

PROCEEDINGS OF THE EENPS 2018 CONFERENCE
IN BRATISLAVA
INTRODUCTION

The first part of this issue brings together five selected papers presented at the second biannual conference of the East European Network for the Philosophy of Science (EENPS 2018). The conference took place in Bratislava on June 20-22, 2018, and, like the previous inaugural conference EENPS 2016 in Sofia (June 24-26, 2016), it proved to be quite successful, given that it gathered many high-quality participants from all over the world.

Many interesting topics in the philosophy of science were discussed during the conference. Some talks were about general philosophy of science, while others focused on more specific issues. Below we provide a brief overview of the selected papers.

In “Examining the Structured Uses of Concepts as Tools: Converging Insights,” Eden Smith argues that the examination of the historical development of scientific concepts sheds light on current experimental practices in which they are used. Smith’s research is focused on two specific concepts — mental imagery and hallucination — that are used in neuroimaging experiments.

In “The Mathematical Explanation as Part of an (Im)perfect Scientific Explanation,” Vladimir Drekalović examines Alan Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument, according to which mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science and therefore should be taken as real. Drekalović addresses two well known cases: the life cycles of cicadas and the Königsberg bridge problem, and argues that the latter is a more convincing example of mathematical explanation in science than the former.

In “Methodological Pluralism in Economics: The ‘Why’ and ‘How’ of Causal Inferences,” Mariusz Maziarz argues for methodological pluralism in economics, according to which economists use different research methods and construct

different models of the same phenomena following different major methodological schools from philosophy of economics. He develops his view by analyzing several examples that can be found in recent economic literature.

In “Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: Good Examples Still to Be Found,” Duško Prelević argues that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is not really supported by relevant examples from science. He is particularly focused on Yafeng Shan’s recently proposed example of the early Mendelian genetics, which is purported to justify the exemplar-based account of incommensurability, and argues that a more plausible interpretation of the very example is available, such that does not support the Kuhnian view of scientific change.

In “Philosophy of Science in Russia: The St. Petersburg Philosophical Society (1897-1923),” Elena Sinelnikova depicts in detail the activities of the St. Petersburg Philosophical Society during its historical existence. She emphasizes its important contribution to the development and institutionalization of Russian philosophy as well as the role of its members, of whom many were renowned representatives of various fields of science, in promoting interdisciplinary research.

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