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THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF INTROSPECTION ACCORDING TO KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI

Abstract

Kazimierz Twardowski attributed high cognitive value to introspection because he believed it plays a fundamental role in psychology, the primary philosophical discipline. He believed that basing philosophy on inner experience would allow it to obtain universal and justified results. Internal experience consists of perceiving one's own mental facts; it is non-sensual and self-evident. Twardowski referred to introspection in his investigations in various ways, which is presented in the article.

Keywords: introspection, Kazimierz Twardowski, Lvov-Warsaw School, mental phenomena, psychology

The question of the cognitive value of introspection¹ has a long tradition, dating back to antiquity. Particularly noteworthy are the solutions proposed by modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Kant, who represent the so-called traditional theory of introspection (Judycki 2002: 265-266). The emergence of psychology as an independent scientific discipline in the 19th century fostered discussions about inner experience. These discussions were combined with a dispute over the new science's methods and its relation to philosophy. Twardowski's position in this dispute was based on the views of Franz Brentano, which, however, Twardowski creatively developed (Rzepa 1991: 169). In this paper, I want to show the place and character of inner experience in Twardowski's conception of philosophy and the way he referred to inner experience to justify specific claims.

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¹ Like Twardowski, I use the words "introspection" and "inner experience" interchangeably.

Thus, in section 1, I indicate that, according to Twardowski, the use or the non-use of introspection serves as a criterion for delimiting particular philosophical disciplines. In section 2, I present the characteristics of introspection given by Twardowski (its specificity, difference in relation to external experience) and his view on the irreducibility of psychology to physiology. In section 3, I illustrate the way in which Twardowski used introspection in his research on traditional philosophical problems (defending the thesis about the immortality of the soul, distinguishing notions from other types of presentations, criticizing psychological hedonism) and psychological problems (the relationship between the assessment of the length of the “auditory” and “visual” utterances). In section 4, I argue that Twardowski’s concept of introspection and its heuristic value significantly influenced the views of the representatives of the so-called Lvov Psychological School.²

1. THE RELATIONSHIP OF INNER EXPERIENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

In his “Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy” (1897), Twardowski presents the concept of philosophy as a set of philosophical sciences, like psychology, logic, ethics, and metaphysics. Twardowski believes that current philosophy is characterized by “psychologism,” which focuses on the mental side of philosophical issues, as opposed to “metaphysicism,” which consists in conducting philosophical considerations to conform to certain metaphysical assumptions. As a result of this psychological attitude, one studies, for instance, the formation of the concept of God in the mind instead of studying God as a certain object; instead of studying the essence of goodness, one studies the formation of a moral sense in man, and so on. Such an approach has brought rich results to philosophy: for instance, through psychological research it has been possible to give accurate formulations of some ethical concepts, such as the sense of duty, compassion, motive, intention, resolve; through psychological study of cognitive activities, it has been shown that traditional logic does not exhaust these activities. So with a psychological

² My discussion is mainly historical, so I do not elaborate on the issue of evaluating Twardowski’s views on introspection from a contemporary perspective, which would require a separate study. For a discussion of the contemporary views on the nature of introspection, see Ziemińska 2004, Dąbrowski 2017, Schwitzgebel 2019. I make a few comments on this matter in the conclusion.

stance, philosophy will be able, like other sciences, to achieve universal and justified results (Twardowski 1897: 57-58).

Psychology should be counted among the philosophical sciences since all the objects of philosophical investigation can be reduced “to some extent” to the symptoms of mental life. Thus, psychology provides philosophy not only with a method but also with objects. If inner experience did not exist, if we did not know the symptoms of our own mental life, then neither psychology nor any other philosophical science could exist (Twardowski 1897: 59).³ The classification of psychology as a philosophical science is also supported by the fact that introspection is sometimes regarded as the primary method of psychology (Twardowski 1897: 54-55). These words imply that Twardowski is convinced of the philosophical character of the method of introspection; that psychology’s use of introspection keeps it close to philosophy and far from becoming independent.

Twardowski uses the concept of inner experience to define the philosophical sciences. Each of these sciences studies objects given only in inner experience or objects given both in inner and outer experience. The first group includes, among others, the sciences that study the manifestations of mental life related to different kinds of evaluation: logic and epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of law. This group also includes the science that studies the mental symptoms related to the concept of God — that is, the philosophy of religion. The second group includes the theory of relations and metaphysics, which draws its issues from both kinds of experience (Twardowski 1897: 60-61).⁴ The fundamental role of inner experience in this

³ Adam Mahrburg objects this way: it is not psychology that provides philosophy with objects but an inner experience. Psychology, on the other hand, provides philosophy with objects of study if these objects are understood as concepts, principles, and hypotheses of psychology, which can be studied by philosophy. Mahrburg agrees with Twardowski that philosophy cannot be scientific without a psychological basis but rejects the thesis that psychology is a philosophical science. He also emphasizes that without the possibility of theoretical elaboration of the content of images, concepts, and judgments given by introspection, neither philosophical nor any other sciences would be possible (Mahrburg 1897: 76, 78-79). Mahrburg’s objections seem valid.

⁴ I am leaving aside the question of the accuracy of such a definition of the philosophical sciences. It is only worth mentioning that, when defining the philosophical sciences and including psychology in them, Tadeusz Czeżowski does not refer to the notions of internal and external experience but to the common historical development of the philosophical sciences, their similarity in the treatment of issues, their content-related relationships, and their characteristic relation to other sciences (Czeżowski 1959: 224-225, 229). Galewicz points out that — following Twardowski’s path — metaphysics with natural sciences could be included among the sciences that deal exclusively with physical objects or also with physical objects (Galewicz 1999: XXVI).

view of philosophical sciences comes from the fact that descriptive psychology, as understood by Brentano, is for Twardowski the fundamental philosophical science (Brożek et al. 2020: 41), and the indispensable basis of psychology so understood is introspection. It is worth adding that logic — at least to some extent — is subject to psychology here, since logic examines, among other things, “the laws and rules of valuation” in terms of truth and falsity, and valuation itself is a mental process (Twardowski 1897: 60). However, even at that time, Twardowski was not willing to unreservedly consider logic as a part of psychology (Kleszcz 2013: 112, Rechlewicz 2015: 13), and later his antipsychologism concerning logic deepened. On the other hand, the recognition of the fundamental role of psychology in the totality of cognition is repeated in his statements, including later ones; for instance, one of them reads, “In psychology . . . all the threads connecting the various domains of human cognition converge into one whole . . .” (Twardowski 1913/1965: 271).⁵

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNAL EXPERIENCE

In his “O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju” [On Psychology, Its Object, Tasks, Method, Relation to Other Sciences, and Its Development] (1913/1965), Twardowski understands psychology as a science of mental life. Mental life consists of such mental actions as experiencing sensory impressions, recreating them in memory, reflecting, thinking, judging, comparing, distinguishing, doubting, abstracting, feeling pleasure and distress, desiring or rejecting, choosing, deciding. The components of mental life also include the products of mental actions: images, concepts, judgments, thoughts, ideas, intentions. Mental actions and products always occur together, forming concrete wholes — mental facts. Thus, psychology is the science of mental facts, or — following Brentano — of mental phenomena. Psychology also studies the conditions, or dispositions, that determine the appearance of mental facts. These are, for example, sensitivity, memory, imagination, intelligence, inclination, and will. Dispositions cannot be stated directly in the experience, but it is possible with many mental facts (Twardowski 1913/1965: 243-245).

⁵ In the cited text (Twardowski 1897), logic is to some extent subordinated to psychology with the reservations indicated above; later Twardowski is inclined to treat both sciences as having the same value, considering them both as basic philosophical sciences (Twardowski 1910: 55).

The method of psychology is essentially the same as the method of any empirical science, justifying its assertions by the data of experience. But some distinctness of the method of psychology is connected with the sources of knowledge of mental facts and the means of their investigation. The point is that the only source of direct knowledge of mental facts is an inner experience. Inner experience is different from outer experience. For example, we recognize colors by means of sight, but the seeing of color is given to us in an inner, non-sensual experience, through which we know that we recall something, think something, or want something. The non-sensuality of inner experience is combined with its self-evidence in the sense that what is given in it always exists; there is always a mental fact of which our consciousness speaks (for example, seeing color or experiencing distress), although we may be mistaken in its closer definition.⁶ In contrast, what is given in external experience — for instance, colors and voices — may fail to exist (Twardowski 1913/1965: 256-257, cf. Brentano 1924/1973: 14). Mental facts given in inner experience are available only to the individual experiencing them. However, the researcher of mental facts does not have to limit himself to the material drawn from his own mental life, because he can refer to sources of indirect cognition of someone else's mental life. These sources are other people's psycho-physical actions and products, which are the external expression of mental actions and products. These actions and products can be impermanent, and then they are signs of another's mental life (e.g., facial expressions, spoken words). On the other hand, they can also be permanent and can be called documents of mental life (e.g., letters, diaries). However, signs and documents of another's mental life are an indirect source of knowledge about mental facts; the only direct source is introspection (Twardowski 1913/1965: 256-258, cf. Brentano 1924/1973: 53-56). Consequently, one can speak of the subjective and objective methods in psychology. The former method occurs when knowledge of mental life is drawn from introspection; the latter method — when this knowledge is based on physical facts connected with mental ones. The subjective method is essential; the objective method is auxiliary. For without introspection, we would know nothing about mental life, just as we would not know the world of color without sight (Twardowski 1913/1965: 259-260).

⁶ Twardowski (1913/1965) does not elaborate on the issue of possible errors and misunderstandings in a closer description of mental phenomena learned through inner experience. His reservation, however, causes the cognitive value of inner experience to be differentiated: it depends on the type of experienced mental phenomenon (visual or auditory perception, etc.) and on what "component" of this phenomenon is meant (its existence, its qualitative endowment, etc.).

Observation — that is, a series of systematic and careful perceptions — cannot be applied to mental facts; it is possible only in relation to external experience. Mental facts proceed too quickly, and moreover, the attempt to observe them causes them to be banished from consciousness.⁷ For instance, when we experience anger, we cannot at the same time pay attention to that anger; when we reason, we cannot at the same time follow our reasoning. A thinking individual cannot break up into two individuals, one who thinks and the other who pays attention to that thinking. So self-observation is not possible, but only self-perception. In order to know mental facts more accurately, one can try to reconstruct them from memory and thus become aware of their course (e.g., one can recall what was going on inside us when we reasoned). But such a reconstruction cannot replace observation of mental facts and always more or less limps along, since memory does not reproduce past facts accurately enough.

The inability to observe mental facts can be compensated for, to some extent, by the experimental method. It consists in inducing mental facts under certain conditions to perceive them. The psychological experiment can thus be put down as evoked introspection. It allows one to remove to some extent the inaccuracy of memory reconstruction of mental facts. The greatest inaccuracy occurs after a single perception of a mental fact. In a psychological experiment, by contrast, a mental fact of a given kind is perceived and recalled many times, so that different properties of the fact can be perceived each time, thus obtaining its overall picture (Twardowski 1913/1965: 260-262).

Apart from these remarks, Twardowski does not compare the epistemic value of the three types of introspection mentioned: introspection as internal perception, introspection by retrospection, and introspection evoked.

The proponents of reducing psychology to physiology (e.g., Auguste Comte) argued that since the observation of mental facts is impossible, one should study the phenomena subject to observation — that is, physiological phenomena (cf. Twardowski 1897: 43, 46). Twardowski counterargued that in order to learn about psychic phenomena, it is enough to perceive them. It is true that observation makes perception more accurate, more confident, and therefore more valuable, but in relation to perception, it is something additional, inessential. If we did not perceive our mental phenomena, our knowledge about them would be incomprehensible. However, we know that we think about something, experience unpleasant and pleasant feelings, make resolutions, and this knowledge is not provided by our senses (Twardowski 1897: 47-48).

⁷ See section 4 below, which mentions some critics of this view (Kreutz 1962, Judycki 2002, 2004).

Some believe that psychology is part of physiology because, according to them, mental phenomena are a species of physiological phenomena. Twardowski refutes this rationale in the following way: 1) there is a fundamental difference between the physiological processes of the nervous system and spiritual manifestations since physiological functions occur in space, and the manifestations of mental life do not occupy space;⁸ 2) we learn about physiological phenomena through the senses and about mental manifestations through inner experience, through direct awareness of these manifestations. These two facts testify to the fundamental difference between mental phenomena and physiological processes, so the claim that the former are a species of the latter is unfounded (Twardowski 1897: 43-45).

According to some, psychology should be reduced to physiology because mental activities are brain functions. Twardowski states that if a function is understood as a quantity that changes with another quantity, then a mental activity is a function of the brain because specific changes in the brain entail changes in this mental activity. If, on the other hand, a function is understood as an activity, then the above thesis is not justified because it has not been proved that the brain performs all mental activities. Many circumstances speak against this assumption — for instance, the unity and continuity of mental life. Psychology would become part of physiology only if mental phenomena were brain functions in the second sense, which is not the case. Even if mental phenomena were merely the result of “brain mechanics and chemistry,” knowledge of the physiological brain functions would not replace inner experience; it would not make it possible to know mental facts (Twardowski 1897: 45-47). On the other hand, Twardowski acknowledged the need to include physiological, especially neurological, research in psychology. He believed that studying the relationships between physiological dispositions and mental dispositions and facts was necessary. However, the object of psychological research is not the stimuli that evoke sensory feelings nor the organs connected with these feelings (Twardowski 1913/1965: 244-245, 266-267).

Twardowski's opposition to reducing psychology to physiology is rooted in Brentano's analogous attitude. The author of *Psychology from an Empirical*

⁸ Brentano believes that the non-spatiality of psychological phenomena is not sufficient to distinguish them clearly from physical ones and is only a negative feature. Such a positive feature is, first of all, the intentionality of mental phenomena — their directedness towards a certain object. Physical phenomena do not have this feature (Brentano 1924/1973: 124-125). According to Mahrburg, one cannot categorically claim that spiritual functions have no extension in space because we have no knowledge in this regard. We only know that we cannot consider spiritual matters in spatial form (Mahrburg 1897: 74-75). Jerzy Bobryk makes a similar argument (Bobryk 2001: 70).

Standpoint assumes that brain processes exert an essential influence on mental phenomena and are their conditions. He also acknowledges that non-physiological psychology is of limited value and that empirical psychological laws established through psychological means require further explanation through physiological research. But, on the other hand, facts indicating the relation between mental and physical properties have been known for a long time and have been learned by way of inner experience. In this way, for example, Aristotle formulated theses concerning habits and dispositions, and Leibniz postulated the existence of unconscious representations; the psychological method thus owes the knowledge of its own deficiencies to itself, and not to the physiological method (Brentano 1924/1973: 66-67, 83-84, 88-89).⁹

According to Twardowski, the first task of psychology is to organize the factual material given in inner experience, including the inventory, analysis, and classification of this material. Preliminary clues in this regard are provided by human speech, which contains words denoting mental actions and products. These expressions group the material of psychology, but scientific inquiry must distinguish facts and dispositions in this material and differentiate between expressions denoting actions and those denoting products. The classification of facts and mental dispositions should be based on essential similarities and differences. It is made possible by an analysis, which decomposes complex facts into simpler ones and leads to the separation of elementary facts, which cannot be further decomposed. For example, the analysis of the mental product called "hope" separates in it successively: a) the thought about a particular event, b) the belief that its occurrence will cause a pleasant feeling, c) the assumption that the event will occur, d) a pleasant feeling (Twardowski 1913/1965: 250-251).

The second task of psychology is to formulate the laws of mental life. These are laws concerning mental facts, mental dispositions, and relations between facts and dispositions. By formulating these laws, psychology explains mental facts. A given mental fact can be considered explained if it can be subsumed under a general law; for instance, the occurrence of an image at a given moment will be explained if this fact can be considered a particular case of the general laws of reproducing specific images (Twardowski 1913/1965: 251-253).

⁹ It should be remembered that Brentano's views in this area evolved — and initially (e.g., in the so-called postdoctoral theses) he favored a naturalistic methodological monism, so he did not mind reducing psychology to physiology.

3. THE WAY OF REFERRING TO INNER EXPERIENCE IN TWARDOWSKI'S RESEARCH

Twardowski referred to introspection, among other works, in "Contemporary Philosophy on the Immortality of the Soul" (1895a), "Metaphysics of the Soul" (1895b), *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [Mental Images and Concepts] (1898), "Does Man Always Behave Egoistically?" (1899), "Przykład wpływu wyobrażeń słuchowych na wzrokowe" [An Example of the Influence of Auditory Mental Images on Visual Mental Images] (1927).

In the first text, Twardowski declares that the question of the immortality of the soul should be investigated using the inductive-deductive method. The successive stages of this investigation are: the inductive study of the properties of mental life, the formulation of general laws, and the derivation of conclusions from these laws by means of deduction. This method is the only scientific method of stating facts that cannot be stated through experience (Twardowski 1895a: 190-191). In order to apply this method to the question of the immortality of the soul, we must first describe the relevant mental phenomena that present themselves in inner experience. Through introspection, we know two facts: 1) the unity of our consciousness; we know that we relate all mental phenomena perceived at a given moment (e.g., the rumble of a passing cart and the letters we see in front of us) to our one and only self; 2) the identity of our self — each person considers himself to be the same person (the same self) he was at every past moment of his life.

On these two facts there is an agreement, but the dispute is over the nature of the self. Some believe that the self exists and is distinct from mental phenomena. Others reject its existence and believe that "the self" (or "I") is a name for a particular group of mental phenomena covered by consciousness and memory, as Gustav Fechner, for example, believes. The divergence of views on this question results from the difference of views on the metaphysical question: is there any substance beyond the phenomena given in experience; something that is not perceived but forms the basis of phenomena? (Twardowski 1895a: 191-192).

Twardowski thinks that Fechner, in rejecting the existence of the self, did not correctly justify his position. However, it is possible that this position is correct because the lack of proof cannot be taken as a sign of falsity. Twardowski declares that for him the self exists, but he is unable to give any proof of this existence, because it belongs to the directly evident truths that cannot and do not have to be proved (Twardowski 1895b: 198).

Despite this declaration, Twardowski attempts to show the absurdity of the claim that the self is a group of mental phenomena. Considering that some group of mental phenomena recognizes these phenomena as their own on the basis of an internal perception leads to absurdity in the following way. Perception P1, which classifies the mental phenomena M into the same group, requires another perception P2 that will classify the phenomena M and P1 into one group. But then perception P3 must follow, putting P1, P2, and M into the same group, and so on *ad infinitum*. Suppose this group recognizes mental phenomena as its own on the basis of the first internal observation. So the group of mental phenomena learns from one of them that this group consists of a certain number of phenomena — for instance, ten mental phenomena learn about something. Does this understanding occur once or ten times? It can be assumed that once, and for each of the ten phenomena there is a part of understanding. But how do the ten phenomena know that these parts of the understanding are one whole? It would require some additional, second knowledge, and this second knowledge a third, and so on *ad infinitum* (Twardowski 1895b: 199-201).¹⁰

So the self exists not as a group of mental phenomena, Twardowski concludes, but as a subject from which these phenomena emerge. But on the other hand, he repeats once again that “inner experience does not reveal the subject to us; we only perceive phenomena . . .” (Twardowski 1895b: 202). Twardowski’s position seems inconsistent because he states that the existence of the self is a self-evident truth in the same text. However, it is difficult to understand why the conviction about the existence of the self should be a self-evident truth if it does not result from inner experience or is not an analytical judgment (cf. Twardowski 1892: 28).

In any case, Twardowski recognizes that the subject exists, is characterized by identity and by unity of consciousness. However, an inference is necessary to establish further characteristics of the subject. On the basis of inference, one can assume that the subject of mental phenomena has the feature of unity; that it is single, indivisible. For when, for example, we compare two objects, the part of the subject that compares must “possess” both objects; the subject of the phenomena compared must be identical with the subject of comparison (Twardowski 1895b: 202-204).¹¹ Since the subject of mental

¹⁰ The point of the second argument seems to be this: knowledge of the unity of mental phenomena cannot arise from any single mental phenomenon. At most, both arguments show that the unity of multiple mental phenomena cannot arise from inner perception.

¹¹ It seems that the “unity of consciousness” previously recognized as a fact given in inner experience, here is the object of inference. For it seems that “the subject of mental phenomena” is the same as “consciousness” or “awareness of mental phenomena.”

phenomena is indivisible, it is the ultimate element in the world of mental phenomena, just as atoms are the ultimate elements in the world of sensory phenomena. Scientific analysis cannot explain the emergence and the disappearance of these indivisible elements, so it assumes that they are eternal and asserts nothing about their cause. Human reason recognizes that only God can exist without a cause. Since natural forces do not create indivisible elements, God created them. So human souls are eternal and created by God (Twardowski 1895b: 206).

There are three steps in the argumentation, which Twardowski himself mentions. The first one is based on inner experience and allows us to state the facts of unity and identity of the subject. Step two is the reasoning leading to the thesis of the indivisibility of the subject, referring to specific facts of inner experience but going beyond these facts. In step three, one arrives solely by reasoning at the conviction that the subject is the ultimate element in the world of mental phenomena, and is, therefore, eternal and created by God. The difficulties associated with steps one and two were indicated above: it seems that Twardowski hesitates as to how to justify the claim of the existence of a subject of mental phenomena since he appeals both to self-evidence and reasoning. At the same time, he admits that inner experience speaks only of mental phenomena. The third step also seems doubtful – the thesis that if something is simple, it is eternal and created by supernatural forces, is not justified (Brożek 2009: 24).

The considerations contained in the extensive treatise *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [Mental Images and Concepts] (1898)¹² start from the facts of inner experience – for instance, from the fact that some things can be represented through mental images, while others can be represented only by concepts. Twardowski points out that this fact is generally acknowledged, but when researchers try to discover the essence of concepts, their paths diverge. Twardowski's goal is to formulate a general theory of concepts that would encompass all their types and could reconcile existing more detailed theories (Twardowski 1898: 1-5). An essential place in the dissertation is occupied by the terminological arrangements relating to factual material. Twardowski divides representations into mental images and concepts, and mental images into perceptual, reproductive, and creative. Twardowski defines a mental image as a synthesis of impressions and notes that such a definition does not contradict the established facts of psychology and unites in one natural class the perceptual, reproductive, and creative mental images (Twardowski 1898: 25; 1995: 88).

¹² A part of the text (paragraphs 1, 3-10) has been translated as “Imageries” (Twardowski 1995).

These words testify that Twardowski aims to draw a boundary between mental facts and a theory based on them, similarly as in the case of the “Metaphysics of the Soul.” The central thesis of Twardowski’s theory of concepts can be put this way: a concept is a representation of an object that consists of a mental image of a similar object — a so-called substrate image (*wyobrażenie podkładowe*) — and one or more imagined judgments referring to the substrate image (Twardowski 1898: 75-76). Twardowski emphasizes that in this way a concept is reduced to a complex of mental images. Thus the unexplored phenomenon is reduced to known phenomena, which is the goal of every study of phenomena (Twardowski 1898: 76).

Regardless of possible objections to Twardowski’s theory of concepts,¹³ he implements in his dissertation what he considered to be the fundamental task of psychology: he describes a specific class of mental phenomena, differentiates the types of these phenomena, and then seeks their explanation.

In his “Does Man Always Behave Egoistically?” (1899), Twardowski refers to inner experience to undermine psychological hedonism — that is, the view that man seeks satisfaction or avoids dissatisfaction in every act. Twardowski’s argument is as follows: when someone aims to achieve satisfaction, it is the goal of his behavior. If something is the goal of an action, it must be thought about at the time of the decision of the action. But we know from our inner experience that when we decide to do something, we often do not think about satisfaction but aim for something else (although in such cases, in addition to achieving the goal, we may also be satisfied). Thus, the thesis of psychological hedonism is contradicted by specific mental facts (Twardowski 1899: 325). Twardowski’s argument is accurate if it is assumed that in such cases there are no unconscious motives for action.

In “Przykład wpływu wyobrażeń słuchowych na wzrokowe” [An Example of the Influence of Auditory Mental Images on Visual Mental Images] (1927),¹⁴ Twardowski starts from the assumption that the auditory length of an expression (i.e., the time it is uttered) is associated with an appropriate visual length (i.e., the length of the line in which the expression is written). To confirm the accuracy of this assumption, Twardowski conducted an experimental study in which five people participated. To do this, he collected pairs of words of unequal auditory length but the same visual length, and these pairs were presented in different ways to subjects who were asked to judge the ratio of auditory to visual length. Twardowski obtained a total of 900 responses,

¹³ Critical discussions of Twardowski’s theory of concepts can be found, among others, in (Jadacki 1989), (Rechlewicz 2015).

¹⁴ This text was based on a lecture given by Twardowski at the first Polish Philosophical Congress (1923). There is no English translation.

which judged correctly or incorrectly the ratio of the two types of length. Erroneous expected judgments (consistent with the initial hypothesis) assigned a greater visual length in a word pair to a word with a greater auditory length or a lesser visual length to a word with a lesser auditory length. In contrast, unexpected misjudgments (inconsistent with the initial hypothesis) assigned a greater visual length to a word with a lesser auditory length or a lesser visual length to a word with a greater auditory length. There were 38% incorrect expected judgments and 8% incorrect unexpected judgments. These results demonstrate, according to Twardowski, the accuracy of the initial assumption (Twardowski 1927: 309-310). This study was an example of performing one of the tasks that Twardowski ascribed to psychology — the inductive study of the laws of association. Generalizing the above examples, it can be said that introspection played various functions in Twardowski's philosophical research: 1) as a falsifier of metaphysical and ethical theses (the description of the facts of the self, possible only thanks to introspection, excludes certain positions — e.g., in the case of the issue of the immortality of the soul or the exclusively egoistic motivation of human activity); 2) as a verifier of terminological distinctions (introspection allows to distinguish concepts of various types); and 3) as a verifier of important psychological hypotheses (e.g., in the case of the perceived length of linguistic expressions).

4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIEWS ON INTROSPECTION IN TWARDOWSKI'S SCHOOL

Twardowski contributed to the establishment of Polish psychological nomenclature, especially regarding concepts such as impression, mental image, perception, representation, abstraction, and mental disposition (Rzepa 2016: 93). He also created an environment of researchers influenced by his views on the essence and methods of psychology. Hence, one can speak of the psychological Lvov School, which includes, among others, Władysław Witwicki, Stefan Baley, Stefan Błachowski, Mieczysław Kreutz, Walter Auerbach, Eugenia Blaustein, Leopold Blaustein, Bronisław Biegeleisen-Żelazowski, Salomon Igel, Helena Słoniewska, Andrzej Lewicki, Tadeusz Tomaszewski (Rzepa 2016: 95-96, 104-105, Woleński 1985: 338-339).

Twardowski's views on introspection were developed by Mieczysław Kreutz. He distinguishes four stages in the introspective method: 1) the person using this method must experience a mental phenomenon; 2) he must pay attention to the processes he wants to study; 3) he must learn about these

processes, name them, and make judgments about them; 4) more judgments about these processes must be gathered, especially through the introspective testimony of other people, and then developed according to the guidelines of logic and general methodology (Kreutz 1962: 27). The second component of introspection can be an obstacle because people tend to live in an extrospective attitude. Sometimes, paying attention to mental processes — *pace* Twardowski — can occur simultaneously with them and not cause them to be banished from consciousness. This happens, for example, when I direct my attention to my toothache.¹⁵ Thus, alongside introspection from memory, there is simultaneous introspection (Kreutz 1962: 28-29).

The self-evidence of mental facts is understood by Kreutz as follows. We know that a particular phenomenon has occurred in our consciousness, and the judgment about it can be taken for granted. But it is not self-evident how this phenomenon should be named or defined (Kreutz 1962: 32). Judgments based on introspection are accused of being unverifiable. But only single introspective judgments are unverifiable, and such judgments are not the goal of science, its goal are general laws for which single judgments are merely the starting material. And general laws can be tested (Kreutz 1962: 41-46). Introspection is also accused of being unproductive and vague in its results. Kreutz admits that the results of using introspection so far are indeed unsatisfactory. However, this is due to the very object of study, which is difficult to grasp, and to a faulty application of introspection (for example, researchers have often relied on literary descriptions or conjectures). Introspection, though it is a fundamental method of psychology, should nevertheless be applied to mental phenomena that are clear and easily recognizable (Kreutz 1962: 53-56, 59-60).

According to Bartłomiej Dobroczyński, however, Kreutz was defending an obsolete paradigm based on the conviction of man's privileged access to his own mind (Dobroczyński 2013: 156, 158). This paradigm has been challenged primarily by arguments from objective psychology (behaviorism and neobehaviorism). These arguments indicated that introspective knowledge comes at least in part from inference and that the individual cannot describe the events occurring within him or her as precisely as the events of the external world. Dobroczyński, therefore, believes that defending introspection in its classical sense is promoting a kind of illusion (Dobroczyński 2013: 163).

¹⁵ Stanisław Judycki presents an argumentation against the radical rejection of the possibility of internal observation. He argues that consciousness can smoothly transit from pre-introspective awareness to a state modified by attention, which, moreover, need not alter introspective data (Judycki 2002: 281-284, cf. Judycki 2004: 87-90).

CONCLUSION

Twardowski's views on introspection are largely historical in nature. They were characteristic of a stage of inquiry at which the influence of language and prior knowledge on introspective judgments had not yet been taken into account, nor had the varieties of the subject's privileged access to his own mind been clearly distinguished.¹⁶ However, we have to do justice to Twardowski: speaking of the mutual dependence of language and thinking, he must have been aware of the influence of linguistic categorization of the world on the results of introspection, also still un verbalized. All the same, Twardowski's claims relating to inner experience were quite general — such was the claim that introspection is characterized by obviousness in the sense that what is given in it certainly exists. And yet we can doubt whether our conscious experiences are what they seem to us just as much as we doubt whether the world is what it seems to us (Ziemińska 2020: 100). Twardowski did not refer to the varieties of privileged access mentioned above and essentially subscribed to the classical Cartesian model of epistemic perfection of inner experience.¹⁷ Although he stated that one can be mistaken in defining and describing mental phenomena more accurately, he did not develop this thread.

Introspectionism as the view that the method of introspection is the main method of psychology is probably a thing of the past. As Dobroczyński points out, introspection in its historical incarnations was something different from what is now referred to in psychology as self-descriptive reports based on inference rather than direct experience. It is the abandonment of traditional introspection that has opened new and prolific horizons for psychology. On the other hand, self-descriptive claims can provide useful research data (Dobroczyński 2013: 156).

Despite all possible objections to introspection, it seems inevitable in philosophical research. Philosophers of mind often believe that claims about consciousness, free will, personal identity, beliefs, etc. have introspective consequences or are introspectively verifiable (Schwitzgebel 2019). It seems that a reference to introspection is necessary, for example, in Renata Ziemińska's

¹⁶ As Eric Schwitzgebel says, one can assume that people have some kind of privileged access to at least some of their mental states — e.g., that they know their own pain better than the pain of someone else. But because of the multiplicity of methods for acquiring such knowledge, there are diversity of forms of privileged access. These are: infallibility, indubitability, incorrigibility, and self-intimacy (Schwitzgebel 2019).

¹⁷ As Ziemińska points out, a similar approach was taken by Twardowski's student Izydora Dąmbska, who regarded the contents of consciousness as indubitable (Ziemińska 2016: 523-524).

considerations on pre-reflective and reflective self-consciousness.¹⁸ As Ziemińska writes, we know about the existence and contents of pre-reflective self-consciousness thanks to the ability to reflect (Ziemińska 2020: 94, cf. Ziemińska 2004: 89). Moreover, when we state that pre-reflective self-consciousness is elusive in the current phase, not susceptible to thematization, and intertwined with reflective self-consciousness (such features are mentioned by Ziemińska), it seems that we do so on the basis of introspection. It may be recognized that philosophers who study the nature of introspection (its varieties, epistemic value, limitations) cannot avoid making statements that are derived from, verified by, or have implications for introspection. If so, then at least to some extent and in some sense, they recognize the significant cognitive value of introspection, although no one seems to attribute cognitive perfection to it anymore. Thus, it can be assumed that descriptive psychology, favored by Kazimierz Twardowski, can still play a significant role in philosophical research.

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¹⁸ A person looking at the window is at the same time aware of herself or himself as perceiving the window. These contents are experienced consciously, but peripherally, and form a pre-reflective self-consciousness. The question "What are you doing?" can be answered by the person on the basis of the material gathered by pre-reflective self-consciousness. But the use of this material will take the form of reflective self-consciousness (Ziemińska 2020: 96).

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