Struktury uzasadniania. Część I. Infinityzm i koherentyzm

Jacek Ziobrowski

doi:10.14394/filnau.2018.0004

Autor

Jacek Ziobrowski Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0004

Słowa kluczowe:

structure of justification, regress problem, regress arguments, infinitism, coherentism

Abstrakt

This paper is the first part of a series of articles about the structure of justification. I outline the so-called infinite regress problem and focus on three corresponding positions: skepticism (concerning justification), infinitism, and coherentism. Skepticism found its expression in Agrippa’s trilemma. Infinitism has been developed by Peter Klein and Scott Aikin. Coherentism is (primarily) discussed in its holistic version. I present different concepts of coherence and coherent justification, point out the main objections to coherentism and some ways to rebut them. General considerations concerning coherentism are illustrated by solutions included in the theories of Laurence BonJour and Thomas Bartelborth.

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