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THE CONCEPT OF AESTHETIC VALUE IN THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL
AN OVERVIEW

Abstract

This article discusses selected conceptions of aesthetic value formulated by representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, including Kazimierz Twardowski, Władysław Witwicki, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Mieczysław Walfisz-Wallis, Stanisław Ossowski, Leopold Blaustein, and Tadeusz Kotarbiński.

Keywords: Lvov-Warsaw School, aesthetic value, aesthetics, axiology, beauty

Aesthetics — as pointed out among others by Jerzy Pelc (1977: 6) — was a philosophical discipline rarely chosen as an object of interest in the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). Nevertheless, the School's achievements in the field of aesthetics are impressive.

The representatives of the School most interested in aesthetics were Mieczysław Walfisz-Wallis,[1] Stanisław Ossowski, and Władysław Tatarkiewicz. Kazimierz Twardowski and Tadeusz Czeżowski contributed to the development of aesthetics while considering axiological, especially ethical problems. Aesthetic issues were also analyzed by Władysław Witwicki, Stefan Baley, and Leopold Blaustein.

The aim of this paper is to present concepts and theories of aesthetic value in Lvov-Warsaw School. We will take into account not only primary but also secondary literature.

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[1] Walfisz was Mieczysław Wallis' last name before the Second World War.

1. AESTHETICS, THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL, AND THE MARXISTS

The achievements of the LWS in the domain of aesthetics are nowadays appreciated by many philosophers. However, there were times when the aesthetics of the Lvov-Warsaw School, as well as the entire philosophy of the LWS, were condemned by Marxists. In the work entitled *Podstawowe zagadnienie estetyki marksistowskiej* [The Basic Problem of Marxist Aesthetics] published in 1950, Stefan Morawski — Władysław Tatarkiewicz's student — claims that "each given developmental formation corresponds to a specific object of aesthetics" (Morawski 1950: III) and distinguishes the following formations: (1) slave formation, (2) feudal formation, (3) bourgeois formation, and (4) socialist formation. He further writes:

> In the socialist period, there are bourgeois systems bearing the germ of struggle against the new ideology. . . . In the bourgeois formation, there is a differentiation of views (its basis is the change of economic relations and the breakdown of medieval universalism), and therefore the object of aesthetics is defined in three ways. (Morawski 1950: V)

Namely, the object of aesthetics is either (1) a special kind of mental experience called "aesthetic experience" (some speaking of perceptual experience and others about artistic experience), or (2) a work of literature, art, or music, or (3) a cognitive experience. Representatives of direction 1 include Tatarkiewicz and Jakub Segał, while Roman Ingarden is a representative of direction 3. We read further:

> Out of the three types of solutions enumerated above, the most numerous in the bourgeois formation are the aestheticians of the first trend; their type seems to be the most characteristic of the ideology of this period. It is an expression of the ideology's excessive individualization of phenomena and (due to this "monadizing" tendency) natural and then legitimate elevation of psychology to the status of a hegemon of the humanities. This psychological analysis treated in an ontological way ("substantial states" as separate entities) is still continued, especially from the end of the 19th century, to the obvious detriment of modern scientific aesthetics. (Morawski 1950: X)

> Aesthetics in the interpretation of prof. Segał and prof. Tatarkiewicz is only part of psychology. . . . In the interpretation of prof. Ingarden it is only part of the theory of knowledge. (Morawski 1950: XIV)

The interpreting of the diverse views of the LWS representatives in terms of subjectivism, psychology, and psychologism would be a common practice among Marxist-Leninists even in the late 1960s. Morawski repeated it in a couple of articles: "O wartości artystycznej" [On Aesthetic Value] (1962) and "Estetyka polska w okresie dwudziestolecia" [Polish Aesthetics in Interwar Period] (1964). In the former article, he indicates Witwicki as a radical psy-

chologist and subjectivist and Ossowski and Wallis as moderate psychologists and subjectivists (Morawski 1962: 36). In the latter publication we read:

> The leading trend was the psychological orientation with which the semantic interpretation became more and more dominant. From the work of J. Segał on the psychological nature of the basic issues of aesthetics (1911) to the works of Witwicki, Ossowski, Tatarkiewicz, and Wallis from the 1930s, there was a conviction that the starting point for research is the analysis of aesthetic experience. Although each of the cited authors expressed doubts as to the construction of a theory of aesthetic values on the basis of the analysis of experiences, this orientation was maintained. . . . Within the framework of the psychological orientation, an attitude symptomatic of the Polish philosophy of the time was expressed — namely, the tendency to analyze concepts, define terms, purify the language of aesthetics by getting rid of ambiguity. (Morawski 1964: 13-14)

According to Morawski, these psychologist semanticists include Ossowski, Tatarkiewicz, and Wallis. Baley is regarded as a representative of Freudism, and Blaustein as a phenomenologist — the most outstanding student of Ingarden. In a book published in 1973, Morawski regarded Ossowski, Wallis, and Pelc as philosophers representing the analytical-linguistic methodological orientation in Polish aesthetics (Morawski 1973: 82). He maintained this view also in (Morawski 1992: 20).

The above-mentioned tendency to regard representatives of the LWS as subjectivists and psychologists is perfectly visible in Seweryn Dziamski's *O subiektywizmie w wersji psychologicznej w polskiej myśli estetycznej XX wieku* [On Subjectivism in the Psychological Version in Polish Aesthetic Thought of the 20th Century] (Dziamski 1968). Dziamski includes Wallis, Ossowski, and Witwicki as supporters of subjectivism in the psychological version. He believes that, from the methodological point of view, these philosophers give up speculative considerations and turn to empirically tangible facts. Dziamski starts from a conditional (he calls it "operational") definition of aesthetic value, which he says, "in its general form, would be accepted by every adherent of the psychological position" — that is to say, also by Wallis, Ossowski, and Witwicki:

> If x is a stimulus for a person o at time t, then x has an aesthetic value for person o at time t if and only if x is a stimulus for person o at time t for an aesthetic response. (Dziamski 1968: 16)

According to the analysis of Dziamski, the positions of Wallis and Ossowski are the same.

It is also impossible to ignore, of course, the disgusting attack by Henryk Holland on the person, views, and achievements of Kazimierz Twardowski (Holland 1953, see also Kuliniak, Pandura, Ratajczak 2021). As to Czeżowski's

aesthetics — or wider, axiology — neither Morawski nor Dziamski mention it at all.

A key concept in the field of aesthetics is that of aesthetic value. The above-mentioned representatives of Lvov-Warsaw School discussed the issue of aesthetic value. These philosophers tried to answer the following questions: what is the ontological category of aesthetic value? Is aesthetic value definable or not? What kind of objects is aesthetic value associated with? Is value something absolute and objective or not? Does aesthetic value belong to the object or is it only assigned to the object by the recipient? They also consider the possibility of distinguishing types of values in aesthetics.

2. KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI

Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) — the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School — devoted two papers to issues of aesthetics: "O estetyce eksperymentalnej" [On Experimental Aesthetics] (1899a/2013) and "Z estetyki muzyki" [On the Aesthetics of Music] (1899b/2013). He also dealt with some aesthetic issues in the margins of his works on ethics.

In the paper "Etyka wobec teorii ewolucji" [Ethics and the Theory of Evolution] (1895/1927), Twardowski defends the absoluteness and objectiveness of the value of good, truth, and beauty and explicitly claims that there is a close analogy between the theory of values and evaluations in ethics, on the one hand, and the theory of values and evaluations in aesthetics as well as in logic, on the other (Twardowski 1895/1927: 347). From the ethical standpoint, things are judged on the basis of conscience, from the aesthetic standpoint — on the basis of taste (that is, the sense of beauty), and from the logical standpoint — on the basis of reason (Twardowski 1895/1927: 348). Conscience, taste, and reason are mental powers. Like in the field of ethics and logic, there are also eternal truths in the field of aesthetics — for instance, "Beethoven's symphonies are beautiful":

> It is not truths that undergo successive stages of development so that what is a truth today could turn into another truth tomorrow, but it is humanity that is transforming, developing in terms of reason and conscience, and aesthetic taste, and therefore it gets rid of more and more errors and it comes to the discovery of new and unknown eternal truths. (Twardowski 1895/1927: 356)

In "O estetyce eksperymentalnej," Twardowski (1899a/2013) presents the results of the research by Adolf Zeising (1810-1876), according to which "only sizes based on the line of the so-called golden ratio can be considered beautiful"

(Twardowski 1899a/2013: 259), and the achievements of Gustav Theodor Fechner in the field of experimental aesthetics. In "Z estetyki muzyki" (1899b/2013), the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School presents and criticizes the aesthetic conception of Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904) and defines a purely aesthetic feeling "as a feeling of both diversity and unity of a certain number of sensations" (Twardowski 1899b/2013: 262). In this work we read:

> In the field of, for example, visual impressions, if we suppose a wall is painted with only one color, even the most pleasing to the eye, then the impression of looking at this wall cannot yet be called "aesthetic." Only if there are a few colors harmonized, if there is a multitude of lines that merge into a whole that can easily catch one's eye, we will call this impression "aesthetic." Likewise, one and the same tone repeated continuously or a large number of different tones randomly coupled with each other will not make an aesthetic impression on us; and we experience it when various tones are so intertwined that they constitute a certain whole, a certain connection for us. (Twardowski 1899b/2013: 262)

In unpublished lecture notes *Zasadnicze zagadnienia teorii poznania i metafizyki* [Fundamental Issues of the Theory of Cognition and Metaphysics], presented in the academic year 1899/1900, Twardowski states that aesthetics investigates the correctness of preferences and the conditions of this correctness (Twardowski 1899/1900: 24-26). He draws an analogy between reality and beauty. Let us quote the entire excerpt:

> But isn't that a relative property then, this reality? The object is real if and only if it is a subject of a correct affirmative judgment. This is a relative property: we attribute reality to it by virtue of a correct affirmative judgment! No. After all, it must be kept in mind that the qualification of real objects, that they are those to which correct affirmative judgments apply, does not exhaust the essence of reality. It is only a temporary characteristic that shows us which objects we call "real," but tells us nothing at all about what reality actually is. Likewise in the case of a beautiful object and beauty. We say: [the beautiful object / beauty is] what we like. Good, but that's not what beauty is about; it is aesthetics that tries to discover what beauty is all about. Consequently, beauty is not a relative feature as it is inherent in certain properties of the beautiful object itself.
>
> The appearance that — when we say that existence is what the objects of correct affirmative judgments possess — it is some kind of relative property stems from the fact that we cannot imagine reality, but must imagine it in terms of a concept. And we do this by expressing a series of judgments about this subject, confirming its relationship to other subjects. By this, however, we do not claim that this object solely consists in these relations, that they are its essence, and, as it were, the whole content. An example: a particle is the smallest part into which a body can be mechanically divided. So here [we have] a description in terms of the part—whole relation, in terms of size ratios. But is this the essence of the particle? Or: the ether is what gives us sensations of light through its vibrating motion. Since we do not know the essence of the ether, we qualify it as such. But this relationship to our optical impressions is not the very essence of the

> ether, but only one of its properties, and a relative property. The same is true of reality. We can only indicate a certain relative property of real bodies that always accompanies their existence — namely, that they can be the subject of true affirmative judgments; but this attitude towards affirmative propositions does not make real objects exist. It is just the only way by which we can explain what we mean by existence. (Twardowski 1899/1900: 25)

This passage is important for several reasons. Firstly, Twardowski compares beauty to existence. Apparently, that influenced Czeżowski's recognition of value as a mode of an object's being. Secondly, Twardowski explicitly supports the objectivity of beauty: beauty does not depend on anything else. Thirdly, according to Twardowski, beauty is connected with other properties of an aesthetic object, and to discover these non-aesthetic properties is the task of aesthetics. Twardowski is an anti-naturalist because his point is not to reduce beauty to other features of an object but to establish relations between beauty and the features of an object. Finally, Twardowski distinguishes the essence of beauty from the relations between beauty and other properties or things, etc. The essence of a given object is mirrored in a classical definition, the relations between a given object and other objects are described in a theory. Accordingly, Twardowski distinguished the definition of beauty from a theory of beauty — the same would be done later by Tatarkiewicz. The definition of beauty is impossible, a theory of beauty is possible. Non-aesthetic properties correlated with beauty are the criterion of beauty; however, in these lecture notes, Twardowski does not use this term in relation to beauty (he writes about the criterion of truth).

In his lecture notes *O sceptycyzmie etycznym* [On Ethical Skepticism], presented in the academic year 1919/1920, Twardowski gives the criterion (but of course not a definition) of beauty: "beautiful [is] every object that captures a certain variety into a uniform whole" (Twardowski 1971/2013: 356). In his lectures *Główne kierunki etyki naukowej* [The Main Trends of Scientific Ethics], delivered in the academic year 1909/1910, Twardowski refers to Fechner's book *Vorschule der Ästhetic* [Introduction to Aesthetics] published in 1876 (Twardowski 1974/2013: 331). Hence it can be assumed that Twardowski would accept Fechner's thesis that an aesthetic experience is an experience towards an object that realizes the *Prinzip der einheitlichen Verknüpfung des Mannigfaltigen* — that is, the principle of the unifying connection of diversity (*Einheit in Mannigfaltigkeit*) (Fechner 1876: 15, 53-80). Beauty — as it may be assumed — is for Twardowski either (1) a property of an object or (2) an object endowed with this property, like in the case of good and evil (Twardowski 1971/2013: 375). Following George Edward Moore and Alexius Meinong, Twardowski is an anti-naturalist and claims that good can-

not be defined. As we know, the founder of the LWS has similar views on beauty. Therefore, we are dealing with an aesthetic system in which there is no definition of beauty, but there is a criterion of beauty (compliance with the rule of the unifying connection of diversity). The general criterion of value is — as we read in the lecture notes from the academic year 1905/1906 — "a general formulation of the assessment made in each particular case" (Twardowski 1974/2013: 339). In these notes we also read:

> A value is called "positive" when the judgment about its existence is the basis of positive feelings (pleasure) and the judgment about its non-existence [is the basis of] negative feelings (unpleasantness); "negative" when the opposite is true (judgment about existence — unpleasant feeling, judgment about non-existence — pleasant feeling). Value is something relative in two ways: (1) on account of a subject that has the feeling of value or that could have such a feeling; (2) on account of another value (proper, specific, derivative). Is there a value in the first and second meaning? The highest value — *summum bonum*. (Twardowski 1974/2013: 324)

As we can see, according to Twardowski, there are three types of value (and also three types of aesthetic value):

(1) absolute and objective — that is, independent of either another valuable object or another evaluating subject (value$_1$),

(2) relative — that is, dependent on another valuable object (value$_2$),

(3) subjective — that is, dependent on a certain evaluating subject (value$_3$).

When we consider the fact that value can be (a) a property or (b) an object endowed with that property, we obtain six types of value and six types of evaluation in Twardowski's theory.

According to Twardowski's view from 1905-1906, the judgment stating the existence of an aesthetic value is prior to the aesthetic feeling. The question arises whether this view is also expressed in the works of Twardowski from 1899: "O poczytalności karnej" [On Criminal Responsibility] (1899c/1994) and "Tezy sformułowane na podstawie odczytu 'O pojęciu poczytalności karnej w świetle psychologii'" [Theses Formulated on the Basis of the Talk "On the Concept of Criminal Responsibility in the Light of Psychology"] (1899d/1927). As Twardowski says, "Ethical evaluation is a mental activity, composed of certain aesthetic feelings and a judgment that is an expression of these feelings" (Twardowski 1899d/1927: 446). The judgment belonging to the soundness of mind is:

> a judgment that certain conduct is forbidden, admissible, correct, reliable. But this judgment is only an expression of a certain emotional state. We call it evaluation in the stricter sense, and we single out the emotional side as an estimation. Namely, this judgment is an expression of ethical feelings that we experience on the basis of the belief that such and such an act has been done. These are the so-called feelings of value that can relate to all sorts of things. . . . These feelings of value are either positive or negative. Hence the positive and negative value of deeds. An act has a positive ethical value if the conviction that it has been fulfilled awakens in us a pleasant feeling, and the conviction that it has not been fulfilled awakens an unpleasant feeling; an act has a negative value if the conviction about its non-fulfillment evokes pleasant feelings, and the conviction that its fulfillment evokes unpleasant feelings. (Twardowski 1994: 121)

In a book published in 1993, *Człowiek szukający etyki. Filozofia moralna Kazimierza Twardowskiego* [Man Seeking Ethics: The Moral Philosophy of Kazimierz Twardowski], Ryszard Jadczak reconstructs Twardowski's concept of value. We read there:

> By rejecting the identification of values with natural features of objects, Twardowski adhered to anti-naturalism. Value is a peculiar property of an object as well as a way of being an object. Value (good) exists objectively and absolutely, but there are different good things, things of different value. From the psychological point of view, however, the position of Twardowski is close to naturalism, because the act of evaluation, in his view, is an act grounded in feelings. (Jadczak 1993: 49)

Anna Drabarek in a chapter devoted to Twardowski's ethical approach writes:

> Twardowski's conclusion can be reduced to the statement that value does not depend on an object, because it is not embedded in it. An object is only a medium of value. Values are transcendent in relations to objects, and therefore we can talk about independence of concrete embodiments in objects. Values exist in the subjective world. We acquire knowledge of values intuitively thanks to inner experience. (Drabarek 2005: 142-143).

As we can see, a peculiar duality is inherent in Twardowski's theory. On the one hand, we have a formal-ontological theory, on the other hand — it is empirical. Are we dealing with an equivocation in the above-quoted fragments? Apparently, the objective value is a property that exists ($value_1$), whereas the value asserted by us could be relative ($value_2$) or subjective ($value_3$) or only ascribed to the object by the recipient. But the recipient could be wrong.

Another problem in Twardowski's philosophy of value is the relation between value, aesthetic feeling, evaluation, aesthetic judgment, and existential judgments. This issue is widely discussed in Dariusz Łukasiewicz's book *Filozofia Tadeusza Czeżowskiego* [The Philosophy of Tadeusz Czeżowski] (Łukasiewicz 2002: 261-272).

3. WŁADYSŁAW WITWICKI

In a historical study *Dzieje sześciu pojęć* [The History of Six Ideas: an Essay on Aesthetics] (1975/2005), Władysław Tatarkiewicz presented, *inter alia*, the so-called Great Theory of Beauty to which Władysław Witwicki (1878-1948) was inclined.[2] Tatarkiewicz writes that according to the Great Theory, beauty consists in the proportion of parts, and more precisely — in the selection of proportions and the correct arrangement of parts (Tatarkiewicz 1975/2005: 140). Beauty is, according to the Great Theory, an objective quality of beautiful things. Beautiful proportions and layouts are beautiful on their own, not because they suit the viewer or listener. On the basis of Tatarkiewicz's statements, it is difficult to establish which objects are endowed with beauty according to the Great Theory and what is its ontological category. On the one hand, Tatarkiewicz says that beauty lies in the proportion of parts, beauty depends on the proportion of parts, the proportion of parts is the basis of beauty, beauty lies in the relation of material parts; on the other hand, in the Great Theory, beauty is equated with proportion, and that beauty is a quality. The following basic interpretations of the Great Theory are possible:

(T.1) Beauty is a feature of an object that depends on the correct proportions of the parts of that object (i.e., relations between the sizes of the individual parts) and on the correct arrangement of the parts (i.e., the arrangement of parts in space or time), but is not identical with the proportion or with the layout. The correct proportions of the parts and their correct arrangement are necessary conditions for having the property of beauty.

(T.2) Beauty is identical to the proportions of the parts of an object and the arrangement of these parts. Beauty is the mereological sum (or a mereological set) of the appropriate spatial and/or temporal relations and the relations of size between the parts of an object.

(T.3) Beauty is a quality of an object. The beauty of an object depends on the beauty of the proportions of its parts and the beauty of the arrangement of these parts. The beauty of the proportions of the parts of an object and the beauty of the arrangement of these parts are necessary conditions for the beauty of the whole object.

Each of the above interpretations of the Great Theory speaks of the proportion of parts and their arrangement, and therefore the relations between the parts. Thus, this theory assumes that every beautiful object consists of at least two parts. The Great Theory denies the beauty of a single colored spot, even if we admire it.

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[2] For Witwicki's theory of ethical values, see Jadczak 1989.

According to (T.1) and (T.2), an object is beautiful just in case its parts have the right proportions and the right arrangement. In connection with this thesis, the following problems arise. First, how to determine the parts of an object that have to be proportional? Are they arbitrary parts? Second, what does it mean that the proportions are right?

It seems impossible to define the parts in question. It is only possible to indicate — for instance, in the case of a building — such elements that constitute a whole and fulfill specific functions: for example, the shaft, the capital (and its individual elements, such as the abacus, echinus, etc.), architrave, frieze (and its elements — metopes, triglyphs). Part of the meaning discussed above will not be, for example, a randomly chipped piece of stone that has been reassembled with an element. However, when it comes to the word "proper," it can be understood as an equivalent of the phrase "in accordance with the canon in force in a given art." Unfortunately, as we know, no canon was fixed once and for all, but it was constantly changing — it was evolving. In any case, certain proportions defined by the canon were considered appropriate because the buildings constructed with them were considered beautiful. Thus, in interpretations (T.1) and (T.2), there is a danger of a vicious circle: we define the beauty of a building by referring to the canon, and in turn, we explain the principles that make up the canon by referring to the beauty of the building.

Another problem arises with regard to the proportions. It is known that the Greeks actually deformed shapes of, for instance, buildings so that when viewed they gave the impression of being undeformed. In the Parthenon, for example, horizontal curves were used: the stylobate "presents itself as a rectangular piece of canvas fixed at four corners, the surface of which is blown by the wind" (Bernhard 1991: 362). This curvature is also repeated by the entablature, based on columns of the same height. The outer columns are not perpendicular but inclined towards the center of the structure. By deforming the buildings, the Greeks deviated from the ideal proportions, unless we assume that the deformation was also determined by the canon. However, Vitruvius writes:

> For the eye is always in search of beauty, and if we do not gratify its desire for pleasure by a proportionate enlargement in these measures, and thus make compensation for ocular deception, a clumsy and awkward appearance will be presented to the beholder. (Vitruvius 1914: 86 [Bk. III, Ch. 3, 13])

Thus, in Greek art, deformation, or "a proportionate enlargement in these measures," is not covered by the rules of proper proportion. It expresses a certain artistic freedom and avoids stiffness. Deformation — departing from the

rules of proper proportions contained in the canon — allowed artists to individualize the building. In fact, there are no two identical temples in Greece (Tatarkiewicz 1986: 76-80). If we assume that the deformation is not determined by the rules of proportion and arrangement of parts, then we must agree that the beauty of, for example, a building is dependent not only on the proportion of parts and their arrangement but also on the "enlargement in these measures." The correct proportions of the parts and the arrangement of the parts are necessary conditions for the beauty of an object but not a sufficient condition.

Tatarkiewicz writes that the ancient Greeks

> probably . . . were able to build well rather than explain why they build well. They developed their skill practically, empirically, and intuitively, not on the basis of scientific evidence. But for their practice, they immediately looked for a theory: that was the Greek style of action. (Tatarkiewicz 1986: 80)

Probably, the Greeks created various buildings at the beginning. They liked some of them more, others less; some they considered more beautiful than others. Therefore, they examined the proportions between individual parts of beautiful buildings (taking as the basis the so-called module — i.e., the semidiameter of the column at the base) and the arrangement of individual parts, and formulated their observations regarding the proportions and arrangement of parts in the form of an appropriate canon.

In the case of the Great Theory, it is also necessary to consider the relation between liking a certain object and the fact that a certain object is beautiful. According to the Great Theory, an object is liked because it is beautiful, not *vice versa*. Certain objects — for instance, buildings — were liked when they were built according to the canon and were additionally deformed. Tatarkiewicz says that those who initiated the Great Theory assumed that beauty "is an objective property of beautiful things and that certain proportions and arrangements are beautiful in themselves, not because they suit the viewer and listener" (Tatarkiewicz 1986: 150-151). However, the practice of the Greeks — creating the canon on an empirical basis and deforming the proportions — shows that the Greeks took the beholder into account. As it turns out, certain proportions and layouts are not beautiful by themselves: to be beautiful, they must be additionally deformed, otherwise they look stiff and ugly and do not suit the beholder's preferences.

Interpretation (T.3) explains the beauty of complex objects by reference to the beauty of proportions and arrangements, but it does not explain the beauty of proportions and arrangements. It does not explain why we like certain proportions and arrangements. It is like saying that an object is white because parts of its surface are white.

Witwicki refers to the Great Theory of Beauty, Fechner's idea of *Einheit in Mannigfaltigkeit*, and Twardowski's consideration of aesthetic value in his conception of coherent arrangement (*układ spoisty*). Beauty, according to Witwicki, is a certain property that belongs either to something simple, to a simple quality (a visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile impression, etc.), or to the arrangement of elements of the so-called well-closed coherent arrangement. The term "coherent arrangement" introduced by Witwicki refers either to a whole composed of sensory elements (i.e., impressions, content) and the relations between them (Witwicki 1925/1962: 210) (a coherent arrangement$_1$), or to a set of relations between sensory elements — that is, "something that remains the same when the quality of the components changes" (Witwicki 1925/1962: 210) (a coherent arrangement$_2$). The coherent arrangement$_1$ is a certain perceptual, productive, or reproductive presentation (*przedstawienie*, *Vorstellung*), while the coherent arrangement$_2$ is an object abstracted from the coherent arrangement$_1$.

As examples of coherent arrangement, Witwicki points to the arrangement of five components in card five in a card deck, the letters of the alphabet, a melody, an image of a familiar person, a view of the face, a sound of a well-known word, verse, and poem (Witwicki 1925/1962: 210). While the qualities of its components do not matter for the values of the coherent arrangement$_2$, these qualities are important in the case of the values of the coherent arrangement$_1$. A melody understood as a coherent arrangement$_2$ has the same value regardless of the quality of sounds: it could be played on any instrument without change in value. A melody understood as a coherent arrangement$_1$ may differ in value depending on the quality of the components — for instance, a melody played on a comb is less valuable than a melody played on a piano because the foundations of the former are uglier than those of the latter.

According to Witwicki, each work of art is a spectacle (*widowisko*) and therefore a certain coherent arrangement, but:

> a spectacle does not necessarily mean something to be seen with the eyes. It is about some whole, some coherent arrangement, which would stand out from the rest of the world, attract attention with its appearance, and attract people to be seen with the eye, with the ear, to have it in any kind of sense impressions or in their combination; in reality or in the imagination. (Witwicki 1963: 278)

Among the coherent arrangements, Witwicki distinguishes well-closed coherent arrangements. These are such arrangements that adding anything to them or removing anything from them changes their quality (Witwicki 1925/1963: 123). They have the ability to evoke aesthetic experiences: "elementary aesthetic pleasure, given in dealing with a well-closed coherent

arrangement, is actually a pleasant feeling of power" (Witwicki 1925/1963: 124). Artists are able to "create decent, organized wholes from the chaotic, raw material they experience" (Witwicki 1920: 55), which give both their creators and recipients a sense of power. At the core of Witwicki's aesthetic theories lies the thesis of "cratism": "Every human being avoids the feeling of humiliation and aims at gaining a sense of power" (Rybicki 1975: 67). We find cratic threads not only in Witwicki's ethics (see Jadczak 1981) but also in his aesthetics, and not only in the theory of aesthetic value but also in theories of artistic activity, aesthetic experience, and work of art (Horecka 2013: 146-148). Aesthetic feeling in Witwicki's conception is therefore a reaction to a beautiful object, it is a pleasure or an unpleasantness experienced in an aesthetic attitude and referring to the simple content of the performance or to the content of a complex representation constituting a coherent, well-closed arrangement (in the latter case, the pleasures and the unpleasantness are related to the arrangement of elements of a coherent arrangement and to the content of these elements (Witwicki 1963: 112-113).

After World War II, towards the end of his life, Witwicki was very skeptical about the possibility of defining the conditions of beauty. In his *List o estetyce* [A Letter on Aesthetics], written in 1947, he says:

> You urge me to write on aesthetics. What is this going to be? A theory of beauty? What would that mean? Should I list in order the features that any item must have so as to be beautiful? And prove that it must possess them, and without them it cannot be beautiful? What does it mean: beautiful? Probably something liked by someone. But who? Me alone? And who cares about that, except my loved ones? So maybe not only me, but also my good friends? Too little. So who? All people? I can't. Because it would mean: Europeans, Chinese, New Zealanders, and Bushmen. And the Greeks from the 5th century BC and Americans and Russians from the 20th century. I do not know the preferences of all people and all human groups, and I know that their feelings and assessments often differ greatly. (Witwicki 1949: 23)

As we mentioned, Witwicki was regarded by Morawski and Dziamski as a radical subjectivist and psychologist. Bohdan Dziemidok (1975) argues against the position of Morawski and Dziamski but states that there are sufficient grounds for the opinion that Witwicki's conception is a form of subjectivism. Nevertheless, he adds immediately:

> However, you cannot limit yourself to this. Witwicki is not at all consistent in this matter. His views on the theory of values do not constitute a coherent and consistent system. Apart from declarations and subjectivist theses, one can find in the works considerations conducted in the spirit of objectivism. (Dziemidok 1975: 11)

It could be claimed that Witwicki's solution is like Twardowski's and we are dealing with two points of view: (1) formal-ontological and (2) empirical.

Aesthetic value is undefinable from the formal-ontological point of view, it exists objectively. Yet within an aesthetic object, it is connected with other properties; the empirical task of an aesthetician is to recognize these non-aesthetic properties — that is, the criterion of beauty. In the case of Witwicki's theory, this criterion is a well-closed and coherent arrangement.

4. WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ

As it was said, Marxists consider Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886-1980) a psychologist and subjectivist. Dziemidok, on the other hand, concludes that in the earlier period "Tatarkiewicz defended the conviction that values are objective, recognizing subjectivism as a false theory" but "in a later period . . . he doubted the full objectivity of aesthetic values. . . . He never accepted aesthetic subjectivism, but he also — in course of time — considered radical aesthetic objectivity to be a one-sided solution" (Dziemidok 1975: 31). Is Dziemidok right?

Let us note that although Tatarkiewicz's work from 1919 is entitled "On the Absoluteness of Good" (Tatarkiewicz 1919/2022, translated for this volume), its subject is not only ethical value. For we read:

> In the present discussion, "good" is not limited to moral good or to utilitarian good or to the sum of moral and utilitarian good; it also encompasses other goods, such as aesthetic, which are neither moral nor utilitarian. Good in this broad interpretation means the same as "value," or more precisely, the same as a positive value; they are synonyms. In other words, good is what is valuable in some way. Evil is what has negative value. Good or value in this broad interpretation are the most general terms in the field of evaluations, just as "being" or "object" are in the field of claims. (Tatarkiewicz 1919/2022: 173, in this volume)

According to Tatarkiewicz, the absolute good — that is, taken "apart from relationships and comparisons" as a property — is one, but there are many items that are also called "goods" — these are objects that have the property of good (Tatarkiewicz 1919/2022: 209; 1986: 113).

In an article published in 1966, "Pojęcie wartości, czyli co historyk filozofii ma do zakomunikowania historykowi sztuki" [The Concept of Value, or What a Historian of Philosophy Has to Say to an Art Historian], Tatarkiewicz emphasizes that the term "value" means "either a property of a thing or a thing that possesses it" (Tatarkiewicz 1966/1986: 70). He writes:

> Two nouns are actually needed: to denote a particular thing beautiful and an abstract quality of beauty. . . . In Polish, "piękno" (beauty) fulfills both functions, and thus is an ambiguous expression. (Tatarkiewicz 1975: 136-137).

Tatarkiewicz points out that the main concept of aesthetics is currently the concept of beauty in an exclusively aesthetic sense (as opposed to, for example, moral beauty). The property of beauty is something that the object is really endowed with and not something that is merely attributed to the object. Tatarkiewicz claimed that:

> we cannot define good and evil, at least in the usual way. This is not negligence but rather an unavoidable state of affairs: it does not derive from our choice of concepts and terms but from the nature of things that we apply those terms to. Good (in the broad interpretation) is a simple property, which cannot be taken apart. It is impossible to define it *per genus et differentiam* as it constitutes the highest genus of a whole domain of evaluations. . . . "good" cannot be defined, just as "being" cannot. (Tatarkiewicz 1919/2022: 173; 1986: 80)

In (Tatarkiewicz 1966) this position is slightly weakened: "defining a value is difficult, if at all possible" because the word "value" "seems to mean a specific, simple, irreducible phenomenon" (Tatarkiewicz 1966/1986: 70). Tatarkiewicz claims that at least a periphrasis of value can be given: "the value of a thing is the property that makes it better for this thing to be than not to be" (Tatarkiewicz 1966/1986: 70). This periphrasis is applied to the value in general; Tatarkiewicz does not give any periphrasis of the aesthetic value.

Tatarkiewicz claims that the term "value" is sometimes used only in a positive sense (in this case, an ugly item is said to have no value), or also in a negative sense (in this case, an ugly item is said to have a negative value) and "the differences between these ways of using the word 'value' are only formal, linguistic and it is ultimately irrelevant how it is used, as long as it is used consistently" (Tatarkiewicz 1966/1986: 70). I believe that Tatarkiewicz is wrong in this last respect because using the concept of value only in a positive sense makes it impossible to distinguish axiologically indifferent objects. With a positive understanding of value, an object without value — for instance, beauty — is equivalent to an ugly object. By contrast, if we distinguish between positive and negative values, an ugly object can be called "an object endowed with a negative aesthetic value," and an axiologically indifferent object — "an object having neither a positive nor a negative aesthetic value." We do not have such a possibility of distinguishing between objects — for instance, ugly and axiologically indifferent as to the aesthetic value — if we use "value" only in a positive sense.

It must be emphasized that Tatarkiewicz — like Twardowski — distinguishes a definition from a description — that is, from a theory:

> The definition of a name is merely a prelude to the knowledge of things: it has separated them into a class, and now it is necessary to establish the properties of that class. Let us call the propositions that establish them "theories." In the correct order, knowledge about a class consists of (one) definition and theories (more or less numerous). (Tatarkiewicz 1975/2005: 18)

Tatarkiewicz gives an example: if someone writes: "Beautiful are things you like when you look at them," we are dealing with a definition, but when it is said that "beauty depends on perfection, proportion, and shine," then we are dealing with a theory (see Tatarkiewicz 1975/2005: 18). In the introduction to the *History of Aesthetics* published in 1960, he writes that in empirical aesthetics:

> nothing is done except that it states and generalizes facts: it describes the properties of things that we consider to be beautiful, describes the experiences we have towards them, and states the criteria we use to evaluate them. (Tatarkiewicz 1960/1985, vol. 1: 14)

Let us note that, in his conception of value, Tatarkiewicz — as an anti-naturalist — does not provide a definition of value. What he puts forth is a theory of value. Thus, in such writings as, for example, "Postawa estetyczna, literacka i poetycka" [Aesthetic, Literary, and Poetic Attitude] (1933/1972) or "Skupienie i marzenie" [Concentration and Dream] (1934/1986) we are not dealing with a definition of value but with a theory of value. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the values in Tatarkiewicz's account are something relative and subjective. It is worth mentioning that in the abstract *Ce que nous savons et ce que nous ignorons des valeurs* [What We Know and What We Ignore about Values] (1937) Tatarkiewicz repeats that values are objective (Tatarkiewicz 1937: 12).

Let us mention that Tatarkiewicz (1919/2022) defines a relative property of an object as one that corresponds to the *relation* of this object to another object (e.g., properties designated by adjectives "distant," "earlier," "later") and a subjective property as a property such that its possession by an object depends on a subject (Tatarkiewicz 1919/2022: 172, 180; 1986: 79, 87). In the case of subjective property, it is the subject that renders the object valuable. Thus, by no means can it be concluded that the value in Tatarkiewicz's conception is subjective and relative.

It is worth noting that in *Historia estetyki* [The History of Aesthetics] (1960), Tatarkiewicz points out that some aestheticians claim that "the basic concept of their science is not beauty but an aesthetic attitude and the experience of beauty" and that "aesthetics is a science solely about the aesthetic experience: it can be science only if it is psychological" (Tatarkiewicz 1960/1985: 14). The author considers such a position to be too problematic but admits that aesthetics as a discipline has two branches: apart from objective issues,

there is a place for issues of subjective experience. These two branches are connected, they condition and complement each other (see Tatarkiewicz 1960/1985: 14).

As we can see, Dziemidok is not right to conclude that Tatarkiewicz, in the later stages of his life, was close to subjectivism. Dziemidok's mistake is pointed out by Ryszard Wiśniewski in his work written in 1976 and published in 2013, *Dobro: moralność, szczęście i piękno. Studium aksjologii Władysława Tatarkiewicza* [Good: Morality, Happiness, and Beauty. A Study of Władysław Tatarkiewicz's Axiology]. Wiśniewski emphasizes that in Tatarkiewicz's thought:

> aesthetics is part of ethics as a general theory of value; in other words, the value of an aesthetic object does not follow from its definition, from its nature. The assertion that good is a unique and most general property of its kind must also be maintained in the area of aesthetic values. . . The issue of the value of aesthetic objects is an issue that, in Tatarkiewicz's axiology, is resolved in terms of abstract and general assumptions. (Wiśniewski 2013: 220)

Wiśniewski recalls important words of Tatarkiewicz from a debate organized by the journal *Znak*:

> In abstract matters, the role of a conceptual apparatus is particularly great: those who are used to employing one apparatus find it difficult to switch to another. As for me, I am used to something other than father Krąpiec; my apparatus is dualistic, it adopts two different orders: the order of being and the order of values, which sometimes connect, but not always. *In ordine divino* they are one, but for a human, being and value are two different things, and it seems artificial to try to combine them. . . . I got used to, and I will probably never stop being used to looking at being and value in such a dualistic way: certain values are realized in being, others do not. I think that this conceptual apparatus is not bad: it is natural to treat being and value as completely different threads that meet, cross, converge, diverge. (*Znak* 130 [1965]: 433, Wiśniewski 2013: 53)

As Wiśniewski says, in these words, Tatarkiewicz expresses the conviction that the order of values is not reducible to the order of reality; Tatarkiewicz's "axiology considers values as general objects, and the value of concrete objects is adjudicated elsewhere — in the order of being" (Wiśniewski 2013: 53).

Tatarkiewicz considers the issue of the classification of aesthetic values. He concludes that such a classification is impossible:

> Classification is a division into narrower classes, while aesthetic phenomena (experiences, attitudes, objects, values) do not constitute a class at all and therefore cannot be divided; they do not have properties that would belong to all of them, and only to them, and would be such that without these properties, there would be no class of objects. (Tatarkiewicz 1933/1972: 87).

Tatarkiewicz points out, however, that while aesthetic phenomena (including values) form a pseudo-class, three subsets of this pseudo-class are genuine

classes: (1) aesthetic phenomena in a narrow sense, (2) literary phenomena, and (3) poetic phenomena. Tatarkiewicz (1933/1972: 86) indicates three types of aesthetic experiences and adds: "an analogous division [to the division of aesthetic experiences — AH] should also be carried out for aesthetic objects and for aesthetic values." These three types of aesthetic experiences are as follows: aesthetic experiences in a narrow sense, poetic experiences, and literary experiences. According to Tatarkiewicz, during an aesthetic experience in a narrow sense, the recipient focuses on the appearance of the object, on what is sensual, and above all on the arrangement of its parts (i.e., form); he takes delight in mere watching. In the case of literary and poetic experiences, the liking is aroused not by the appearance of objects but by the images and thoughts that the recipient associates with these objects, and by the content rather than the form. In the case of literary experiences, the most important role is played by the intellectual factor, and in the case of poetic ones — by the emotional one.

Tatarkiewicz creates a similar typology for aesthetic objects. Aesthetic objects in the strict sense include objects that are liked thanks to the mere sight of them, such as flowers, fabrics, animals, ceramics, jewelry, works of architecture and technology, sculptures and music, visions and fantasies. Literary objects include objects that use signs and evoke experiences with an intellectual factor. They are, for example, works of literature, some works of painting, sculpture, and music. Finally, poetic objects are objects that evoke experiences with an emotional factor — for instance, poetry, landscapes, some musical works.

Tatarkiewicz does not carry out an analogous division for aesthetic values, but only allows it to be made. However, offering such a typology is problematic. Probably three types of values should be distinguished: (1) aesthetic values in a narrow sense, (2) literary values, and (3) poetic values. It may be assumed that aesthetic values in the narrow sense would be possessed by real objects, the appearance of these objects, and the arrangements of parts of these objects. Literary values would be possessed by presentations (*przedstawienia*, *Vorstellungen*) and thoughts (or perhaps objects of thought) that the recipient associates with these objects and their content.

In "Skupienie i marzenie" [Concentration and Dream] (1934/1986) Tatarkiewicz presents a slightly different typology of aesthetic objects: he distinguishes not three, but two types: (1) objects that evoke aesthetic concentration in the strict sense — namely, aesthetic (*sensu stricto*) and literary objects, and (2) objects that evoke dreams — namely, poetic objects (Tatarkiewicz 1934/ 1986: 174). So it seems that we should similarly distinguish only two types of aesthetic values, not three.

Let us note that Tatarkiewicz's statements concerning types of aesthetic objects and experiences are made in the order of being. But when Tatarkiewicz argued that a similar classification could or even should be made in the domain of aesthetic values, he goes beyond the order of being and steps into a different order — the order of value. Is it correct to propose a classification of values on the basis of divisions made in the order of being? Or maybe the possibility of classifying aesthetic objects and experiences is only a consequence of an analogous classification in the order of values? What are the relations between these two orders? We leave this question unanswered.

Finally, let us turn to the problem of the aesthetic object — a problem that seems to be complex when we take into account Tatarkiewicz's statement:

> in the consciousness of a person dealing with a work of art, there is usually something more than the work itself; there are also images and thoughts associated with it. They are like a supplement to the work made by the work's recipient. Together with it, they constitute what we call "an aesthetic object." It is more than a set of the form and content: there is more to these additions. In an aesthetic experience, they constitute a position no less important than the form and content. (Tatarkiewicz 1949/1972: 157-158)

If we accept Tatarkiewicz's structure of an aesthetic object, we will be forced to assume that while a work of art — for example, Leonardo da Vinci's *The Virgin of the Rocks* — is one, there are many aesthetic objects created on the basis of this work: maybe even as many as there are recipients of this work. However, the object that possesses aesthetic value is the work of art itself.

5. TADEUSZ CZEŻOWSKI

Tadeusz Czeżowski's (1889-1981) views on the nature of values, including aesthetic values, underwent an evolution. In the paper "O formalnym pojęciu wartości" [On the Formal Concept of Value] written in 1915-1918, Czeżowski examines the following whole: object *a* has value *w* for object *s* due to object *p* (Czeżowski 1919/1989: 122). Object *s* is the evaluating subject and object *p* is the value parameter. According to this approach, a value is a relational property, more precisely — a bi-relational property of an object. It is a subjective property — that is, dependent on the evaluating subject, and at the same time relative — that is, dependent on the value parameter. Value is not an immanent feature of an object but it is only ascribed to it (Czeżowski 1919/1989: 122). Czeżowski calls the relation between the object and the value parameter *p* "the fundamental ratio" and believes that this ratio "determines the positive or negative value of the object *a*" (Czeżowski 1919/1989: 123). In the field of

aesthetics and ethics, the basic relation is "compliance or non-compliance with certain rules" (Czeżowski 1919/1989: 123). The basic relation may also be "the ability to evoke pleasant or unpleasant feelings wherever the value is assessed in relation to the experiencing subject" (Czeżowski 1919/1989: 123).

Czeżowski's conception of value could be treated as a general axiological theory. Its author does not provide any example of its application in the field of aesthetics. However, since Czeżowski claims that various types of values are distinguished according to the parameters of value, it can be assumed that in his theory we would deal with two varieties of aesthetic values of an object *a*:

(1) aesthetic value due to the parameter of compliance or non-compliance of object *a* with aesthetic rules (aesthetic value1),

(2) aesthetic value due to the evoking of a pleasant or unpleasant aesthetic feeling in the recipient (aesthetic value2).

And so, on the one hand, we could say, for example, that Leonardo's *The Virgin of the Rocks* has a positive aesthetic value1 for a certain person *O*1 thanks to its compliance with the principles of a triangular Renaissance composition, and on the other hand — that it has a positive aesthetic value2 for *O*1 due to the fact that it evokes a pleasant aesthetic experience in *O*1. However, for another person *O*2, this painting could have a negative aesthetic value1 due to non-compliance with the rule of symmetry, and a negative aesthetic value2 due to a failure to evoke a pleasant aesthetic experience in *O*2. Of course, it could also happen that for a certain person *O*3, the image in question would have a positive aesthetic value1 and a negative aesthetic value2, or *vice versa*. As we can see, these two different types of aesthetic values are independent of each other.

In the papers "Jak budować logikę dóbr?" [How to Build a Logic of Goods?] (part 2) (1959-1960/1989) and "Jak budować logikę dóbr?" (part 1) (1960b/1989), Czeżowski distinguishes goods that are doubly relativized from absolute goods. Let us emphasize that Czeżowski calls "goods" all individual objects that satisfy the criterion of value. The criterion of value is a descriptive predicate — namely, the phrase "such and such" in the generalization "such and such things are valuable" (Czeżowski 1959-1960/1989: 136). Hence beautiful, aesthetically valuable objects are also goods. Goods are not only ethically valuable objects. This is important because it entitles us to assume that the general views developed by Czeżowski on ethics could also be applied to aesthetics. Let us note that in (Czeżowski 1959-1960/1989) Czeżowski distinguishes the primary meaning of the word "valuable" from a secondary one. A good is valuable in the primary sense of the word "valuable"

when it is valuable "not because of something else but only because of itself" (Czeżowski 1959-1960/1989: 136). Thus in the fundamental, primary sense, something is valuable when it is absolutely valuable, whereas in a secondary sense "valuable" is the same as "relatively valuable." According to Czeżowski:

> Goods are the goals of human endeavors, different people choose different goods as goals of their endeavors. In this way, the good relativizes itself, becoming good for someone. At the same time, the scope of goods is expanded through a different kind of relativization — namely, things that are in different relations to goods constituting the primary goals become secondary goods for someone. (Czeżowski 1959-1960/1989: 136)

We would therefore distinguish three types of goods (i.e., valuable objects) in Czeżowski's theory, including of course aesthetically valuable objects (and at the same time we would talk about three types of value):

(1) $good_1$ — absolute and objective good,

(2) $good_2$ — absolute and subjective good (as the goal of someone's pursuit),

(3) $good_3$ — relative and subjective good.

We would talk about:

(1) a $good_1$ in a particular sentence "it is valuable" — that is, a sentence of the scheme $D1(x)$, in which the variable x refers to an individual object,

(2) a $good_2$ — in a sentence of the scheme: $D2(x, x, z)$ — "x is $good_2$ due to x for z," where z stands for the evaluating subject,

(3) a $good_3$ — in the sentence with the scheme $D3(x, y, z)$ — "x is $good_3$ due to y for z," where y stands for the value parameter different from x, and z refers to the evaluating subject.

When applied to the aesthetic value we would have, for instance:

(1) aesthetic $value_1$ stated in the sentence "The painting by Leonardo da Vinci *The Virgin of the Rocks* is aesthetically $valuable_1$";

(2) aesthetic $value_2$ stated in the sentence "The painting by Leonardo da Vinci *The Virgin of the Rocks* is aesthetically $valuable_2$ because of itself for Czeżowski";

(3) aesthetic $value_3$ stated in the sentences "The painting by Leonardo da Vinci *The Virgin of the Rocks* is aesthetically $valuable_3$ for Czeżowski due to the fact that it evokes an aesthetic experience in him" or "The painting by Leonardo da Vinci *The Virgin of the Rocks* is aesthetically $valuable_3$ for Czeżowski due to the fact that the painting is consistent with the canons of composition in the Renaissance."

All these aesthetic values would be some sort of object's property.

Both Czeżowski's axiological conceptions, from 1919 and from the years 1959-1960 face difficulties. The first difficulty arises as to the question of how values (including aesthetic values) understood as properties can be the goals of human striving. It seems that the goals can be states of affairs, actions, or products of the actions — for instance, the artist's goal is to create an aesthetically valuable object, and the recipient's goal is to come into contact with an aesthetically valuable object. The second difficulty related to the first arises in relation to the value of the so-called original goals of striving. We read in (Czeżowski 1959-1960/1989: 136): "things that secondarily become goods for someone else are differently related to goods that constitute the primary goals of striving." If the artist's primary goal is to create an aesthetically valuable object, then the object to be created has a value secondary to that of the artist's goal. Similarly, if the recipient wants to come into contact with a work of art in order to have an aesthetic experience and that is the recipient's primary goal, then it must be more valuable than the aesthetic object itself.

It can be assumed that the former difficulty was noticed by Czeżowski as early as 1936. In the paper "O przedmiocie aksjologii" [On the Subject Matter of Axiology] (1936/1989), the author points out that there are axiological sentences in which:

> we declare a fact or state of affairs to be "good." In these sentences, therefore, the predicate is "good," and the subject is a sentence about a fact, e.g., that "*S* is *P*" is good. At the same time, "good" is not a term identical to the term "good" as an *abstractum* from good, nor is it a name for all goods, i.e., good objects in their proper meaning. . . . According to the analogy with the modal sentence "it is necessary that *S* is *P*," the sentence "it is good that *S* is *P*" means that the fact stated in the sentence "*S* is *P*" is good. (Czeżowski 1936/1989: 115)

Facts are existing states of affairs. Czeżowski (1936/1989) claims that a state of affairs may be *good*, or it may be *a good*. I believe that Czeżowski does not determine unequivocally whether the appropriate sentence has the form:

(1) "That S is P is good" or

(2) "That S is P is a good."

It is certain, however, that "good" and "a good" were considered by Czeżowski in 1936 as predicates.

In any case, my assumption that in the papers written in the years 1915-1918 and 1959-1960 Czeżowski presents general axiological theories, which can be applied to aesthetic values, may be questioned. The problem is that according to Czeżowski's *Propedeutyka filozofii* [Introduction to Philosophy] (1938),

only ethical values could be the aims of human pursuits, thanks to the resolutions (Czeżowski 1938: 127). It turns out that the aesthetic and ethical values are not wholly parallel.[3]

Czeżowski distinguishes feelings of value, or affections (e.g., love, hatred, sadness, despair, fear, anger, indignation, pity, jealousy), from aesthetic feelings, or preferences. In the *Propedeutyka filozofii*, Czeżowski states that there are many analogies between these two kinds of feelings, evaluations (moral and aesthetic), and values. (1) A feeling of value is positive or negative depending on whether its object has a positive or negative value (Czeżowski 1938: 124). (2) The assessments of both kinds are (a) individual (b) true or false (c) statements or denials (d) of values, but they differ from judgments in that they do not concern the existence of an object (Czeżowski 1938: 122). (3) Neither ethical nor aesthetic value is a sensual, empirical property. (4) Values are sensually unknowable. These are similarities. What are the differences?

(1) A necessary condition for the origin of a feeling of (moral) value is the subject's conviction about the existence of a valuable object (Czeżowski 1938: 124). In the case of an aesthetic feeling, such a condition does not have to be satisfied. It is enough that the object (existing or not) is given in the content of a presentation (*przedstawienie*, *Vorstellung*) or a general concept (Czeżowski 1938: 121). (2) "For the origin of an aesthetic feeling it is indifferent what relations connect the object of the feeling with other objects, it does not matter whether this object is useful for something or useful at all, whether it is ours or in our power, whether it causes something or is an effect of something else" (Czeżowski 1938: 121). By contrast, feelings of value may arise against the background of the subject's relationship with other people. (3) Assessments of (moral) values may be relative or absolute, while aesthetic assessments are only absolute. (4) Negative feelings of value provoke the desire to change the negatively assessed state of affairs (Czeżowski 1938: 127). By contrast, aesthetic feelings are contemplative, and their characteristic feature is disinterestedness (Czeżowski 1938: 123), which means that an aesthetic feeling — whether positive or negative — does not cause action. In his "Strach i lęk (przyczynek do klasyfikacji uczuć)" [Fear and Anxiety (A Contribution to the Classification of

[3] The lack of parallelism between the theories of aesthetic and ethical values is noted among others by Andrzej Wachowiak in "O spójności dobra i piękna. Tadeusza Czeżowskiego czasy wileńskie" [On the Coherence of Good and Beauty: Tadeusz Czeżowski's Vilnius Times] (Wachowiak 1997: 100-102). Wachowiak refers to many unpublished writings by Czeżowski. Particularly noteworthy is Czeżowski's description of subjectivism and objectivism in terms of values and his conclusion that "for . . . subjectivism there is no axiology as a special branch of philosophical considerations. Evaluation and assessments, in accordance with the theses [of subjectivism — AH], should be considered within psychology" (Wachowiak 1997: 97-98).

Feelings)] published in 1945 Czeżowski emphasizes that while feelings of value, or moral feelings, are active, aesthetic feelings are inactive — contemplative (Czeżowski 1945/1958: 265).

It is necessary to comment briefly on the relation between the ethical or aesthetic judgment (i.e., assessment) and the feeling of value or the aesthetic feeling in Czeżowski's axiology. Feelings are secondary to evaluations. We get to know the value directly, then we state it in an assessment, and subsequently, we have an axiological experience. Not the other way round. An object is liked because it is valuable, not *vice versa*. Czeżowski deals with these issues already in the *Propedeutyka filozofii* (Czeżowski 1938: 124) and then many times in other works, especially in (Czeżowski 1965b).

It seems that Czeżowski's papers on the formal concept of value and the logic of goods only concern ethical values. We could find the same opinion in Wiśniewski's article "Doświadczenie aksjologiczne a teorie etyczne w koncepcji Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" [Axiological Experience and Ethical Theories according to Tadeusz Czeżowski]. The author points out that the concept of value in Czeżowski's works does not have a fixed scope of meaning. In the beginning, Czeżowski "uses the term 'value' in relation to moral values" and later, in his texts written not before 1936, he says that goodness and beauty are two varieties of values (Wiśniewski 1989: 267-268).

As a result, solutions in the theory of values presented by Czeżowski in the papers written before 1936 cannot be transferred without additional assumptions to the theory of aesthetic values. Such a transfer requires making assumptions incompatible with Czeżowski's thought that aesthetic values can be not only absolute but also relative, and that an aesthetically valuable (negative or positive) state of affairs can trigger an attempt to change it.

We deal with a completely different conception of value in the works of Czeżowski written after 1948, in which the author claims that value — and aesthetic value in particular — is not a property of an object but its mode of being (strictly, a modification of being): "the concept of being is most general and behaves differently in the processes of generalization, specialization, and negation than all genera and species" (Czeżowski 1948: 70). It is transcendental: non-determinable (there is no name whose scope would intersect with the scope of the name "being") and non-infinite (there is no name whose scope would be wider that the scope of the name "being"). Consequently, for Czeżowski (who follows Aristotle and Thomists in this regard), the concept of being is not generic (i.e., it does not correspond to a genus) but analogous, and "cannot be obtained from subordinate concepts by means of a perfect abstraction" (Czeżowski 1948: 71). Modifications of being are members of the distinctions made within the totality of beings. Modifications of being are: autonomous

(*samoistny*) and non-autonomous being, possible and necessary being, real and conceptual being, and values: good, truth, and beauty. Czeżowski must therefore — it seems — recognize that evil, falsehood, and ugliness are also modifications of being. Presumably, in the case of such modifications as truth or autonomy, there is no gradation (something is either autonomous or not; something is either true or not), but we can talk about more beautiful and less beautiful, better and worse things. Czeżowski would therefore have to assume that there are many modifications such as beauty or good — perhaps even infinitely many.

Czeżowski considers the issue of value also on the linguistic level. Thus, he claims that the expression "beautiful" — like words "existing," "necessary," "possible," "good," and "true" — are transcendental terms — that is, terms outside the scope of any Aristotelian category or proper predicates (such as "colorful"). Czeżowski compares two sentences: "*a* is good" and "*a* is green" (Czeżowski 1960a/1989: 108) and claims that:

(Z.1) "*a* is green" means the same as "$\exists x\,(x = a \,\&\, x$ is green)."

(Z.2) "*a* is good" means the same as "It is good that $\exists x\,(x = a)$."

If we replace the word "good" with "beautiful" in (Z.2), we get the formula:

(Z.2a) "*a* is beautiful" means "It is beautiful that $\exists x\,(x = a)$."

As we see, sentences (Z.1) and (Z.2) have different "deep" structures. The word "green" is a predicate, whereas the word "good" (or "beautiful") is not a predicate but a propositional functor (operator) analogous to modal functors. In the logical paraphrase of the sentence (Z.1), the expression "is green" remains a sentence-forming functor for one name argument (s/n) — that is, it creates a sentence in connection with the name; by contrast, in the logical paraphrase of sentences (Z.2) and (Z.2a), the expressions "good that" and "beautiful that" are sentence-forming functors for one sentence argument (s/s). Czeżowski's conclusion is as follows: aesthetic value is sensually unknowable, non-representable (like existence, necessity, or possibility), and is stated as an object's mode of being in modal sentences. Czeżowski adds that:

> between features and modes of being there is a connection such that each feature belongs to its object according to a certain *modus*, in some way: either actually or necessarily, or possibly, or so that it is beautiful or good, etc. (Czeżowski 1965b: 120)

What was Czeżowski's inspiration to create such a theory of values? Dariusz Łukasiewicz, who in the book *Filozofia Tadeusza Czeżowskiego* [The Philosophy of Tadeusz Czeżowski] discusses both Twardowski's and Czeżowski's notions of values, including the issue of transcendentals (see Łukasiewicz

2002: 261-272, 281-285), in the article "Tadeusz Czeżowski's Theory of Values" (2004) claims that Czeżowski's understanding of values as *modi entis* is inspired by: (1) the Brentanian idiogenetic theory of judgment that consists of two statements: "A judgment is not a mere combination of presentations (*przedstawienia*, *Vorstellungen*)" and "Every judgment is existential"; (2) a Brentanian thesis that emotions can be logically evaluated as proper or improper like judgments; (3) a statement defended by Brentano: "Existence is not representable, because it is neither a predicate nor an object," which is a consequence of (1). Łukasiewicz shows that Czeżowski puts forward an original argument supporting the idiogenetic theory of judgment (regarding "true" and "existing" not as predicates like "green" etc. but as syncategorematic propositional functors) and extrapolates the result of his analysis onto modal concepts and values ("necessary," "possible," "valuable") (see Łukasiewicz 2004).

The problem of transcendentals is also raised by Czeżowski in the summary "Transcendentalia — przyczynek do ontologii" [Transcendentals: A Contribution to Ontology] (1977). In this paper, Czeżowski defines transcendentals as ontological concepts that go beyond the system of general concepts or universals. Universals are arranged in a hierarchy from the lowest species to the highest genera or categories. There are two categories: an autonomous being — that is, the first substance in Aristotle (*ens a se* or *ens per se*), namely, an individual object — and a non-autonomous being (*ens ab alio* or *ens in alio*), which is a property, relationship, event, or process (see Czeżowski 1977: 54). Examples of transcendentals are concepts of necessity, possibility, beauty, good, etc. Necessity, possibility, beauty, and good themselves are denoted by transcendentals and are modes of being: *modi entis*. *Modi entis*: (1) are non-representable, (2) are stated in sentences "with a specific structure consisting of a propositional functor and its argument in the form of an affirmative or negative sentence," (3) can be negated, and their negations are not empty, (4) are cognizable intuitively — that is, directly (non-discursively) and comprehensively (without mentioning the properties of an object or its part) — in an appropriate cognitive attitude. For values, this attitude is an evaluative attitude: moral or aesthetic (Czeżowski 1977: 55-56). Let us note that thirty years earlier, Czeżowski claimed that neither moral nor aesthetic attitudes are cognitive attitudes (Czeżowski 1947/1958: 238-240).

Czeżowski explicitly says that negation as lack is opposed to existence, and positive values have negative values as their opposite. And here an interesting question arises: "Is there any room in Czeżowski's theory for objects that are neither good nor bad — that is, ethically indifferent — and neither beautiful nor ugly — that is, aesthetically indifferent?" This question is an-

swered positively by Jan Woleński in "Dwie koncepcje transcendentaliów" [Two Conceptions of Transcendentals]: "Czeżowski proposed a theory of transcendentals that respects the fact that beings can be good, bad, or indifferent" (Woleński 1993/1996: 150).[4] Woleński proposes a formalization of such a theory. Wiśniewski (1989: 278), however, states that:

> it is more difficult . . . to find in Czeżowski's texts a complete answer to the question concerning the way a negative value exists. In the classical philosophy of values, evil is understood as the lack of good, and modern axiology builds a developed axiomatics of the good—evil relationship in terms of their existence or non-existence. Czeżowski admitted that he had not resolved this problem in his theory. (Wiśniewski 1989: 278)

The acceptance of existence or the possibility of existence of indifferent objects in Czeżowski's philosophy could be supported by a distinction drawn by himself: necessity — impossibility — contingency (as non-necessity and non-impossibility) (see Czeżowski 1977: 55, Woleński 1993/1996: 153-155). We would have respectively: beauty — ugliness — aesthetic indifference as non-beauty and non-ugliness (see Woleński 1993/1996: 152-153). Let us consider a quote from (Czeżowski 1938: 124): "An object that is indifferent, worthless, neither good nor bad is never an object of emotion." Is it an argument against the existence of indifferent objects? No, because in the case of an indifferent object, we would not experience a suitable emotion at all. We would adopt an evaluative attitude (for example aesthetic) towards the object, we would know directly that the object does not have a given value, we would formulate an assessment stating the lack of this value and we would have neither a feeling of liking nor a feeling of disgust.

In the light of the article on transcendentals, we can ask once again what objects of what ontological categories can have an aesthetic value. Since the concept of aesthetic value is a *transcendentale*, it seems that, on the one hand, an object of value may be an independent being (*ens per se*) — that is, a thing such as a painting or a sculpture — or a dependent being (*ens in alio*) such as a property (e.g., a certain shade of color), a ratio (e.g., a proportion), an event (e.g., death), a process (e.g., a spectacle). On the other hand,

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[4] In his "Ontologia i zło" [Ontology and Evil], Woleński (1992/1996: 90-94) proposes a formalization of the theory taking into account evil and good as *modi entis* and strictly defines theses of (I) radical ontological etism in versions: (Ia) monism of good (Every being is good), (Ib) monism of evil (Every being is bad), (Ic) dualism of good and evil (Every being is good or bad); (II) moderate ontological etism in versions: (IIa) moderate etism of good (Some beings are good, other are indifferent), (IIb) moderate etism of evil (Some beings are bad, other are indifferent), (IIc) moderate dualism of good and evil (Some beings are good, some beings are bad, and some beings are indifferent), (III) ontological ethical indifferentism (Every being is indifferent).

Czeżowski talks about the criteria of value — that is, the properties by which we recognize that an object is aesthetically valuable. But can a beauty criterion be given for a beautiful property or a beautiful ratio?

It is worth mentioning that as examples of goods Czeżowski gives: health, good fame, wealth, physical objects (e.g., money, land, good weather, rain during a drought), products of human psychophysical activity — that is, products of culture, mental phenomena, and even psychological dispositions (e.g., intelligence, prudence, kindness of heart), ideal objects (knowledge) (see Czeżowski 1938: 126).

In a paper published in 1949 entitled "Etyka jako nauka empiryczna" [Ethics as an Empirical Science], Czeżowski says that assessments have as their object "either an empirical individual when the object of assessment is given in a presentation (*przedstawienie*) or an abstract object of a general concept, such as the concept of happiness analyzed above, when we evaluated happiness positively" (Czeżowski 1949a/1958: 60). How should we understand the "empirical individual" in the above passage? On the one hand, according to (Czeżowski 1951/1958), an empirical individual is a particular — a thing or a person. On the other hand, according to (Czeżowski 1959: 15), various objects could be given in a presentation, among others: physical and mental phenomena. Are individual events, processes, states of affairs — for instance, the murder of Mahatma Gandhi by Nathuram Godse on January 30, 1948 in New Delhi — empirical individuals? They are endowed with value. Apparently, we should understand the expression "empirical individual" used by Czeżowski in a broader sense in which this term encompasses not only things and persons but also particular events, physical and psychological phenomena, processes, dispositions, relations, etc.

It is worth mentioning the problem of non-existent or non-real objects. As Czeżowski claims, someone can have an aesthetic feeling or even a feeling of value toward an object that is given in a presentation or concept but does not exist. For example, I consider the non-existent murder committed by me to be a bad, horrible deed and my decaying corpse as ugly and disgusting. How is it possible in Czeżowski's axiology, given that value is a mode of being and not a mode of non-being?[5]

A property such that an object possessing it is beautiful is called by Czeżowski "the criterion of beauty." It allows one to distinguish aesthetically

[5] For a solution to that problem, see Jacek Jadacki's article "Kłopoty z kategoriami ontycznymi czyli o (pewnych) poglądach Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" [Problems with Ontological Categories: On (Certain) Views of Tadeusz Czeżowski] (Jadacki 1999) and a paper by Cezary Gorzka "Teoria wartości Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" [Tadeusz Czeżowski's Theory of Value] (Gorzka 1991).

valuable objects from other objects. Czeżowski, therefore, does not provide a definition of beauty; he lists four kinds of beauty: grace, sublimity, tragedy, and comedy (see Czeżowski 1938: 122) and puts forward a theory of beauty. Wiśniewski discusses the issue of the criteria of values (taking into account the theories of Twardowski, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski, Ingarden, and Elzenberg) in his "Problem z kryteriami wartości. W nawiązaniu do aksjologii Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" [A Problem with the Criteria of Values: In Reference to the Axiology of Tadeusz Czeżowski] (Wiśniewski 2002).

It is worth mentioning that Czeżowski did not write any work devoted entirely to aesthetic value. As Tadeusz Siwiec (2009: 811) puts it, the issues of aesthetics were discussed by Czeżowski "only contextually against the background of broader axiological analyzes, in which the author gave priority to ethical issues." Siwiec's paper is wholly devoted to Czeżowski's aesthetics and fills the gap that the author himself points out, noting that Czeżowski's aesthetics is not mentioned either in the collective work *Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889-1981): dziedzictwo idei: logika — filozofia — etyka* [Heritage of Ideas: Logic — Philosophy — Ethics] (Tyburski, Wiśniewski 2002) or in Teresa Kostyrko's paper "O swoistości polskiej myśli estetycznej XX wieku" [On the Specificity of Polish Philosophical Thought of the 20th Century] (Kostyrko 2007). Let us add that the Marxists do not mention Czeżowski either. Czeżowski's aesthetic theory is taken into account by Dziemidok, but is not called by him directly "axiological objectivism" but "the conception of objectivity of the criteria of value." Surprisingly, Dziemidok claims that Czeżowski's "account of the relation between value and qualities of an object is partially convergent with Ingarden's idea that aesthetic value is a polyphonic synthetic quality built on simple qualities, but is not identical with it, because for Czeżowski, qualities are criteria values and are not valuable themselves" (Dziemidok 1975: 21). I cannot agree with Dziemidok's conclusion. Czeżowski's and Ingarden's concepts of values do not fit together at all.

Finally, let us turn to the studies by Agnieszka Smolicka. In the article "Rola wartości w życiu człowieka w ujęciu Tadeusza Czeżowskiego" [The Role of Values in Human Life according to Tadeusz Czeżowski] (2009: 782) the author refers to Czeżowski's work "Trzy postawy wobec świata" [Three Attitudes towards the World] (Czeżowski 1947/1958) to invoke his distinction between cognitive, practical, and contemplative (i.e., reflective) attitudes, which correspond to the threefold nature of human behavior: learning, acting, and contemplating aesthetic objects. These attitudes are "intertwined in the mental life of each of us and bring about its richness and diversity" (Czeżowski 1947/1958: 240). Smolicka notes that:

> the deeper manifestation of philosophy, aesthetics, and the ability to contemplate are, according to Czeżowski, endangered today, especially in the life of a man enslaved and deformed by the one-sided expansion of scientific cognition and technical activity, focused mainly on profit and publicity. (Smolicka 2009: 782)

Hence, Czeżowski calls to return to the classical ideal of moderation, order, and harmony (Czeżowski 1947/1958: 241).

Smolicka also refers to Czeżowski's paper "Jak rozumieć 'sens życia'"? [How to Understand the "Meaning of Life"?] (1949b/1958). Czeżowski distinguishes three senses of the phrase "the meaning of life." In the first sense, life has meaning when "it has been arranged in such a way that it creates a certain whole rationally aimed at achieving the best goals that we are able to achieve under given conditions" (Czeżowski 1949b/1958: 231); in the second — "the meaningfulness of life, or its value, is measured by the results of actions achieved in their course"; "this value extends beyond the individual life, having social effects" (Czeżowski 1949b/1958: 232). In the third sense, life is meaningful as an element of the world as a whole; the whole world is meaningful because of its logical and harmonious structure (Czeżowski 1949b/1958: 233). Smolicka says that "Man, with the goals and products of his actions, reaches beyond individual life" (Smolicka 2009: 783) and quotes Czeżowski: "The dead not only rule the living but also teach and equip them" (Czeżowski 1949b/1958: 232). Regarding aesthetic value, we can say that whoever multiplies cultural goods and creates works of art gives meaning and value to his life and "equips" future generations. In her doctoral dissertation, Smolicka (2010) compares the concepts of values of Czeżowski and Elzenberg.

6. MIECZYSŁAW WALFISZ-WALLIS

In Twardowski's and Czeżowski's theories, "aesthetic value" is an undefined expression. The definition of aesthetic value is given by Mieczysław Walfisz-Wallis (1895-1975). For Walfisz-Wallis, aesthetic value is the ability of certain objects to evoke aesthetic experiences in the recipient (Walfisz-Wallis 1968: 9). According to the philosopher, aesthetic value is a property of certain objects and does not exist in isolation from them. It is also a dispositional property: it reveals itself only when appropriate conditions are met.

Under the influence of Morawski, Dziamski considers Walfisz-Wallis' conception to be a variant of subjectivism in the psychological version, and more precisely, he imputes to him a viveristic (from Latin *vivere* — to live) or bioaesthetic position, according to which:

> the aesthetic value is reduced to experience understood only in a general sense — that is, to the reaction that is called "aesthetic." . . . This experience constitutes the aesthetic quality of the object. (Dziamski 1968: 46)

Dziemidok states that subjectivists "consider the aesthetic attitude to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of aesthetic value. This value is then created by an aesthetic attitude" (Dziemidok 2002: 259). According to Dziemidok, from this point of view, Walfisz-Wallis cannot be considered a subjectivist (Dziemidok 1975: 33), but he is a psychological relationist (Dziemidok 1975: 32-37).

According to Dziamski, relationism is the view that "value arises from the correspondence between subjective and objective properties" (Dziamski 1968: 41). Dziemidok explains that relationists reject "both the objectivist and subjectivist solution, believing that beauty is neither an objective property nor a product of the subject's experience, but that it emerges in the relation between the object and the subject" (Dziemidok 1975: 8).

I submit that Walfisz-Wallis cannot be considered a psychological relationist. Firstly, he protests against Ingarden's accusation that he "illegally psychologizes value" (Walfisz-Wallis 1949/1968: 205). He writes: "By saying 'object *P* has aesthetic value *a*,' we only mean that 'object *P* is *a*'" (Walfisz-Wallis 1949/1968: 188). Secondly, by writing that "aesthetic values do not have . . . any being independent of aesthetic objects" (Walfisz-Wallis 1949/1968: 188), he merely wants to say that he does not recognize the existence of properties in themselves — for example, properties that are not exemplified. Thirdly, let us note once again that, according to Walfisz-Wallis, aesthetic value is a dispositional property. I believe that, according to Walfisz-Wallis' theory, even if there were no humans in the world, objects would have an aesthetic value, so I am in favor of the objectiveness of value in Walfisz-Wallis' theory. For comparison, consider the fragility of a crystal glass made of a very thin layer of material. Fragility is a dispositional property. Such a glass taken gently in the hand will not reveal its fragility, but when held tight and pressed, will fall into pieces and its fragility will reveal itself. This disclosure of brittleness will depend on external conditions — for instance, the colder it is, the more likely it is that the glass will break, but it also depends on the subject — the person taking it in the hand. I believe that the aesthetic value in Walfisz-Wallis' approach is similar to such fragility (but fortunately, an aesthetic object is not destroyed when it reveals its aesthetic value). It is necessary to distinguish between the aesthetic value itself as a dispositional property and the disclosure of aesthetic value. The dispositional property is objective and absolute, but its disclosure depends on the subject.

Teresa Pękala devoted the entire third part of her book *Estetyka otwarta Mieczysława Wallisa* [The Open Aesthetics of Mieczysław Wallis] to Walfisz-Wallis' theory of aesthetic values (Pękala 1997: 116-157). By applying Ingarden's analytic methods to aesthetic value in Walfisz-Wallis' account, Pękala concludes that such a value is a relative being (Pękala 1997: 126). I would agree that as a property it cannot exist alone without an object that exemplifies it. But I would not concede that it is a relative being. I prefer Tatarkiewicz's method of analysis, which allows one to argue that Walfisz-Wallis' value as a property is not relative because it belongs to an object P_1 and does not depend on any other object P_2. It is therefore an absolute feature.

Pękala points out that it is possible to derive two categories from Walfisz-Wallis' theory — concepts of potential and actual value — and refers to Tadeusz Pawłowski (1924-1996, Janina Kotarbińska's student), who accepted such a solution after 1970 (Pawłowski 1987: 88, n. 1). In his book *Wartości estetyczne* [Aesthetic Values], Pawłowski states that:

> The aesthetic value that is attributed to each object according to the pansemiotic assumption is the potential value. In the process of actualizing, the system of features constituting the potential value is captured and experienced as a value. (Pawłowski 1987: 90)

> The process of actualizing the values consists of three elements: 1 — improvement, extending our capacity of cognitive-emotional responsiveness, 2 — perceiving and recognizing the quality of objects and aesthetic values associated with them, 3 — an acknowledgment of this value. (Pawłowski 1987: 89-90)

The lack of experience does not mean the lack of value, because an object may have a potential value, which under appropriate conditions may constitute an actual aesthetic value (Pękala 1997: 145-146, Pawłowski 1987: 90). It must be emphasized that Pawłowski believes — unlike Walfisz-Wallis — that the ability to induce aesthetic experience is not an essential property of value, it does not belong to the set of definitional features of values but "is associated with a set of essential properties on the basis of empirical relations established by appropriate research." However, Pawłowski does not determine the nature of these relations (Pawłowski 1987: 86-87).

I would rather not distinguish potential value from actual value, because I believe that the emergence of value in certain conditions is not a value, but a symptom of value.

The expression "aesthetic value" is defined by Walfisz-Wallis using the expression "aesthetic experience." However, Walfisz-Wallis no longer defines aesthetic experience. It is limited only to listing the properties that are usually associated with such experiences: aesthetic experience is "a state or a series of states of strong concentration of attention, . . . suspends for some time

the drives, desires, strivings that thrill us in everyday life," is something isolated — that is, it is not connected with other aesthetic experiences and interrupts the course of our everyday life (Walfisz-Wallis 1931a/1968: 238).

Walfisz-Wallis distinguishes several types of aesthetic values depending on the types of aesthetic experiences. Aesthetic experiences can be harmonious — those that have a homogeneous tinge — or partially disharmonious — those that have elements of unpleasantness as their ingredients (Walfisz-Wallis 1931a/1968: 240). In the case of disharmonious experiences, "we achieve satisfaction . . . only after overcoming some initial unpleasant feelings," "we reach aesthetic satisfaction in a circular way — through initial unpleasantness — disgust, disorientation, fear, depression" (Walfisz-Wallis 1932/1968: 262). An example of an aesthetic experience that is partly disharmonious is the experience that we have when dealing with comic, lofty, tragic, or aesthetically ugly objects. According to the experience, we have the following aesthetic values: beauty and prettiness (i.e., the ability of objects to evoke a harmonious aesthetic experience in the right recipient under appropriate conditions) and aesthetic ugliness, loftiness, tragedy, and comedy (the ability of objects to evoke a partially disharmonious aesthetic experience in the right recipient under appropriate conditions).

One object can have several aesthetic values — for instance, it can be lofty and beautiful at the same time. However, not all combinations of aesthetic values are possible: it is impossible, for example, to combine comedy and prettiness in one object. Walfisz-Wallis claims that the transition from beautiful to lofty objects is "continuous — that is, we have aesthetic experiences in which unpleasant feelings . . . are barely discernible, so that we may have doubts as to whether the object that elicits these sensations is beautiful or lofty" (Walfisz-Wallis 1949/1968: 193-194). There is a similar transition from beautiful (*piękne*) to pretty (*śliczne*) objects. It seems, therefore, that we are dealing with a similar "transition" between the very values — for example, beauty and loftiness, or beauty and prettiness. In Walfisz-Wallis' conception of aesthetic values, we are presented with a typology, not a logical division. Beauty, prettiness, aesthetic ugliness, loftiness, tragedy, and comedy are the types of ideal aesthetic values; between some types, there are many intermediate varieties.

Walfisz-Wallis pays particular attention to the subjective conditions of aesthetic experience. He distinguishes between appropriate and inappropriate aesthetic experiences. He defines improper aesthetic experience as "an aesthetic experience towards a certain object *P* in which the recipient does not actualize all the essential aesthetic possibilities of *P*, or in which the effect of *P* on the recipient is in some way modified by the 'background' of *P*, by the

influence of outsiders, or by certain states or dispositions of the recipient on which several of these factors act jointly" (Walfisz-Wallis 1937/1968: 56). On the basis of Walfisz-Walis' papers, it can be concluded that we deal with an improper aesthetic experience when, in relation to an object with an aesthetic value of type *T* to the degree *S*, a certain subject has an experience of a different type than *T* and to a different degree than *S*. For every object having an aesthetic value, there is some optimal experience of the recipient that is "adequate" to the value of that object.

The question arises as to what kinds of objects are endowed with aesthetic values in Walfisz-Wallis' theory. The word "object" that appears in the definition of aesthetic value is understood by Walfisz-Wallis "as broadly as possible" as corresponding to the word "something" (Walfisz-Wallis 1931b/1968: 243). An aesthetic object — that is, an object with an aesthetic value — can be a certain thing, a physical body (a piece of furniture, a building, a machine, a landscape), an organism (a human, a plant, an animal), a person (or a group of people), a feature (color, shape), a phenomenon (a sunset), a process (human life), an event (someone's behavior), a relationship (harmony, arrangement of elements), an activity (a mental process), an image, a fictional object, or even a scientific theory. An aesthetic object can, in principle, be an object of any ontological category.

In 1968 Walfisz-Wallis changed his views on the nature of the aesthetic object. A note from that year calls into question the theory of value developed earlier (Walfisz-Wallis 1931b/1968: 255). This is because in this note — published under the influence of Ingarden — Walfisz-Wallis suggests that "marble blocks, canvases covered with paint, etc., should be called 'bearers of works of art.'" Works of art and aesthetic objects — according to Walfisz-Wallis — are created when the recipient notices and interprets these "bearers." From the "foundations of being," thanks to the recipient's conscious acts, aesthetic objects are created. While in Walfisz-Wallis' theory from before 1968, aesthetic value was a property of an "existing" object, in the theory that assumes the existence of bearers of aesthetic objects, aesthetic value is a feature not of an "existing," real object, but of an intentional object. We read in one of Ingarden's works: "aesthetic values do not exist in the same way as real objects, . . . they are probably qualifications or a special superstructure of purely intentional objects, having at most their existential basis in certain real objects" (Ingarden 1948/1970: 218).

7. STANISŁAW OSSOWSKI

In his book *U podstaw estetyki* [The Foundations of Aesthetics], Stanisław Ossowski (1933/1966) presents various aspects on account of which a given object could be aesthetically assessed. In terms of Czeżowski, we could say that Ossowski concentrates on the diversity of aesthetic value parameters. We can ascribe value to a piece of art because of: (1) appearance, (2) composition (arrangements of colors, tones, blocks, arrangement in time, space), (3) appearance and composition of the object represented by that piece of art, (4) realism, (5) the way of capturing the content, (6) artist's attitude to the topic, (7) harmony between form and content, (8) expression, (9) intention of the artist, (10) realization, (11) artistry, (12) its ability to evoke aesthetic feelings. The author states that "aesthetic value in contemporary European cultural community is a conceptual cluster" (Ossowski 1966: 283). Therefore, he proposes to distinguish two types of valuation in aesthetics — valuation with regard to beauty and with regard to artistry. He is also aware that his terminological proposal differs from some linguistic customs: "the word 'beauty' is also burdened with the duality of the concept of value, but to a lesser . . . degree than the term 'aesthetic value'" (Ossowski 1933/1966: 282).

Ossowski's terminological proposal raises doubts, however, if — in accordance with the remark from the introduction to *U podstaw estetyki* — the word "beautiful" is treated as an equivalent of the phrase "possessing an aesthetic value" (Ossowski 1933/1966: 15). To avoid misunderstandings let us assume that we have two kinds of aesthetic value in the broad sense of the word (two values in aesthetics): artistic value and aesthetic value in the narrow sense. Artistic value is — according to Ossowski — assigned to an object due to the artistic effort put into it: due to the fact that the object is "a product of great craftsmanship, great ingenuity, dexterity, or great intensity of creative power" (Ossowski 1933/1966: 282). Aesthetic value in a narrower sense is — according to Ossowski — ascribed to an object due to the recipient's aesthetic experience. Ossowski writes: "aesthetic value is a value assigned to objects because of a certain type of experience that one has thanks to these objects — namely, due to aesthetic experiences" (Ossowski 1933/1966: 253), and: "the only common feature of all objects having aesthetic value would be the property of inducing aesthetic experiences, a property that, by definition, we considered a test of aesthetic values" (Ossowski 1933/1966: 256). The "aesthetic value" in the previous sentence should be understood as the aesthetic value in a narrower sense.

The latter statement by Ossowski resembles Walfisz-Wallis' definition of aesthetic value. However, while Wallis directly talks about the fact that aesthetic value is a property — the ability of an object to induce experiences (i.e., he gives a definition of aesthetic value) — Ossowski only talks about the correlation between value and the property of inducing aesthetic experiences. Valuable objects, according to Ossowski, have the property of evoking aesthetic experiences, but (as it seems) this property is not the aesthetic value of these objects. Ossowski seems to be adopting a statement that is a consequence of Walfisz-Wallis' definition of aesthetic value — namely, that under certain conditions an object with an aesthetic value (in the narrow sense) evokes an aesthetic experience in the recipient. Ossowski says that aesthetic value (in the narrow sense) is a value assigned to aesthetic objects due to an aesthetic experience. This statement, however, cannot be treated as a definition of aesthetic value, because Ossowski later talks about the experience as a *test* of aesthetic value. If we accept the following formulas as definitions: "aesthetic value is what the subject assigns to an object because of an aesthetic experience" (Ossowski 1933/1966: 17) and "aesthetic experience is a test of aesthetic value" (Ossowski 1933/1966: 14), we get an intermediate vicious circle.

The difficulties in exploring Ossowski's views on the essence of aesthetic value stem from the fact that Ossowski does not decide whether certain objects are beautiful because we like them (i.e., we experience aesthetic experiences towards them) or we like certain objects (i.e., we experience aesthetic experiences towards certain objects) because they are beautiful. However, there are many indications that Ossowski is inclined to accept the statement that if an object is liked by someone, then that object is aesthetically valuable in the narrow sense, and to reject the statement: "If an object is aesthetically valuable in the narrow sense, someone likes it." In Ossowski's theory, the relation between the subject's reaction to an object and the attribution of an aesthetic value to the object is unclear. In particular, several variants are possible: (1) the subject assigns an aesthetic value to an object and then reacts to the object; (2) the subject reacts to an object and then assigns an aesthetic value to that object; (3) the ascription of an aesthetic value to an object by the subject is the subject's reaction to the object or an element of this reaction. It seems that Ossowski would be willing to accept the second option: aesthetic experience is a necessary and sufficient condition for assigning an aesthetic value, and in particular, it is the cause of assigning value to an object; the subject's aesthetic experience as a cause precedes the subject's ascription of an aesthetic value in the narrow sense to a given object.

The question arises of which objects have aesthetic values according to Ossowski. This point has not been fully clarified by Ossowski. It seems that in

his theory, sensual qualities, sense data (interpreted or not interpreted), arrangements of elements, and specific objects of the external world could be endowed with aesthetic value (Ossowski 1933/1966: 23).

As mentioned above, Ossowski was regarded by Morawski and Dziamski as a subjectivist and psychologist. His position — as well as that of Walfisz-Wallis — was called "viveristic" and "bioaesthetical" (Dziamski 1968: 46). Dziemidok (1975: 37) considered Ossowski to be a psychological and sociological relationist. I believe that in the light of the axiological considerations of Twardowski, Czeżowski, and Tatarkiewicz, one could be tempted to defend the statement that Ossowski distinguished the theoretical problem of value from the empirical problem of the criteria of value, but he has never said it explicitly and precisely. Therefore, his position is interpreted as undecided. But it must be emphasized that Ossowski consistently distinguishes artistic and aesthetic values.

8. LEOPOLD BLAUSTEIN

Leopold Blaustein (1905-1942/44) does not develop a theory of aesthetic values: he is primarily interested in various types of perception and the issue of aesthetic experience. Even though he extensively cites the views of Ingarden, he does not accept Ingarden's concept of aesthetic values developed in the 1930s. Blaustein believes that in an aesthetic experience, the subject actively shapes the aesthetic object. He writes: "in an aesthetic experience, an object appears as endowed with certain aesthetic values, but the number and type of those values that reach the consciousness of the experiencer depend not only on the objective properties of the object but also on the course and type of perception" (Blaustein 1938/2005: 12) and "only with the perception of the object . . . the work of art is revealed . . . in all its aesthetic qualities and values" (Blaustein 1938/2005: 12). According to Blaustein, it seems that aesthetic value is not co-created by the subject in an aesthetic experience on the basis of certain properties of the object, but belongs to "existing" fragments of reality. It is revealed, however, only in the perception of the object. One could say that it is inherent in the object potentially and that the perceiving subject actualizes it.

9. TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI

Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886-1981) believes that beauty as an aesthetic value is a property not only of objects of fine arts but also of other objects and that it is given "in such structures of mental totality that cannot be grasped either with the eye or with the ear or with the visual or auditory imagination" (Kotarbiński 1961: 72). According to Kotarbiński, everything that "at least partially satisfies some need or liking" has value (Kotarbiński 1948/1987: 129). Are all values: ethical, aesthetic, etc., equally important and equally significant? In Kotarbiński's view, there is a hierarchy of values and, in action, everyone should choose the most important option. The most important thing to do is to "prevent a greater evil or remove an evil" (Kotarbiński 1948/1987: 129). The latter thesis is the thesis of practical realism.

As a consequence of this thesis, Kotarbiński claims that works of art are not particularly important objects. They are important only insofar as they counteract evil — that is, they bring joy, enable the recipient to cope with misfortune, or contribute to the development of appropriate moral attitudes (Kotarbiński 1961: 73). In an article written in 1948 we read:

> Art is important not because it creates beauty, delight, joy, satisfaction, etc., but because it prevents ugliness, fights with it, and displaces it. This, however, is a function of less importance than that of preventing stupidity, let alone comparing the importance of such a skill with that of preventing death or disability. Operating rooms are more important than concert halls, although it must be admitted that the joy of listening to music often helps patients to cope with the gloomy atmosphere of suffering and physical suffering itself. (Kotarbiński 1948/1987: 131)

Let us mention that the thesis of practical realism was criticized by Henryk Elzenberg as striking against culture (science, art, love) and the sense of life (Elzenberg 1963/1966: 129-135). A detailed analysis of Elzenberg's argumentation against Kotarbiński's thesis is presented by Joanna Zegzuła-Nowak (2017: 154-182). In reaction to Elzenberg's criticism, Kotarbiński slightly weakened his position. In an article published in 1965, we read that, according to the practical realist:

> It will be best if the main forces will be engaged in the fight against evil. For music and poetry, he [the practical realist — AH] leaves a place in the program of activities, but not the main place, and he sees the main value of art not in the fact that it evokes specific emotions (although it is valuable and even very valuable) but in the fact that it gives temporary relaxation and relief to people who fight against evil in its numerous and varying forms. (Kotarbiński 1965/1987: 136)

As we can see, objects equipped with an aesthetic value are, according to Kotarbiński, important only as objects that enable and facilitate the achieve-

ment of ethical goals. Aesthetic values are therefore secondary, and ethical values are primary.

CONCLUSION

Between 1895 and 1899, Kazimierz Twardowski formulated the basic axiological theses and created the framework for the axiological discourse in the Lvov-Warsaw School. He provided a conceptual apparatus, distinguishing six types of values that are obtained by combining two logical divisions of values: (1) value (a) as a property or (b) as an object endowed with that property; (2) values: (i) absolute and objective, (ii) subjective, (iii) relative. The founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School defended objective and absolute values and claimed that there is no definition of value, but the criterion of value could be formulated. For aesthetic value, this criterion is Fechner's unifying connection of diversity.

We can observe that at least three philosophers refer directly to Twardowski's ideas: Władysław Witwicki, with his conception of coherent arrangement, Tadeusz Czeżowski, and Władysław Tatarkiewicz — with their terminology and the idea of objectiveness and absoluteness of value.

The innovations of Czeżowski's theory of value are, firstly, the account of value as a mode of being, secondly, his proposal of formalization of axiology (the logic of goods), and thirdly, the diversification of the so-called value parameter. Czeżowski claims that, according to different value parameters, we obtain different types of value (aesthetic value of an object according to compliance or non-compliance with certain rules or according to the ability to evoke pleasant or unpleasant feelings). This is important because it was Czeżowski who, in 1919, indicated the basis for distinguishing the aesthetic artistic value from the emotional one.

This differentiation was accepted by Stanisław Ossowski, who claimed — in the 1930s — that the contemporary expression "aesthetic value" was an equivocal cluster, and so he indicated and analyzed many value parameters.

The main contributions of Mieczysław Walfisz-Wallis to the theory of aesthetic value are, firstly, his definition of aesthetic value in terms of dispositional property, secondly, his proposal of diversification of values, and thirdly, his subtle and detailed descriptions of various aesthetic experiences.

What is characteristic of Witwicki is the connection between the idea of aesthetic value and his theory of cratism.

We can also observe the influence of phenomenology of Ingarden upon the representatives of Lvov-Warsaw School. As we saw, both Walfisz-Wallis in 1968 and Tatarkiewicz in 1972 leaned towards the claim that aesthetic property is a property of intentional objects.

All the above-mentioned philosophers assumed that aesthetic values are as important as ethical and logical ones. The exception is Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who argued that aesthetic value is only a "servant" of ethical value.

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