In essence, the idea is to show or indicate a typically human gesture in which the observer’s attention is diverted from himself to a thing which is not here but is to become the object of his interest. In this case, one sometimes speaks of shared intentionality. Two things are worth emphasizing. First, looking from the evolutionary perspective, it

⁶“Pattern” here does not imply some magic model activity which was once performed for the first time and to which any subsequent activity should conform, but rather “a notion created through successive performances.” “Pattern’ is not a source of behaviors but their result, or product” (Kosiński 2016: 45–46).

turns out that the pointing gesture, developed only by humans, derives from the grasping gesture, of which it is a “degraded form”: “the child also reaches for those objects which it cannot get to because they are too far. This is why the grasping movement is transformed into a pointing gesture” (Wundt 1904: 129). It can be seen, then, why the verbal signs that develop later in speech need, as Husserl says, their void to be filled. It is as if the basis of speech were in the unsatisfied gesture of reaching for food – as if the desire to speak were underpinned by the desire to eat. Second, the pointing is connected, as we have noted above, with some deficiency or absence. It points at something that the gesture does not have. A sign points away from itself.

What would, by Twardowski’s lights, fulfill the role of the represented and the representation itself (the representing)? On the one hand, it appears that the function of representation is best fulfilled by the product of an activity (walking or a walk, dancing or a dance, etc.). A product would be the “content” of an activity, giving it a new designation – turning the activity into performance. In his habilitation dissertation, Twardowski compares (1965: 11–13) representation, its content and object, to a situation where an artist is painting a picture of a landscape. Painting would be an activity analogous to a representation whose product-content is a picture, and the landscape is the presented object. The content of the representation (picture) is its “closer object” that “inexists” in the activity but is not the external object (landscape) to which the representation refers. In saying this, Twardowski alludes, obviously, to Brentano’s theory of intentionality and modifies it substantially. Brentano claimed that intentionality is a criterion that distinguishes mental phenomena from physical ones. Drawing on Twardowski, we could ask, however, whether it is not characteristic, *mutatis mutandis*, of psychophysical activities to have an “internal object,” or some content: just as remembering refers to what is remembered, seeing refers to what is seen, representing refers to what is being represented, drawing refers to what is being drawn (the drawing), walking refers to what is being walked (the walk), dancing refers to what is being danced (the dance), etc. The point is not to cling to some historical terminology, but to use some more or less fitting analogies which will help us understand the sense of performative action. Let us leave aside the question of the external object of the presentation (activity) as it is made more complex by the question of existence (see below). Otherwise, this would entail reversing the order proposed by Twardowski. Although every product of an activity depends for its existence on the activity from which it arises, in the case of performance

the “modifying designation” would prevail over “the determining designation” (“attributive”).⁷ The product of an activity seen as a presentation thereof would be a designation modifying this activity in such a degree that it would become a presentation of itself. For example, an attributive characterization of the activity of walking as moving by means of limbs in terms of its product-content (i.e., that which can be described as a walk) would be secondary to a modifying designation that would define the activity of walking as a *presentation* of moving by means of limbs.

On the other hand, it can be said that it is not the product that acts as a presentation but precisely the activity that in every such case *performs* the product (the walk, dance, etc.). We noted in part two that the performance of an activity, which thus becomes a product, implies a conscious and purposive action (e.g., walking differs from performing a walk, or dancing differs from performing a dance, etc.). Performing an activity would be to “present,” show, or reveal (it would be this “phenomenological” exposure, mentioned also by Schechner) an activity (which in so doing becomes a product–phenomenon–presentation). As “performance,” an activity actualizes this important aspect of performative action, which is to draw our attention to its causality – the fact that something has been performed – to the utmost degree.

From the grammatical perspective, in the context of Twardowski’s theory of actions and products, performance should be regarded as a product rather than an activity. With (or thanks to, through, etc.) the activity *to perform*, a result is produced, which is called *performance*. That performance is to be considered more as product than activity is also demonstrated by examples of artistic activities invoked by Twardowski himself. So, a performance would essentially be a non-enduring, albeit partly enduring, psychophysical product whose non-enduring parts can (again, only in part) be made permanent in an enduring product. In contradistinction to lasting artistic products (sculpture, painting, architecture) and despite there being some enduring elements in a performance, it is in principle a non-enduring product – a fact underscored by the above-cited theoreticians of performance, who see it more as an action, event or happening, rather than a thing. As an impermanent product, its meaning is event-like or phenomenal: it is a presentation, showing, revealing.

⁷In his distinction between attributive (determining) and modifying designations, Twardowski refers to Brentano (Twardowski 1965: 11).

However, our recognition that a product is a locus where the phenomenal aspect of a performative action is the most visible contradicts what we said earlier about the product – namely, that it reminds us about an earlier action which constitutes the pattern of an undertaken activity (“dance a *dance*”). If we endorse this latter identification, which admittedly is not without its problems, where to find this phenomenality that both linguistically and substantively should probably be linked to the *spectacularity* of performance? Now, there is the third element, rendered by the gerund form such as “dancing,” “writing,” “walking,” etc. Twardowski himself regards it as another name for a product – one that emphasizes the action-like aspect of the product, the fact that it results from an *activity*. Is this indeed merely an aspect of a product, or something else in respect of activity that Twardowski missed? How else to define what the gerund expresses so as not to confuse it with the more substantial aspect of a product?

Twardowski noted that there is an intermediate link between activity and product that is grammatically defined by the gerund, but he did not present it as a distinct concept, concluding only that it expresses the “functional aspect” of the product (Twardowski 1999: 107). Considering the importance of this moment for understanding performance, this aspect should be defined more closely. Therefore, our reply to the question of how to characterize this functional moment that Twardowski assigns to the product and which we would like to keep separate is with the word “presentation.”⁸

When we say that something is performed, executed, accomplished, etc., we draw our attention to another aspect, other than the one called here “phenomenal.” In a way, it is a far cry from the phenomenal sense, especially in the sense of phenomenality that is familiar to phenomenology as a current in contemporary philosophy. Performance means a real action, realization, something that takes place for real, or the effect, result, or product of this action. In other words, it is something real, something that exists and constitutes a concrete action/event in the world. Notwithstanding, just like in the thought of Husserl – who in order to reveal the dimension of appearing called for phenomenological reduction as suspension of all “recognition in being” – on the theory propounded by Twardowski, who invokes Brentano’s understanding of presentation as a mental phenomenon that is devoid of the act of acknowledging or rejecting *existence* inherent in a judgement, the showing of oneself, appearing or presentation do not have

⁸In this regard we follow Kosiński (2016: 41). In our choice of this term, we deem as valuable its central philosophical meaning, especially in the context of the historical sources of phenomenology.

the characteristics of a real event. These three forms occur in a "pure" fashion, precisely when the question of existence is suspended. Quite apart from the theories just mentioned, we need to ask whether these two moments of performative action can be reconciled.

To answer this, we must address the question of an external object, left untouched for some time now, which Twardowski recognized but left unresolved. Besides the product (internal, direct object), some activities also have an external object (indirect); for example, the activity of writing creates writing which presents *something*. The product of speaking is speech which speaks of *something*, etc. Well, other activities are harder to analyze this way. For instance, what object has walking or dancing? You can say that walking has a direction or a destination, or that dancing shows, tells or symbolizes something, etc. In the latter case, it would be much better to use the notion of "express" or "sign." We can refer to the object of these activities in this way, but only figuratively.

We can get some clues from theories of speech acts, which somehow try to reconcile the moment of presenting (or judgement) inherent in an utterance with an act that not only says something but also does something (requests, commands, demands, questions, etc.). What springs to mind is the theory of non-propositional utterances, such as requests, commands, or queries, provided by Husserl and Austin's theory of performatives (and his theory of illocutionary acts in particular). According to Husserl, such utterances as requests, commands, or questions do not have a meaning of their own, in which case their meaning is embodied in judgements that express an observation (emerging in a reflection) that the speaker is granting a request, obeying an order or answering a question (Husserl 2001: 332–334). This implies that the aforementioned utterances express a dual act: the one referred to by a given utterance, understood as a request, command, or question, and the act of judgement that informs us that the judging person is requesting, commanding, or asking. Therefore, the logic of a judgement can accommodate the logic of all other meanings. A different clue is provided by Austin's theory of speech acts. In his opinion, illocutionary utterances are speech acts such as "informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc.," "which have a certain (conventional) force" (Austin 1962: 108). "Performance of an 'illocutionary' act, i.e., performance of an act *in* saying something as opposed to performance of an act *of* saying something" (Austin 1962: 99). This means that these speech acts contain a doubling (analogous to the one we mentioned earlier): they are the kind of utterance that, in addition to saying something, makes that which it says hap-

pen somehow in reality. In both these theories, therefore, we have utterances that contain a doubling of sorts, but a different thing dominates in both. In Husserl's theory, actual requesting, commanding, or questioning are subject to a kind of objectification in a judgement, which is a superior act to them. In Austin's theory, although a command or an oath are uttered in a judgement, their meaning lies not in stating something, but in what they actually do as a command or an oath.

The theories referred to above seek to reconcile two moments in a single speech act: a more presentational or descriptive moment articulated in a judgement, and a more functional moment invoked by a request, command, or question. Although speech – notwithstanding the fact that it is uttered at a certain time and in a certain place, which makes it inherently an action and an event, thus belonging to the realm of facts – does not in fact change anything by what it says, it does change something, and this is precisely the performative role it plays.

The situation is similar in the case of performance. Owing to its phenomenal function, performance, we might say, deflects the "intentional arc" (Merleau-Ponty) of action in such a way that – instead of directing action towards an external object (provided, of course, that it is present in a given action; see above) – it directs it toward the product itself. In other words, whether the external object exists or not, and regardless of whether activities can be referred to this object, performance places the product in the center of action, or more precisely, its more functional aspect, rendered grammatically by means of the gerund. Activity is transformed to such a degree that not only does the external object of the activity become of little relevance, but also the substance of the product is depreciated. In the case of ordinary activities, the focus is on the external object, whereas the product is, at best, a side effect of the activity operating as an efficient cause; for example, we say something about something to someone in order to inform them about something, so that they know, not just to speak or generate speech. There are activities, however, where the product is important. For instance, in the process of painting a picture attention is moved to the product, which is the picture (at the expense of what is being painted). A similar thing happens with writing, sculpting, and in other instances of artistic activity. When dancing, it is hard to conceive of an external object to which the dance would refer. Dance as the product of dancing is of crucial importance here. But with performance, it happens that this activity disengages even more from the world of objects. In a performance entitled "Painting a Picture," all attention is focused on the painting itself, which is the functional moment of the product of the activity "to

paint.” In a performance entitled “Dance,” it is not the very dance that counts – as happens with the art of dancing, where existing canons are applied to assess the product, not the activity itself – but the “dancing.” The effect of performance, or its performative power, can be measured not by the degree of actual changes made to the world, or by aesthetic considerations such as the aesthetic or artistic quality of the product, but by something completely different. Performance suspends (in the phenomenological sense, it “reduces” or “puts in brackets”) its actual impact on the world – without ruling it out or depriving itself of the possibility of having such an effect – focusing on the product instead, or more precisely, on its functional moment, to which the larger proportion of its performative power is transferred.

It should be noted that this functional moment of the product that is expressed by means of the gerundial form is something that does not exist, in a sense, from the perspective of the existence of not only external things but also the psyche and the body. For how can we distinguish the activity “to dance” from the product “dancing,” “to walk” from “walking,” “to paint” from “painting,” “to shout” from “shouting,” etc.? Then, what kind of influence does this type of product exert? What is the status of its “existence”?

We have said that after the reference of an activity to the external object is suspended (which is not to say, obviously, that an activity does not provide for this reference; well, it does – and at times very effectively and, technically speaking, flawlessly – yet this no longer has constitutive relevance for the activity), our attention is captured by the activity and its product. Let us call this shifting of attention a *performative reduction*. Twardowski mentions the “material of the action,” which is some physical object that provides substance to form and preserves the product of a psychophysical activity. But Twardowski does not consider a situation where such a physical object is just not needed, such as walking or dancing. We cannot say, necessarily, that an activity like this and its product have no grounding of sorts in being. The substance of a mental product is the psyche, whereas the substance of a psychophysical product is the psyche and the body. Surely the psyche and the body are not materials in the sense that they form an external object that is subject to processing. Every activity – therefore both one which entails an external object (e.g., writing) and one which has none (e.g., walking) – and its product need some substance to constitute them in being, which in this case is the body and mind of the agent. But with performative action, the substance of the action and the product takes on a new

meaning. Take, for instance, walking. The walking a performer does is different from the one we do while going, for example, to the forest with our dog. The performative reduction applies not only to the external object but also to mental and bodily functions. Walking, which every time serves specific purposes, is deprived of its vital functions during performance. A performer does not walk to move. This is even clearer if we look at the performative activity of eating. A performer does not eat to fill himself. This also applies to mental activities: we do not look in order to see; we do not recall to remember; we do not reflect to know the truth, etc. The situation of the performer is similar to what happens during a festival, understood as a ritual time out of the ordinary, when life goals and the natural order are suspended. As Giorgio Agamben says, “if one eats, it is not done for the sake of being fed; if one gets dressed, it is not done for the sake of being covered up or taking shelter from the cold” (Agamben 2011: 111). During a festival, the psyche and the body are divested of their natural functions – just like in those who, as theologians say, attained salvation and enjoy eternal life, whose psyche and bodies are “glorious” and “luminous.” We can, then, speak of three types of action substance. First is the object-like substance: it is the substance of an external object, which becomes the “material of action.” Second is the subject-like substance, which is the doer himself: his psyche and body, which have specific capabilities and functions; no action could be realized without them (How could we walk, dance, etc., if we had no body? How could we think, see, imagine ourselves, etc., if we had no psyche?). Third is the performative substance: it is a material medium (experienced in its functional character) of the product of activity; this substance shows itself when action becomes performative. We could say that this third type of the substance of activity and its product actually does not exist when looking from the perspective of the other two. Its character is not purely physical or mental, but (as we have said metaphorically, following Agamben) luminous, which affirms its phenomenal status of performative action interpreted as showing.

As a side note, our considerations above suggest that the object of an activity is also, so to speak, suspended during a performative reduction. Twardowski does not mention this object at all, as though the action could be analyzed separately from its subjective agency. While this assumption is false in the case of ordinary activities (if an activity has no doer or he exists indeterminately, it becomes an event rather than an act), in the case of performative activities they appear to be nobody’s. Action somehow is “disconnected” from a concrete doer, becoming

somewhat anonymous and thus resembling an event rather than an activity. As Schechner says (2013: 34), “restored behavior is ‘out there,’ separate from ‘me.’ To put it in personal terms, restored behavior is ‘me behaving as if I were someone else,’ or ‘as I am told to do,’ or ‘as I have learned.’” Obviously, this does not imply that the activity ceases to have its distinctive character, style, that is no longer a unique expression of the life of a person who is directly involved in the action. Unlike the product of an activity, which may hide the individual traits of its doer owing to its “object-like” character and be analyzed and described as “one in itself,” in the case of performative action, which highlights the functional aspect of the product (at the expense of its object-like aspect), the fact that an activity is always somebody’s must not be ignored completely. Since this element of agency is preserved in the performative product, it cannot be viewed in complete isolation from the doer and the context. Unlike with other impermanent artistic activities, such as dance or music, which can be viewed in terms so general that the existence of a specific doer is almost completely ignored – with art said to have become framed by rules – such an “abstraction” is impossible for performative action. So, the *art* of making good performances does not exist. Performative action is anonymous only up to a point. Or, to put it another way, it is neither individual nor anonymous, but intersubjective. Most typically, however, it happens that there is an individual doer who can be credited with a specific action, which, nonetheless, calls for wider agency. It is said that a performer acts in the name or place of those to whom the performance is addressed. A performer not only presents but also represents something. The subject of a performance is a certain “we.”

For this reason, it is hard to say that the performative product is, as Twardowski would see it, an *expression* of a mental product that can be reproduced (e.g., while viewing) in the mind of another individual. Neither contemporary hermeneutic philosophy nor artistic practice confirms the existence of this kind of process of reproducing the mental activities of the doer in the mental activities of the recipient. Again, we should not think that a performative product does not express anything at all or is not an expression of the doer’s idea. Our earlier remarks on agency should be sufficient for us to realize that every performance expresses or is an expression of the doer (Twardowski 1999: 122, note 48). In accordance with the terminology adopted in this article, it might be said that the performative product is not an expression; nor does it express an activity but is an “expressioning” thereof. In so doing, we avoid both a purely subjective and a purely objective understanding of expression.

Twardowski's theory of sign and meaning, which he develops on the basis of his theory of action and product, turns out to be similarly problematic. A mental activity is not the meaning of a product, which as a sign ostensibly refers to that activity. We said earlier that one of the two internal moments that make up the nature of performance is showing. Performance is a sign. What is its meaning? Well, if not a mental activity, does this mean that it is appropriate to correct the theory of meaning proposed by Husserl, whereby not a mental experience but the essence of this experience (or more precisely, the essence of the "matter" of the experience) is the meaning that has an all-embracing and supraindividual status? Apparently, in the case of performance – also in the context of meaning – an intermediate stance is recommended which neither makes meaning a mental activity nor separates its content from the individual characteristics of the doer's experience and represented recipients. Performance has neither a subjective nor only an objective meaning. Escaping this ambivalence, performance has a meaning that emerges from the unceasing play between the corporeal and psychical substance of the performer and the context. Meaning, on the one hand, goes beyond what the subject "believes" about its action; on the other, meaning does not feature in some universal, suprahistorical and supracultural order of phenomenological "essences."

This intermediate status of meaning can be grasped if we take into consideration the validity of the claim made by a particular meaning. Without being either individual or universal, it is neither relative nor absolute. The power of its claim lies in its capacity to challenge both extremes. While challenging the absolute, it does not accept the relative. And vice versa. The meaning that appears during a performative action precedes and eludes the distinction between the affirmative and the negative. Rather, it has a sense of questionability. It asks: What is happening? What does it mean? What sense does it make? And hence follows the critical and opening potential of performance.

CONCLUSION

Can we – in light of the foregoing – develop a new definition of performance by way of summary? Without the slightest doubt, Twardowski's theory of actions and products casts a new light on this issue, leaving some essential questions unresolved, nonetheless. Among the most important ones is the question of the subject of action. It is clear, however, that the reflection on the essence of per-

formative action that has marked much of contemporary humanities since the so-called “performative turn” (Domańska 2007) finds in Twardowski’s theory very clear instructions on how it can be developed to achieve recognition in the ontological-linguistic structure of performance. This opens up a new path of research for the philosophy of performance.

On the classic understanding of performance, it was a twofold or even threefold activity, containing the proper activity and the showing thereof, modeled on a prior activity or its elements. In light of Twardowski’s theory of actions and products, we can define performance as a three-element dynamic P-scheme (*P-układ*)⁹ with the following moments: (1) an activity (act) responsible for the doing, realization, and actualization; (2) a presentation that reveals or shows an activity; (3) a product that serves to preserve the pattern of the activity. Performative action so understood would fulfill the three functions attributed to performance: executive, presentational, and normative. The most obvious limitation of the above-formulated definition of performance is that it captures performance statically as an arrangement, but performance is an action or an event. Undoubtedly, this static view of performance must be complemented with a dynamic interpretation. Only by capturing and describing the tensions arising among its elements – by discovering and capturing their mutual flows and influences, and by considering the role of subjects, their initiatives, and the context – can we entertain the conviction that performance has been captured in a holistic manner.

This dynamic presentation is also essential for capturing the process of differentiation of individual kinds of performance. The above-mentioned elements of the P-scheme are subordinated to each other, forming slightly different structures, characterized at times as distinct kinds of performance: technical, cultural, and organizational. Each of these three kinds of performance is said to have a different performativity-oriented function. Jon McKenzie (2001: 97) links performativity of cultural performance to efficacy, performativity of organizational performance to efficiency, and performativity of technical performance to effectiveness. The emergence of these functions is associated with one of the basic functions (mentioned earlier: executive, representational, and normative) of performative action becoming dominant and the transformation of the whole P-scheme. At the same time, depending on the degree of this dominance, the remaining moments of this

⁹In calling performance a scheme (*układ*), we draw obviously on Raszewski’s definition of theatre as an *S-układ* (Raszewski 1991: 12). A “scheme of what is done” is also mentioned by Kosiński (2016: 47).

scheme suffer greater or lesser deformation: the weaker the primacy of a given function over the others (forcing them to play the same tune), the more each of them acts according to its nature. The greater the primacy of one function, the more the others are deformed. We speak of weaker or stronger dominance since we allow for its gradation, the intensity of which determines the genre variations of one of the three main types of performance. Accordingly, technical performance occurs when the executive function takes precedence and changes into effectiveness, turning the representational function into a measure, and normativity into a standard (McKenzie 2001: 107–108). Organizational performance takes place when the normative function takes precedence and changes into efficiency (achievement), translating the representational function into the marketing function, and the executive function into productivity. Finally, cultural performance happens when the representational function gains the upper hand, turning into spectacularity (efficacy) and transforming the executive function into a ritual one, and the normative function into a liminal one.¹⁰

The type of relationship between the three elements of the P-scheme indicated above should also be considered as a research perspective. Twardowski himself, as we recall, took an ambiguous stance in this matter, characterizing the action–product relationship with phrases like “thanks to,” “through,” or even “when.” Nonetheless, it would pay off to establish the kind of relationship that holds between action and its product, as well as that between action and presentation, or between presentation and product. For example, is an activity the cause of presentation, or is it something else? If it is the cause, is it formal, material, purposeful, etc.? Moreover, this would imply that the very activity comprises elements that provide for a presentation in the structure of action. But what does this mean? This should be answered first. Besides, there is another important thing: the question of presentation itself “acting upon” activity. That presentation – whose purpose is to reveal and show – influences the activity itself is beyond doubt. We have said that it suspends its natural function. For instance, the whole effort inherent in the art of acting, which is an exemplificatory kind of cultural performance, consists in keeping the activity “organic,” which is always “jeopardized” by presentation, which turns it into something “irreal,” a form of play. If so, this would mean that presentation, in a sense, acts contrary to the activity, reducing its gravity and naturalness. But finding out what this means exactly merits a separate

¹⁰This would obviously require more in-depth research going beyond the scope here.

study. Similarly underspecified is the question of the relationship between presentation and product. According to Twardowski, what we call "presentation" and distinguished from the other moments of the P-scheme is the functional aspect of a product, whose exemplary object-like moment is an enduring thing produced in the course of the activity. Is the moment of presentation as impermanent as the activity, vanishing together with it? Or, conversely, does it stay together with the product, even when the activity has ceased? If this moment persists in the thing, is it responsible for showing the course of the activity that has led this thing to exist, or does it have a different function? Questions can and should be asked to reveal more and more new aspects of the P-scheme, problematic as they may be. It is quite likely that such an examination would challenge some of our findings here.

Finally, there is the question of how to classify performance within the humanities. We mentioned that due to, among other things, the "performative turn," the contemporary humanities have faced new challenges that were completely absent from the culture of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in which Twardowski lived and worked. It would be interesting, for example, to examine Zbigniew Raszewski's classification of spectacles, of which he distinguishes three main types due to the familiar three-element structure and dynamics of the P-scheme: competitions, stunts, and shows (Raszewski 1991: 47). While Raszewski himself would certainly classify performance as the second type, attributing spectacle the role of an overriding notion but subordinated to the category of "S-scheme,"¹¹ Schechner (2013: 17–18), for example, would regard performance as the overriding concept, represented, among others, by spectacle and theatre, whose structure, perhaps, is determined by the P-scheme proposed here. In view of the latter, it seems that the representational element in theatre holds such a powerful sway over other moments of the system that, in a sense, it deforms their function. All of that, however, would require separate studies.

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¹¹As Raszewski says (1991: 35): "Each spectacle works by employing the S-scheme. Not every S-scheme leads to a spectacle."

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